- 1 International Criminal Court
- 2 Trial Chamber V
- 3 Situation: Central African Republic II
- 4 In the case of The Prosecutor v. Alfred Rombhot Yekatom and Patrice-Edouard
- 5 Ngaïssona ICC-01/14-01/18
- 6 Presiding Judge Bertram Schmitt, Judge Péter Kovács and
- 7 Judge Chang-ho Chung
- 8 Trial Hearing Courtroom 1
- 9 Monday, 14 March 2022
- 10 (The hearing starts in open session at 9.30 a.m.)
- 11 THE COURT USHER: [9:30:45] All rise.
- 12 The International Criminal Court is now in session.
- 13 Please be seated.
- 14 PRESIDING JUDGE SCHMITT: [9:31:06] Good morning, everyone.
- 15 Court officer, please call the case.
- 16 THE COURT OFFICER: [9:31:13] Good morning, Mr President, your Honours.
- 17 Situation in the Central African Republic II, in the case of The Prosecutor versus
- 18 Alfred Yekatom and Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona, case reference ICC-01/14-01/18.
- 19 And for the record, we are in open session.
- 20 PRESIDING JUDGE SCHMITT: [9:31:29] Thank you.
- 21 I ask for the appearance of the parties.
- 22 Not so many names today, Ms Struyven.
- 23 MS STRUYVEN: [9:31:38] No, exactly. Good morning, your Honours. Today we
- 24 have Sylvie Wakchom and myself, Olivia Struyven.
- 25 PRESIDING JUDGE SCHMITT: [9:31:43] Thank you.

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- 1 I turn to Mr Fall, representative of the victims.
- 2 MR FALL: [9:31:49](Interpretation) Thank you, Mr President. The victims of the
- 3 other crimes are represented today by Madam Ombeni and myself, Yaré Fall. Thank

4 you.

- 5 PRESIDING JUDGE SCHMITT: [9:31:59] Mr Suprun.
- 6 MR SUPRUN: [9:32:02] Good morning, Mr President, your Honours. The former
- 7 child soldiers are represented by myself, Dmytro Suprun, counsel at the Office of
- 8 Public Counsel for Victims. Thank you.
- 9 PRESIDING JUDGE SCHMITT: [9:32:11] Thank you.
- 10 I turn to the Defence.
- 11 Mr -- oh, yeah. No preference.
- 12 MS GUISSÉ: [9:32:15](Interpretation) Thank you, Mr President. Mr Yekatom is
- 13 present in the house. He is assisted by Gyo Suzuki actually and myself
- 14 Madam -- there's Madam Dimitri and myself. I am Anta Guissé.
- 15 PRESIDING JUDGE SCHMITT: [9:32:44] Thank you.
- 16 Mr Knoops, please.
- 17 MR KNOOPS: [9:32:49] Good morning, Mr President, your Honours. Good
- 18 morning, everyone in the courtroom.
- 19 Mr Patrice Ngaïssona is appearing with the following members of his Defence team
- 20 today, Ms Marie-Hélène Proulx, Ms Chiara Giudici, Ms Sara Pedroso, Ms Alexandre
- 21 Desevedavy. And Mr Landry is following the proceedings from the field office.
- 22 Thank you.
- 23 PRESIDING JUDGE SCHMITT: [9:33:13] Thank you very much.
- 24 And of course most importantly, good morning and welcome to Mr Witness at the
- 25 video-link location. The Chamber hopes that you had a good weekend.

- 1 WITNESS: CAR-OTP-P-0889 (On former oath)
- 2 (The witness speaks French)
- 3 (The witness gives evidence via video link)
- 4 THE WITNESS: [9:33:32](Interpretation) Good morning, everyone. Good morning,
- 5 the judges. Good morning, Mr President. I had a good weekend. Thank you.
- 6 PRESIDING JUDGE SCHMITT: [9:33:46] That sounds promising. And with that
- 7 good start, so to speak, I give the floor to Ms Proulx.
- 8 MS PROULX: [9:34:03] Thank you, Mr President.
- 9 QUESTIONED BY MS PROULX: (Continuing) (Interpretation)
- 10 Q. [9:34:09] Good morning, Mr Witness.
- 11 A. [9:34:14] Good morning, Counsel.
- 12 Q. [9:34:17] I would like to come back briefly on a question that was put to you last
- 13 week by my learned friend of the OTP. She talked about your mobile phone which
- 14 had been seized, if I'm not mistaken, in June 2020.
- 15 Now, do you remember about how long you had this phone in your possession
- 16 before it was seized?
- A. [9:34:54] The phone that was seized, I had -- I had had it for about one and a half
 years to two years.
- 19 Now, regarding my Facebook account, I have a Facebook account that I have been
- 20 using for a very, very long time. And I think I created that FB account in 2009 or '10
- 21 and it is the same one I am using till today.
- 22 The telephone, I had not used it for a long time before being -- it being seized.
- 23 Q. [9:35:57] I would like to show you a document, 91 in the Defence list.
- 24 Please show it to the witness but not to the public. It is CAR-D30-0009-0003.
- 25 And it is a document that gives us some information on your telephone which was

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1 seized. I am waiting for it to be displayed and then I will continue.

2 Can you scroll down a little bit. Yes, okay that's perfect.

3 Now you can see, Mr Witness, that this document is your telephone. It is -- it is

4 written "IMEI", and that is your phone number, and the same number appears on the

5 OTP list with your contacts.

6 A. [9:37:23] I cannot see clearly the image on the screen, please.

Q. [9:37:33] Maybe it can be enlarged a little bit, please, and then scroll down. Yes,
8 perfect.

9 Now, Mr Witness, does this document indicate that that document -- or, rather, that

10 telephone was fabricated or made on 4 July 2019? That means you had it for -- for

11 one year. So you had it for a very short amount of time.

12 A. [9:38:13] Yes, I had it for a very short amount of time. And I still have the13 contract.

14 Q. [9:38:30] Do you remember that last week you confirmed the names of some of

15 your contacts. I don't want to necessarily ask you to look at the numbers and

16 confirm the numbers, neither the period for which the number was active.

17 Now am I correct to believe that the contacts that were extracted from your telephone

18 in 2020 included older numbers that might have been compared -- copied from your

19 former telephones, but also contains numbers that you acquired in 2020?

20 A. [9:39:21] Yes, that is correct what you are saying. There are numbers that are

21 copied from older telephones. So this is not my number, but I have a Google account

22 that has a list of my numbers. So I still have those numbers all the time. So there

are old numbers and then new numbers that I added to my phone list.

24 Q. [9:40:03] Thank you.

25 I will come back to something else that was mentioned last week, but I would like for

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- 1 that to go into private session.
- 2 PRESIDING JUDGE SCHMITT: [9:40:18] Private session.
- 3 (Private session at 9.40 a.m.)
- 4 THE COURT OFFICER: [9:40:33] We are in private session, Mr President.
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(Open Session)

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- 1 (Redacted)
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- 4 (Open session at 10.01 a.m.)
- 5 THE COURT OFFICER: [10:01:10] We are back in open session, Mr President.
- 6 MS PROULX: [10:01:17] (Interpretation)

7 Q. [10:01:21] Witness, I would now like to talk about the creation of Anti-Balaka

8 self-defence groups. In your statement, you mention that they were made up of

9 youth from each village because of the violence from the Seleka, and so they

10 mobilised themselves and regrouped in order to defend themselves and to get back

11 peace.

Now, as far as you know, were these groups set up spontaneously in the villages andwere they independent of each other?

A. [10:02:05] The Anti-Balaka group, one may say, was one where no one actually
asked the young people to organise themselves and to be mobilised. As far as I
know, no one did so.

You see, we were all in the Central African Republic, and what was happening to the country or in the country at the time is that the population found itself in a very, very delicate position. There was no army in place, no gendarmerie. The army at the time was the Seleka coalition and the gendarmes. And that's what it was.

21 So because of the abuses and excesses committed on the population, there was really

22 no -- not -- in Bangui there was, how do I put it? There was no one who could arise

and say that they are protecting their particular sector in Bangui. No.

24 But in the provinces, a number of young persons living in the provinces, some

25 hunters whose job was to go hunt animals in the forest, in the bush, wild animals,

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there were also farmers, some of whom had -- had machetes -- and by the way, to be
specific, when we talk about machetes, it is not the same as what you may have in
Europe where you can't find a machete in your house. When it comes to a machete
or machetes, each Central African has a machete or two in the hinterland at home
because that's what we use for our farms. We need to clear the farms of bad weed or
grass.

And so young people in the villages got mobilised using the available resources like
machetes, arrows, and hunting guns called the Mbadika (phon). Because in our area
the villagers themselves manufactured their own hunting guns by themselves.
So even before the Seleka arrived, the inhabitants in the provinces in Central Africa
were already able to produce and manufacture their own hunting guns which they

12 used for hunting.

So because they already had those weapons in the hinterland, it was thus possible for villagers to organise themselves into the Anti-Balaka in order to defend themselves using their hunting tools, using their farming tools. And that is how gradually the others in other villages began to be motivated to defend themselves because of what was happening in other villages, using the same resources that they had within their villages. And that's how the movement began to expand in the hinterland.

Q. [10:05:37] Mr Witness, would you agree that these self-defence groups at the
time of their creation did not have a political motive, for example, attempting to bring
back François Bozizé to power?

A. [10:05:54] No. There was no political project in place. The organisation's
main goal was simply to restore peace, calm, freedom of movement, and an ability to
go about one's business. There was no political project behind all this.

25 Q. [10:06:29] Some time ago some witnesses here testified, and who were part of

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| 1 | the Anti-Balaka at the time, before the advance on Bangui. I'm referring specifically |
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| 2 | to Witness *P-2251 and P-1521. Well, these witnesses described movements that |
| 3 | were disorganised, as disorganised without a command chain. And I was referring |
| 4 | to P-0025 51 and so their testimony was that the chiefs or leaders in the bush were |
| 5 | all equal to each other. And so Konaté had no chief as such as Andjilo. |
| 6 | So it dovetails with what you have said, namely, that at the time of the organisation of |
| 7 | the Anti-Balaka, there was really no structure in place as the leaders emerged |
| 8 | individually. |
| 9 | Do you agree with that? |
| 10 | A. [10:07:31] Yes, I agree with you. |
| 11 | Q. [10:07:35] I mentioned Andjilo and I have a question about him. Do you know |
| 12 | how and why Andjilo joined the Anti-Balaka? |
| 13 | A. [10:07:59] Andjilo joined the Anti-Balaka for the same reason as the other young |
| 14 | people in all the villages or in each village that mobilised itself to defend itself. |
| 15 | Andjilo is a native of a village. He used to live in a village in Bouca. That is |
| 16 | between Bouca and Batangafo. His village also came under attack and experienced |
| 17 | the same violence committed against them. So Andjilo, therefore, was obliged to |
| 18 | defend his village. And that is how it was. By defending his village, he took back |
| 19 | control of almost his entire village, Andjilo. |
| 20 | Q. [10:08:52] I put this question to you because a witness told us that Andjilo had |
| 21 | been recruited by a delegation. First of all, a first delegation had been led by |
| 22 | Charles by Richard Bejouane and then a second was also led by Konaté and that the |
| 23 | two delegations had been sent by Ngaïssona. Have you ever heard of this? |
| 24 | A. [10:09:22](Overlapping speakers) |
| 25 | PRESIDING JUDGE SCHMITT: [10:09:25] A moment, please, before you answer, |

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(Open Session)

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- 1 please.
- 2 Ms Struyven, you wanted to say something.

3 MS STRUYVEN: [10:09:34] Yes, because I don't think that this witness can testify

- 4 about how another individual in a totally different region actually residing in a
- 5 different country at the time, how he was recruited, what conversations he had with
- 6 whom. I don't think there is any foundation to ask these type of questions to this7 witness.
- 8 MS PROULX: [10:09:51] If I may.
- 9 PRESIDING JUDGE SCHMITT: [10:09:52] Yeah.

10 MS PROULX: [10:09:53] The witness in his -- in his interview with the Office of the

11 Prosecutor was asked such questions about what was happening in the bush at the

12 time.

13 PRESIDING JUDGE SCHMITT: [10:10:01] Yeah.

14 MS PROULX: [10:10:04] I think it's only fair that I can explore the same.

15 PRESIDING JUDGE SCHMITT: [10:10:08] Absolutely. No, no, I agree with you,

16 but on the other hand, if you don't do it, I would ask the witness where he has his

17 information from. So, you know, people sometimes hear only things. People, as I

18 said, sometimes it's hearsay. Sometimes even only on the radio. Other times you

19 have personal connections to people who know the person we are talking about.

20 And best of course if you have talked with the person we are talking about.

21 Yes, Ms Struyven.

22 MS STRUYVEN: [10:10:38] If I may add, Mr President, we just tried to -- my

colleague just tried to establish a timeline that brought us in October 2013, whereas

24 we also know that the recruitment efforts took place much earlier. So if she can then

also clarify with the witness whether he heard information after the facts or as it was

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1 ongoing.

2 PRESIDING JUDGE SCHMITT: [10:10:54] Well, what we know is of course the
3 question and I would not want to subscribe to that without further investigating it or

4 looking into it.

5 But it's, of course, Ms Proulx, it's best I think if you have such a line of questioning

6 about certain person, if perhaps you first ask, you have of course heard of the person,

7 any information about that. Because it might have in the end not such a lot of

8 probative value. It might turn -- I don't know. Perhaps he knows. The witness is

9 an intelligent person, perhaps he has immediate information about that. But

10 perhaps we do that. And it would also shorten the whole thing a little bit. Thank

11 you.

12 MS PROULX: [10:11:53](Interpretation)

Q. [10:11:54] Mr Witness, could you clarify the source of your information on the
reasons that pushed Andjilo to join the Anti-Balaka.

15 [10:12:09] In my statement, I stated that whether it be Andjilo or Richard A. 16 Bejouane or any other Anti-Balaka, I want to specify that at that time Konaté was not 17 with them. And I got my information from someone whose name I provided and 18 who somehow transformed the idea of defending villages by the Anti-Balaka. And I 19 got that information from him. And mindful of the ideas that were put in place, it is 20 that person who somehow ran aground, so to speak, the idea of the Anti-Balaka to 21 defend their villages. Because without that person's actions, the Anti-Balaka or the 22 Andjilo, as we know them today, would not have gone to Bangui to fight the Seleka in 23 the capital. Without him, the Bejouanes or the Hippolytes and all the others would 24 not have found themselves in Bangui.

25 It is in relation to that person that Andjilo and the others ended up in Bangui.

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| Because at that time he was not in contact with him and they remained in their |
|--|
| various places. But when he succeeded to contact these people, that is when he |
| asked for the unification of the groups and asked this group from this village to link |
| up with this village in order to help them take back their village. And that's how |
| they did from the beginning and were able to recover a number of groups as they |
| went on from village to village. And then ultimately, he asked these groups that had |
| already recovered the villages to now come and free the people in in Bangui. |
| So based on this idea of liberating the people, it is from there that the concept of |
| taking over power emerged. Because you see, you could not be liberating Bangui |
| and taking over power at the same time. |
| I also told you that I was able to hear some of the telephone conversations. |
| PRESIDING JUDGE SCHMITT: [10:14:50] For the record, I think it would be good if |
| you would say which person you speak of, which person you mean when you say |
| someone was, let's say, induced or helped these people go to Bangui. |
| If you want to do that in private session, we can go to private session. |
| Private session, shortly. |
| THE WITNESS: [10:15:32](No interpretation) |
| (Private session at 10.15 a.m.) |
| THE COURT OFFICER: [10:15:35] We are in private session, Mr President. |
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| Trial Hearing | | | |
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- 13 (Open session at 10.33 a.m.)
- 14 THE COURT OFFICER: [10:33:55] We are in open session, Mr President.
- 15 MS PROULX: [10:34:01](Interpretation)
- 16 Q. [10:34:02] Mr Witness, do you agree with me, if you know, that it was that lack
- 17 of ammunition and equipment that prompted the Anti-Balaka to have to retreat
- 18 during the attack of 5 December?
- 19 A. [10:34:23] Yes, I agree with you.
- 20 Q. [10:34:29] You said in your statement that 12 Puissances was in Boy-Rabe when
- 21 the attack of 5 December was launched and that he arrived before the others in
- 22 Bangui.
- 23 Can you help us, because we received information from another witness telling us
- 24 that 12 Puissances did not participate in the 5 December attack because he and his
- 25 group had gotten lost on the way. So can you tell us anything about that

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1 information.

A. [10:35:15] The information that I received was that he was the one who was the
first to arrive behind the hill. Not Boy-Rabe. So the -- behind the *colline* is
not -- behind the hill is not the same thing as Boy-Rabe.

5 So in the attack of the 5th, he may not have found his way, but I know that he arrived

6 behind the hill in Boy-Rabe before the others. He was the first to arrive and he also

7 had many elements.

8 So he was fighting and he -- he lost his way. Maybe when he left the hill he lost his

9 way. Because the -- you didn't have direct roads to go up and down and travel

10 where you wanted to go. That is -- that is it.

11 Q. [10:36:27] Now, during your interview with the OTP, you stated that on

12 5 December, as far as you know, it was calm in the hinterland or the rural areas. So

13 did you talk of any attacks that might have taken place on that day?

14 A. [10:36:54] As I have told you, I got my information from some person, from an

15 individual, and if that person is occupied in the capital, then I do not know what is

16 happening in the hinterland. *So if he tells me about what is happening, then I will

17 know. But if he doesn't tell me, I will never know what is going on there.

18 Q. [10:37:25] *Thank you. Now let us go back a little.

19 Now let us go back a lit bit, that is, the period between the attack of 5 December and

20 the return of Ngaïssona to Bangui. Now, *the few following days or weeks of the

21 attack, the people who were the leaders in -- of the Anti-Balaka, they auto-proclaimed

22 themselves as the ComZones in the neighbourhoods of Bangui; is that correct?

23 A. [10:38:05] Yes.

Q. [10:38:07] So these chiefs just took over neighbourhoods that had been captured
by -- from the Seleka; is that correct?

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1 A. [10:38:16] It is not all the neighbourhoods that they took over. They took 2 certain neighbourhoods, but not all. For example, kilometre 5, they did not capture 3 There are parts where the Seleka did not have bases. They had bases in that. 4 certain neighbourhoods. But Seleka came to neighbourhoods such as Boy-Rabe just 5 a few days between each time to pillage and loot. So they come to that 6 neighbourhood just to -- to loot and then go back. So in Boy-Rabe they could not 7 occupy those neighbourhoods in the beginning. 8 Now that is why the people who came back, the leaders who came back decided to 9 occupy those neighbourhoods. 10 Q. [10:39:38] In your statement you said that the Anti-Balaka who came from the 11 provinces had a lot of difficulties surviving in Bangui, they didn't have food and that 12 nobody was helping them. So am I to understand the conditions of life of those 13 Anti-Balaka relating to food, health and so on, it was very, very difficult for them; is 14 that correct? 15 The living conditions were very, very unfavourable for the A. [10:40:14] Yes. 16 They did not find any food. These are people who have their diets. Anti-Balaka. 17 People wanted to help them, but they could not. The people in Bangui wanted to 18 help them, but they could not eat the food prepared by the women because they were 19 wearing *gris-gris*. And given that food was prepared by the women, they could not 20 eat it because that would undermine their gris-gris. 21 *But when they arrived in Bangui, despite the lack of weapons or anything at all, 22 many youths from Bangui joined them. So the living conditions were not really

favourable to the Anti-Balaka when it came to food and health and everything. Itwas not favourable at all.

25 Q. [10:41:27] Do you agree with me that the unfavourable conditions relating to

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1 food and so on -- it looks like the witness has disappeared. We have a problem of

2 connection.

3 PRESIDING JUDGE SCHMITT: [10:41:47] Then he -- we would have to wait until he

4 has resurfaced. Oh, here he is.

5 I think you better start again with your question.

6 MS PROULX: [10:42:03](Interpretation)

7 Q. [10:42:05] Before the little break, Mr Witness, I will repeat that question: Do

8 you agree that the difficult conditions of the Anti-Balaka at that moment - I am talking

9 of December, early January - those conditions compelled some of them to start looting,

10 and that created insecurity in Bangui? Do you agree?

11 A. [10:42:37] I do not agree with you on that point, because if you look at the

12 looting in Bangui you cannot say that it was only the Anti-Balaka that were looting.

13 I can tell you that there was a lot of looting in Bangui that were not attributable to the

14 Anti-Balaka. Even before the events, when we were living peacefully, there were

15 thieves, robbers everywhere. And after that -- after the Anti-Balaka arrived, they

16 started passing themselves off as the Anti-Balaka so as to continue their work. In

17 Bangui they were even referred to as the Anti-Balaka of Bangui, who spent their time

18 just to steal and to loot.

So the truth is that when the real Anti-Balaka, they believed that if you steal you will
be killed by a bullet, and those who had those *gris-gris* respected that reality because

21 they knew that the laws of the *gris-gris* were serious.

22 But there were people who claimed to be Anti-Balaka, and then they did a lot of

23 damage. They did a lot of stealing and looting in the name of the Anti-Balaka,

24 whereas they were not.

25 Q. [10:44:34] Thank you for that clarification. I was coming back to that fact.

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Many people of the population took false *gris-gris* and started claiming to be
 Anti-Balaka. Do you agree that some civilians at the time took advantage of the
 chaos to attack -- to attack as a matter of vengeance, of revenge, because of the
 suffering that they had under the Seleka?

5 A. [10:45:26] What the civilians did is even worse, and we know it. The civilians 6 did far worse in the destruction of mosques and so on. Because of the spirit of 7 vengeance, they destroyed everything. They even removed bricks and so -- and so 8 what happened was attributable to the civilians. They did very, very bad things. 9 So it was very difficult at the time, civilians, Anti-Balaka, soldiers, Christians and 10 I mean, the country went through the worst, the very worst of times. Muslims. 11 Q. [10:46:22] In your statement you say that the people who claimed to be 12 Anti-Balaka had secured some false *gris-gris*. There was a witness who appeared 13 here and who told us that false gris-gris cannot be distinguished from the real ones 14 because the difference is in the interior.

So would I be correct to say that it was almost impossible for someone who did not
know from distinguishing between a true Anti-Balaka with real *gris-gris* from a false
Anti-Balaka who was wearing false *gris-gris*?

18 A. [10:47:13] With the naked eye it is not possible. When you look at them like 19 that you cannot know. But it is the contents inside that makes the difference. But I 20 can distinguish the truth from the false. A true Balaka does not cross over a rope or 21 somehow -- because his gris-gris could be destroyed. His manner of walking, his 22 manner of doing certain things, he distinguishes himself from something that could 23 be done and may not be done. But if you see someone with a gris-gris who goes to a 24 house and removes the roofing sheets and so on, and takes property to take away, 25 you know precisely, immediately, that it is not a true Anti-Balaka.

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Q. [10:48:28] I understand that you are capable of distinguishing between a false
and a fake -- a false and a true Anti-Balaka, but the Sangaris members or the MISCA,
and generally people from outside, would they have that ability to make that
distinction?

5 A. [10:48:58] I do not think so. If I could make that distinction, it is because you 6 know my position. Thanks to the person I was next to, he was wondering also who 7 is who and who is doing what. He himself was asking himself the question. And it 8 made it possible for me to listen and to understand.

9 Now, those people who were real, not -- and they did not want to undermine their
10 situation, they had to respect certain rules, otherwise they would lose their lives. So
11 when you say Anti-Balaka, it is so that the bullet cannot kill you. But if you do not
12 respect the rules, the bullet would kill you.

So the marabouts who provided these potions to them, it was not easy, so everyone wanted to protect the *gris-gris* that they had. That is how I am telling you what is described in the protection of this -- this product.

But foreigners cannot make that distinction. You really have to explain to -- tosomeone to be able to make that distinction.

18 Q. [10:50:51] In your statement you said that many Muslims left *Bangui at that

19 time. Am I to understand that the international forces of the Sangaris and the

20 MISCA started the evacuation of Muslims immediately after the attack of 5 December;

21 is that correct?

A. [10:51:19] Yes. I do not have accurate memories of that, but after 5 December

those forces decided -- they began to repatriate Muslims out of the territory.

24 Q. [10:51:44] During that period - I am still talking about December and before the

25 return of Ngaïssona - are you aware of Mokom, Wenezoui, Kamezolaï and so on,

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1 who -- who had a coordination and who were in contact with people in the villages 2 and in the rural areas? Do you know anything about that? 3 A. [10:52:20] Yes. What I am talking about is that Mokom was already rejecting 4 that coordination, especially that of Kamezolaï. So he was in charge of the 5 coordination and Konaté was the spokesperson. 6 And now Wenezoui, he was in Mokom's coordination and then he created his own 7 coordination because, according to him, he started the blockage of the runway of the 8 airport. 9 So he had his own coordination. Kamezolaï had his own coordination. So the 10 Anti-Balaka were divided. *Mr Konaté was the spokesperson for Mr Mokom's 11 coordination. So there was a coordination that Mokom believed that he was leading himself. 12 13 Q. [10:53:35] If I understand correctly, before the return of Mr Ngaïssona, there 14 were several people who were trying to position themselves to be the leaders of the 15 Anti-Balaka. Do we agree on that? 16 A. [10:53:51] Yes. 17 Q. [10:53:57] Do you also agree that before the return of Mr Ngaïssona no one had 18 been publicly recognised as the coordinator of the movement? 19 [10:54:11] Yes. No one had presented themselves publicly before the media to A. 20 say that "I am the coordinator", apart from Mokom, because he, if someone asked 21 about the situation, he would say, "If they ask for a coordinator, tell that person to 22 That is what Mokom said. It was only him. contact me." 23 Q. [10:54:53] I would like to change topics now. The return of Ngaïssona in --24 PRESIDING JUDGE SCHMITT: [10:55:02] May I shortly. 25 I know -- I have nothing against changing topic, but I would like to ask you before the

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| 1 | break if you have already an estimate? You know, the Chamber would appreciate it |
|----|--|
| 2 | if we could finish on Thursday, because members of the Chamber have other judicial |
| 3 | obligations. So it would be good of course, no no force or something like that, |
| 4 | but perhaps you can. |
| 5 | I have the impression that you are going relatively fast, but I might be wrong. |
| 6 | MS PROULX: [10:55:34] Thank you, Mr President. I I'm hopeful that I I can be |
| 7 | finished for my part on Wednesday, at the end of the day, which would leave |
| 8 | Thursday to the other team. |
| 9 | PRESIDING JUDGE SCHMITT: [10:55:49] That would be the next question, of |
| 10 | course, question for the other team. |
| 11 | Do you have already an idea? |
| 12 | MR SUZUKI: [10:55:58] Good morning, Mr President, your Honours. |
| 13 | At this stage we think we would be less than the three hours that we initially asked |
| 14 | for. It depends a little bit on the topics that Madam Proulx will cover, but |
| 15 | PRESIDING JUDGE SCHMITT: [10:56:12] So this looks promising. So it looks at |
| 16 | least like we would have the Friday, the Friday free as a hearing day. |
| 17 | And since we would go into a new topic, I think we can have now the coffee break. |
| 18 | THE COURT USHER: [10:56:29] All rise. |
| 19 | (Recess taken at 10.56 a.m.) |
| 20 | (Upon resuming in open session at 11.32 a.m.) |
| 21 | THE COURT USHER: [11:32:03] All rise. |
| 22 | Please be seated. |
| 23 | PRESIDING JUDGE SCHMITT: [11:32:34] Ms Proulx, rightly assumes that she has |
| 24 | still the floor. |
| | |

25 Please continue with the examination.

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- 1 MS PROULX: [11:32:47](Interpretation)
- 2 Q. [11:32:48] Good morning once more, Mr Witness.
- 3 I would like now to talk about the return in mid-January 2014 of Mr Ngaïssona.
- 4 In your statement you explain that the population celebrated his return and that it
- 5 was covered by the media. Would it be correct, Mr Witness, to say that that was the
- 6 first time since the Seleka coup d'état that Mr Ngaïssona had been seen or heard over
- 7 the media? As far as you know, was that the first time after the coup d'état that you
- 8 were seeing Mr Ngaïssona on the media?

9 A. [11:33:41] I really don't have an exact answer for you on this question because I

- 10 myself, I do not know whether he spoke to the media or not. So I have no exact
- 11 answer for you.
- 12 PRESIDING JUDGE SCHMITT: [11:33:55] But perhaps, if I may. Mr Witness, have
- 13 you had -- heard of him before?
- 14 THE WITNESS: [11:34:16](Interpretation) No, Mr President.

15 PRESIDING JUDGE SCHMITT: [11:34:17] Please continue.

16 MS PROULX: [11:34:22](Interpretation)

17 Q. [11:34:25] You explained that some Anti-Balaka had gone to see Mr Ngaïssona

18 to ask him to speak on their behalf. From outside this courtroom, it might seem

- 19 strange that the Anti-Balaka might ask some people -- or ask someone who had
- 20 nothing to do with them to represent them.
- 21 Now, can you explain to us whether you know why the Anti-Balaka wanted
- 22 Mr Ngaïssona to be their representative?
- A. [11:35:07] Yes. Ngaïssona is a leader. He is a political leader in the Central
- 24 African Republic. He's known through his football activities. He's known for his
- 25 generosity to Central Africans. Now, whether he knows you or not, he is someone

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- 1 who is generous to everybody.
- 2 Now, when it comes to the return of Ngaïssona, what I said is that people clapped for
- 3 him. They turned out massively to welcome him at the Central African airport, the
- 4 Bangui airport, because as I said there were many of them who were refugees at the
- 5 airport. So this was a time at which they thought that Ngaïssona might assist or help
- 6 them because he was someone who was known to be ordinarily generous.
- 7 So going by information available to me, it is the Anti-Balaka themselves who went
- 8 towards him, who approached him and talked (Redacted)
- 9 (Redacted)
- 10 (Redacted)
- 11 (Redacted)
- 12 (Redacted)
- 13 (Redacted).

a few things from time to time. So he said at some point that Ngaïssona had arrived
in Bangui and that he apparently would be the one to represent the Anti-Balaka. He
had wanted to (Redacted).

17 (Redacted).

18 So what I noticed was frustration on his face. And the manner in which he was

- 19 speaking showed that he was not happy, not happy at all. And that's when I
- 20 understood that Ngaïssona had returned to Bangui and that the Anti-Balaka had
- 21 asked Ngaïssona to be the Anti-Balaka representative.
- 22 So this is what I can tell you, going by my understanding of this question.
- 23 Q. [11:37:58] So Mr Ngaïssona started to accept to become the spokesperson for the
- 24 Anti-Balaka. Would you agree with me that Mr Ngaïssona immediately called for a
- 25 return to peace in the CAR?

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A. [11:38:22] Yes. He called for or promised for peace to return to the Central
 African Republic.

Q. [11:38:38] Some witnesses who have appeared here before you testified that
when Mr Ngaïssona returned, he gave some small amounts of money to the
Anti-Balaka for food and for health reasons, and also to enable some return to their
villages. Would you agree that providing food for the Anti-Balaka and making it
possible for them to return to their villages, that such measures would contribute to
reducing violence?

9 [11:39:15] I agree. When you help someone who is unwell, and you help them A. 10 to get treatment, that is what humanitarian organisations do today. They assist 11 those who have needs, who have need for food and health so that they can be healthy. 12 But some, instead of remaining in Bangui, wanted to return to their farming rather 13 than remain in Bangui. So when you help such a person to return you are 14 contributing to development, because when that person returns to the village, they 15 will farm and then the harvests will benefit all Central Africans. 16 I can also go on to say that it was not only about money. It's Ngaïssona's words, 17 what he spoke, that helped those who were unwell or those who wanted to go back to 18 the villages. At the time President Panza-Samba, if I remember well, he gave some 19 money twice before the money from Angola was received. Money was given twice 20 to Ngaïssona, he received that money and gave it to Mokom to share and to -- to help 21 those who wanted to go back and also to obtain some medication.

22 So that's what he did.

Q. [11:41:01] I would now like to show you a document which I believe you have
already seen. It's at tab 75 in the Defence binder, *CAR-OTP-2124-1211. I'll wait for
it to be displayed before I put a few questions to you.

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1 Can you maybe just scroll down so that the witness can see the entire document,

2 please.

3 Do you remember seeing this document, Mr Witness?

4 A. [11:42:12] Yes, I remember.

5 Q. [11:42:20] So this is an organigram, so to speak, or a list of functions within the

6 Anti-Balaka dated 23 January -- 23 July 2014, rather -- 23 January 2014.

7 Mr Witness, would it be correct to say that many people were unhappy or dissatisfied8 when this document was published?

9 A. [11:42:49] Yes, there was dissatisfaction. First of all, when this organigram or 10 organisational chart was broadcast, I was not yet in Bangui. But from where I was at 11 the time, I was able to become aware of this flowchart on which you can see the name of one gentleman known as Léopold Bara, who also claimed to be the coordinator of 12 13 the Anti-Balaka. He is the coordinator of his own movement of the Anti-Balaka. 14 We see also here Joachim Kokaté also showing as a coordinator of the Anti-Balaka. 15 And then you have Captain Kamezolaï as a coordinator of the Anti-Balaka as well. 16 Then we have Yvon Konaté, who is also spokesperson or -- or chief of general staff of 17 the Anti-Balaka. And then we have Deboulet Caroline, that one as a *conseillere*. I 18 don't know that person. I have heard this name only for the first time today. But as 19 for the others, we have heard about them.

So there were Anti-Balakas and coordinators of the Anti-Balaka all over, and so there
were different or many coordinators. How then could it be possible for all these
people to control or to speak on behalf of the Anti-Balaka? And which Anti-Balaka
would one be talking about specifically? Because as you see here, each person is
portrayed as representing the Anti-Balaka. Each person on this list represents the
Anti-Balaka, but which Anti-Balaka do they represent?

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1 So if -- the idea then would be to -- to bring all of these people together under an 2 umbrella of peace, so that together all these people could work for peace rather than 3 remain in their own separate camps. And so it would be unfortunate that peace 4 would not return to the country if each person is doing their own thing, in their own 5 way, in their own camp. So what was important was for people to come together 6 and speak the same language so that peace may return. 7 And so following this publication, there was no -- no respect, because in the end 8 Léopold Bara ended up in his own camp, Kamezolaï was in his own camp, Kokaté, 9 Ngaïssona were together for a while, but then he then took off in another direction. 10 So we had Konaté who remained with Ngaïssona, and that's -- that's my 11 That's what I can tell you about this organigram. understanding. 12 Q. [11:46:10] Thank you very much. You answered my next question already. 13 There are some witnesses who appeared before you who have testified that this 14 coordination which we look at had never been implemented, and that it was 15 dissolved a few hours after the publication of this document. 16 So would you agree that this coordination never really had any real impact in reality; is that correct? 17 18 A. [11:46:43] It existed only by name. It never did anything concrete. So I don't 19 think it ever said anything or tried to do anything whatsoever. 20 Q. [11:47:01] Thank you very much. I'll move on to another topic. 21 But I would like to request that we go into private session. 22 PRESIDING JUDGE SCHMITT: [11:47:10] Private session. 23 (Private session at 11.47 a.m.) 24 THE COURT OFFICER: [11:47:25] We are in private session, Mr President.

25 (Redacted)

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| Trial Hearing | | (Private Session) |
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| Trial Hearing | | (Private Session) |
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| WITNESS: | CAR-OTP-P-0889 |

(Private Session)

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| Trial Hearir | ıg |
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| WITNESS: | CAR-OTP-P-0889 |

(Private Session)

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(Private Session)

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- 11 (Open session at 12.40 p.m.)
- 12 THE COURT OFFICER: [12:40:10] We are in open session, Mr President.
- 13 MS PROULX: [12:40:19](Interpretation)

14 Q. [12:40:21] Mr Witness, I will continue now in open session, but please be careful

15 not to provide any information that might identify you.

16 You gave me a very exhaustive answer and I thank you. But I would like us to look

17 at the period before the Brazzaville forum, which I will talk about later on. My

18 objective here is to try to understand what happened before the forum, that is, from

- 19 the time Mokom returned to Bangui around February, up until around June.
- 20 So in your statement you say that Mr Ngaïssona did not understand why there was
- 21 need for an operations coordination in the organigram because there were no

22 operations being planned.

23 Can you describe to us how these discussions took place, without identifying yourself,

24 please.

25 A. [12:41:35] Yes. As I said, Ngaïssona did not understand because Ngaïssona

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asked the question, "Ata, we are not talking about resuming violence now. We are
talking about coordinating these things and putting up an organigram for the
international community and for the organisers of the Brazzaville forum, and we are
looking for peace to return. And we are not talking about operations. So what kind
of operations are you alluding to?"

And Maxime Mokom answered: "Ata, I have been managing operations. I was
managing operations up until the arrival of the Anti-Balaka in Bangui. And I am a
soldier, so anything that is political, that's not my business." So he -- that's what he
said, and he was clear that he was a soldier. And in the country soldiers do not have
any role to play in politics, so he preferred to remain as part of the military.

So when he says he is managing operations, he does not mean that including that in the organigram would mean that people are going to take up arms again. It's simply reference to the fact that operations that have already taken place up to 5 December would be what he had in mind. And so it was only optional, so to speak. It was not about organising to fight again.

16 So that's the answer that Mokom provided.

Q. [12:43:39] In your previous answer you said that Mokom was the leader of aparamilitary group. Was that in 2014 or later?

A. [12:43:55] When I talk about the paramilitary group which was being led by
 Mokom, yeah, there were paramilitary -- it was a paramilitary group. You see,
 initially it happened spontaneously, as the Anti-Balaka came together for their own
 Defence. So when he contacted the Anti-Balaka, it is at that time that I say that the

23 group became paramilitary under his leadership. That's -- that's what I meant.

24 Q. [12:44:31] Thank you for that clarification. As far as you know, in the weeks

25 and months following Mokom's return to Bangui, did he remain in frequent contact

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1 with the ComZones?

A. [12:44:48] Yes, in Bangui, he was in contact, always in contact with them.
Well, I say in contact, although I was not always with him, but I was in Bangui, I
knew where to go, I knew that I was doing a few things. I went to see my parents
and my family and so on and so forth. But it was clearly seen that he was in contact,
and being the leader of the movement it is clear that he succeeded in dividing the
movement because of that contact which he had with them, always.

Q. [12:45:36] In your statement you explain that Mokom's goals were different from
those of Mr Ngaïssona and that Mr -- that Mokom never reported to Mr Ngaïssona.
Am I to understand then that, although on paper they belonged to the same party, in
practice Mr Mokom and Mr Ngaïssona worked separately and did not coordinate
things among themselves?

A. [12:46:08] The truth is that this organisation chart is only worth the piece of
paper on which it is written. It appears only on that paper and I have never seen
members of that coordination bureau meet to decide anything whatsoever. It was
only prepared for the purposes of the Brazzaville forum. I never saw any such
meetings. It appeared only on paper and it remained only on paper.

Mokom did not report to Ngaïssona, Ngaïssona did not report to Mokom. Well,
Ngaïssona from time to time maybe would have discussions with an ambassador or
with an official of the international community, and then report back to everybody on
what had been discussed, and talk about what the Anti-Balaka had to uphold. But
Mokom, Mokom never came back to say, "Oh, this is what I did. This is what I did."
He never. He never reported back.

So that that organigram was only on paper, but it's Ngaïssona who from time to time
would report to his -- to the group about his contacts with the African Union, with

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| 1 | ambassadors in the international community, and so on and so forth. And from time |
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| 2 | to time he would take a number of persons with him to go to CEEAC or to the AU, |
| 3 | along with a number of other persons, to be able to listen to each other. But but |
| 4 | Mokom worked by himself and yet he had contact with the ComZones. |
| 5 | Q. [12:48:16] Did you ever hear that Maxime Mokom, Bernard Mokom and |
| 6 | Mr Ngaïssona went met together, rather, to report to each other on the happenings |
| 7 | of the day? |
| 8 | A. [12:48:31] Never. If anyone were to meet, it was Ngaïssona. |
| 9 | And by the way, you never saw Bernard Mokom because he was always with |
| 10 | magistrate Dede and his coordination was based at magistrate Dede's place, and that |
| 11 | is where they would take decisions and then tell Mokom what he had to do. So they |
| 12 | would be on that end and Bernard Mokom never reported to Ngaïssona, Ngaïssona |
| 13 | never reported to him either. |
| 14 | Bernard Mokom and Dede were always together, and Maxime, but they never |
| 15 | reported to Ngaïssona. And even though Maxime attended a few meetings, the idea |
| 16 | was simply to come and find out what Ngaïssona was doing and what he was |
| 17 | planning. And every now and then, Ngaïssona would say: Oh, I went here. I met |
| 18 | such-and-such a person and they said such-and-such a thing. |
| 19 | But Mokom, never. |
| 20 | Q. [12:49:45] A witness appearing before you told the Court that, according to him, |
| 21 | Maxime Mokom was a radical who had a hidden agenda and who wanted to create |
| 22 | disorder in order to bring back Bozizé to power. |
| 23 | Was that also your observation, Mr Witness? |
| 24 | A. [12:50:09] I agree with that individual. I myself have testified that Maxime |
| 25 | Mokom, all he wanted, all that he was concerned about and by the way, to to start |

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1 with, he always talked about returning to the constitutional order. So while the 2 transition was going on, or Djotodia or the transition, someone was still talking about 3 returning to the constitutional order. 4 What was he referring to? When he said constitutional order, it simply meant 5 returning Bozizé to power. So I agree with that individual who said that Mokom 6 wanted Bozizé to be returned to power. I agree with that person that a lot was done, 7 but whether it was organised, I don't know. But, you know, things were emerging 8 and sometimes you will hear about things done by Anti-Balaka. And then I

9 would -- I would even be surprised and wonder which Anti-Balaka would have done

10 this. Some bad things happened, so you would wonder who was behind them.

11 Some people wanted a return to the constitutional order, while others wanted peace.

12 And those ideas are different from each other. Calling for peace through elections

and the ballot box is quite different from calling for a return to the constitutionalorder.

Q. [12:52:01] Mr Witness, knowing that their goals were different from each other,
would Mr Ngaïssona have had the means and the resources to exclude Maxime
Mokom from the movement?

A. [12:52:21] That is a question that causes me to chuckle somewhat. You see,
someone is the -- the leader. He has all the contacts of all Anti-Balaka leaders. How
could Ngaïssona, even if he was the coordinator, how would he have been able to

21 dismiss him, dismiss, or dissolve Mokom?

22 It is true that there were proposals for Mokom to be taken out when he proposed to

23 go to Nairobi, and in Bangui they were being referred to as the Nairobists and the

24 extremists. But Ngaïssona and the other Anti-Balaka who had adopted his idea,

25 namely for a return to peace.

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1 Now, these people agreed with Ngaïssona to dismiss Mokom. What happened? 2 Was he dismissed? No. He still had a place and he remained powerful. What I 3 can tell you is that Maxime continued to be powerful because he had in his hand the 4 armed wing of the Anti-Balaka movement. He was in hiding maybe, but many of 5 the leaders followed him and he knew how to convince them. Many of them 6 followed him. And you can see that towards the end he became even more powerful 7 and his coordination was recognised. 8 Now, Ngaïssona, Kokaté, Kamezolaï, and the others who claimed to be Anti-Balaka 9 coordinators, were they as powerful as Mokom? Now, when Ngaïssona decided to 10 dismiss Mokom, Mokom, no. Why did they not succeed to become powerful, as 11 powerful as Maxime? So I think that Ngaïssona does not measure up, so to speak, when it comes to Maxime 12 13 Mokom. 14 [12:54:57] You have just talked about the Anti-Balaka leaders and ComZones Q. 15 who decided to support Maxime Mokom. Did you notice or observe that the 16 ComZones with whom Mokom had been in contact were more inclined to supporting 17 Mokom's ideals rather than support the calls to peace and the cessation of hostilities 18 that Mr Ngaïssona was championing? 19 [12:55:33] What I can tell you is that at that time after January, and so on and so Α. 20 forth, I think there were no more attacks in Bangui, apart from what was happening 21 every now and then at PK5. There was no more attack on the capital. The 22 transitional government under Catherine Samba-Panza had been set up. There were 23 no attacks. 24 So as Mokom was detaching himself, there was an upsurge in violence in the

provinces at that time. I don't remember clearly the locations at which there was this

25

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1 upsurge of violence in the provinces, but there was.

Now, in Bangui, because of the outreach and the strong awareness building -- well, let
me also specify that in Boy-Rabe there was systematic pillaging that continued to
happen. And I can provide you with a lot more details if we are able to discuss that
in -- in that other kind of session, that I think you know. So everything was calm in
Bangui and yet the question must be who was controlling those people there.
Q. [12:56:59] Just to be sure that I understand, you said that the upsurge in violence

8 was linked to requests from Maxime Mokom?

9 A. [12:57:16] That's what I think. Now, when he split at the time when talk was

10 about peace and awareness, for the return to peace after the Brazzaville agreement, at

11 that time peace was beginning to come in gradually into the country. But then at

12 some point the Anti-Balaka again started to resurface in some towns in the provinces.

13 And even in other towns where the Anti-Balaka had not existed before, we saw new

14 groups of Anti-Balaka being formed. So that leads one to think that there was a

15 different ideology being pursued and there was one team seeking peace while the

16 other was looking for a return to the constitutional order.

17 Q. [12:58:09] Thank you, Mr Witness.

18 I was going to change my topic, but maybe this is a good time for the lunch break.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE SCHMITT: [12:58:16] Indeed, I agree.

20 So we have the lunch break until 2.30.

21 THE COURT USHER: [12:58:21] All rise.

22 (Recess taken at 12.58 p.m.)

23 (Upon resuming in open session at 2.40 p.m.)

24 THE COURT USHER: [14:40:20] All rise.

25 Please be seated.

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1 PRESIDING JUDGE SCHMITT: [14:40:50] Good afternoon, everyone.

2 I understand that Mr Yekatom waives for this afternoon his right to be present at the

3 trial. Is this correct? Can you please confirm it for the record.

4 MS GUISSÉ: [14:41:06](Interpretation) Yes, Mr President, I can confirm to you that

5 Mr Yekatom is, indeed, waiving his right to be present this afternoon, conscious of the

6 fact that he has -- there is a particular arrangement for this witness, and also the fact

7 that tomorrow, as we are not sitting, he will have the opportunity to rest in the hope

8 that he will feel better by Wednesday. And I am, indeed, confirming his position.

9 PRESIDING JUDGE SCHMITT: [14:41:34] Thank you very much.

10 So we state for the record that the accused Yekatom is excused from the presence

11 during this afternoon session. Their exists exceptional circumstances to justify such

12 an absence. We just have heard and we note and appreciate that the accused has

13 explicitly waived his right to be present in the afternoon session, and we trust and are

14 absolutely sure that his rights will be fully ensured in his absence by the counsel here

15 in the courtroom.

16 So we continue with the examination, Ms Proulx.

17 MS PROULX: [14:42:20] Thank you, Mr President.

18 Q. [14:42:24] (Interpretation) Mr Witness, good afternoon.

19 A. [14:42:29] Good afternoon to you.

20 Q. [14:42:33] Now, before we rose for lunch, we were speaking about the

21 challenges for the leadership by Mr Mokom, Mr Ngaïssona's leadership. I'm going

22 to continue a little in the same vein, and I would like to talk about some other

23 individuals who put themselves forward at the time, talking about -- commencing

24 with Sebastien Wenezoui.

25 I'd like to have you listen to a brief audio file. This is document 46 of the Defence,

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- 1 *CAR-OTP-2076-0825.
- 2 For the interpreters, we have a transcript to be found at document 76, CAR-2122-7403.
- 3 And we shall be playing it from the beginning until 2:40. And for the transcript,
- 4 these are lines 1 to lines 36.
- 5 Now, this is an interview of Sebastien Wenezoui dated 3 March 2014. So we are
- 6 going to be listening to it, and then I shall be putting a few questions to you.
- 7 (Playing of the audio excerpt)
- 8 THE INTERPRETER: [14:44:36] (Interpretation of the audio excerpt)
- 9 "Sebastien Wenezoui, hello.

10 Yes, hello.

- 11 You say that you are not in agreement with the statements of certain personalities as
- 12 to the coordination of the Anti-Balaka. Why this reaction?
- 13 These are statements that have a tendency to divide our movement, whilst our
- 14 movement from the very beginning wanted to quite simply to fight for freedom. In
- 15 these statements by Mr Ngaïssona and Captain Kokaté, they tend to divide our
- 16 movement. We are not in agreement.
- I7 Journalist: Your reaction, is it a way of saying that your movement is targeted forpolitical recuperation?
- 19 Yes, indeed. According to the statements that people are making over the waves,
- 20 over the media, this is a political -- it's taking a political tint. And in order to avoid
- 21 that there are any blunders, we would like to remain -- put things to remain logical.
- 22 We do not want political men" --
- The interpreter could not see the text, it is being scrolled down too rapidly. Pleasedo not scroll down the text too rapidly.
- 25 (Interpretation continued) "Initially there were coordinators. The coordinator

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1 general, his name was Maxime Mokom. Then Mr Ngaïssona was taken as a political 2 leader of the Anti-Balaka. The problem is this. Because we are a movement, we 3 came into the town with regard to certain actions, and because we do not have a 4 political leader in common agreement with all the soldiers of Boeing, Boy-Rabe, the 5 provinces and PK9 and Bimbo, we have chosen Mr Ngaïssona to be our political 6 leader. But Mr Kokaté, we did not recognise him at the outset, but when we -- when 7 both of them arrived in Bangui, you went to see that there were little groups of people 8 who went to the head of state in order to be received by him. And it was at that 9 level that the head of state did not want group 1 and group 2 to come and see him. 10 So the head of state advised now to those groups to place up a council, and it is at that 11 level that a common agreement was met between Mr Ngaïssona, Kokaté, Bara. They 12 set up this council, and they elected Mr Ngaïssona as the general coordinator of the 13 council, which is available -- who is available to be received by the head of state 14 in -- when the need arises for work. That is the issue. But it is not a question that 15 Mr Ngaïssona will tomorrow be broadcasting over the radio or that Mr Kokaté will be 16 on the radio creating dissidents. No, we are not in agreement on that level. The 17 statement that Mr Kokaté was saying that there were, namely, Anti-Balaka to the south and that there are Anti-Balaka in the north, there aren't any Anti-Balaka from 18 19 the south, and there aren't any Anti-Balaka from the south. We are Anti-Balaka. 20 We have one sole objective, that is to drive out Djotodia from power, because these 21 elements have conducted acts of violence upon the civilian population. That is our 22 So we have to try and calm down these tensions." aim.

23 End of sight translation.

24 MS PROULX: [14:48:13](Interpretation)

25 Q. [14:48:14] So you heard the audio file, Mr Witness. And as I was saying to you,

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this dates from 3 March 2014. So that was approximately one and a half months
after the return of Mr Ngaïssona to Bangui. You heard Mr Wenezoui clearly saying
that, according to him, the general coordinator was called Maxime Mokom.
To your knowledge, was that what other members of the Anti-Balaka movement
thought at that moment in time?

A. [14:48:59] This audio by Mr Wenezoui, I have heard it, and I have taken good
note of its contents. But I can tell you that this statement does not only come from
Wenezoui alone.

9 Just to say to you that Wenezoui, at the outset, well, his struggle was to defend Bozizé. 10 We will agree that Wenezoui -- well, his brother was also close to Bozizé, his late 11 older brother was close to Bozizé. You will agree with me when I say that Wenezoui 12 liked his life under Bozizé as well, and Bozizé left. You will agree with me once 13 again when I say that Wenezoui was also aimed -- also aimed to support Bozizé. 14 Now, before making this statement, you will agree with me that Wenezoui had 15 already told Maxime Mokom. Before making this statement, Maxime Mokom had 16 already given him some guidelines as to what he should do and what he should say. 17 He is in contact from Boeing. That is the position where he is to be found, but he is 18 also in telephone contact with Maxime Mokom. Why is that? And I can also tell 19 you that Wenezoui is not very happy with what Ngaïssona did as a coordinator. He also wants to remind Ngaïssona, like Maxime, that it is not he who should be taking 20 21 decisions. And Wenezoui, at the end, also is struggling to have some kind of 22 position in the transitional government in which Ngaïssona did not want to hold a 23 position.

There was Kokaté who represented the Anti-Balaka at that moment in time in the
government, in the transitional government, that is. Kokaté was there as well as an

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1 Anti-Balaka.

Wenezoui did not have a ministerial post, and he wasn't happy. Neither was
Maxime Mokom happy at all. So there's a leadership battle.

4 Q. [14:51:55] Do I understand, Mr Witness, that, according to you -- or might you 5 have information to enable you to confirm that Maxime Mokom and Sebastien 6 Wenezoui worked together in order to weaken the leadership of Mr Ngaïssona? 7 A. [14:52:20] I can confirm that the two were working together, but Wenezoui was 8 also somebody who would change sides from time to time. At a given moment in 9 time, he went out on his own. When Ngaïssona sent Wenezoui him in the 10 government, that's when Wenezoui changed side. He changed sides from Mokom. 11 And after that, when he was relieved of his position and replaced by somebody else whom Ngaïssona had sent, Wenezoui then again changed position, and he went out 12 13 on his own on a limb. He became coordinator once again of his own camp or side. 14 [14:53:12] In the audio we hear Mr Wenezoui denounce what he calls the Q. 15 political taint that the movement is taking on. Would you agree with me that that is 16 a way of rejecting Mr Ngaïssona's vision of the Anti-Balaka movement? 17 Α. [14:53:36] Ngaïssona's vision is clear. He doesn't hide his political vision. He

18 is clear.

19 It is clear that Ngaïssona is once again talking about a return or restoration of peace, 20 and he is requesting the Anti-Balaka to stop using violence, stop using weapons, and 21 to have recourse to peace. He is talking about the party that he himself is going to be 22 putting in place, the Central African Party for Unity and Development.

23 So Wenezoui, just like Mokom, knew only too well what Ngaïssona was up to and

24 that this was stopping Bozizé from coming back to power. So the two are not in

25 agreement with this ideology headed up by Ngaïssona or spearheaded by Ngaïssona,

| 1 | and that is why they are reclaiming the restoration of constitutional order, which is to |
|----|--|
| 2 | say, to use by all means and power the Anti-Balaka to bring back the outgoing or |
| 3 | removed president by all means and powers, whether it be by using those very same |
| 4 | entities, the Anti-Balaka, or whether by means of continued violence or the |
| 5 | international community, saying, "Bozizé is coming back, he's going to finish off his |
| 6 | mandate," and there we are, then we'll turn the page, or if the Anti-Balaka are able to |
| 7 | take power and give Bozizé power. |
| 8 | But the fact of to allow Ngaïssona to raise awareness for peace, he's talking here |
| 9 | about his own party, this is making everything impossible. |
| 10 | Q. [14:55:39] I would like to show you another document. *It is at tab 6 in the |
| 11 | Defence binder, CAR-D30-0008-0041. |
| 12 | And while it is coming up on the screen, this is an article of radio Ndeke Luka dated |
| 13 | 16 May 2014. |
| 14 | THE INTERPRETER: [14:56:06] 0041, correction. |
| 15 | MS PROULX: (Interpretation) |
| 16 | Q. [14:56:10] And it is discussed in this article the fact that Mr Wenezoui was |
| 17 | designated as general coordinator of the Anti-Balaka, replacing Mr Ngaïssona. And |
| 18 | he is alleged to have been elected by an extraordinary assembly comprising |
| 19 | approximately 300 Anti-Balaka. |
| 20 | Now, do you remember this election of Mr Wenezoui? |
| 21 | A. [14:56:44] Yes, I do recall. And as I was saying to you at an earlier stage, |
| 22 | Mr Sebastien Wenezoui is somebody whom, as I stated earlier, changed sides every |
| 23 | now and then. He was with Maxime Mokom at the very beginning. He supported |
| 24 | Maxime Mokom for the return of Bozizé to power. And at the end, he too wanted a |
| 25 | ministerial position in the transitional government. And at the end, Ngaïssona |
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1 ended up giving him this possibility of representing the Anti-Balaka as a minister in 2 the transitional government. And then sent somebody else, whilst he, of course, was 3 not at all happy and does not want to follow in the steps or does not want to follow 4 the way traced by Maxime Mokom or Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona. He now wants to 5 follow his own way. He uses -- I don't know where this meeting occurred, with 6 which Anti-Balaka leaders it was held, but the proof is in the article published by the 7 radio, according to which Sebastien Wenezoui is coordinator, replacing 8 Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona. 9 So this goes to prove that I don't know where that meeting took place, but it is clear 10 that it was published that it was he, the new coordinator. And at the very end, he 11 made the most of the setting up of an association whose name I have forgotten. I do not know the name of this association. But in that vein, in order to be heard and to 12 13 continue to have a ministerial position on behalf of the Anti-Balaka. 14 Q. [14:59:22] In your statement, you make mention of the fact that Mr Ngaïssona's 15 leadership at the head of the Anti-Balaka was also challenged by other individuals, 16 Kokaté and Kamezolaï. 17 Could you please describe to us the manner in which Kokaté, Kamezolaï contested or 18 challenged his leadership. 19 [14:59:55] In the way -- in the manner in which Wenezoui contested or A. 20 challenged Ngaïssona's leadership, and in the same way in which Mokom challenged 21 the leadership of Mr Ngaïssona, that is also how Joachim Kokaté challenged 22 Ngaïssona's leadership, and also Kamezolaï challenged the leadership of 23 Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona. 24 So, according to Kokaté, it is he, the leader, he is the leader of the Anti-Balaka. And 25 he has many Anti-Balaka behind him.

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1 According to Captain Kamezolaï, he also has many Anti-Balaka behind him, and it

2 should be him the leader.

So, Kamezolaï and Joachim Kokaté are also challenged by Mokom. They are all
challenged by Mokom until Wenezoui starts to go out on a limb on his own. Mokom

5 also challenges. The only true leader is Maxime Mokom. So all those are

6 challenging the leadership of Ngaïssona.

7 Let me point out that Joachim Kokaté joined with Mokom in the participation of

8 Joachim and Mokom in Nairobi. So after that, there was no later -- later any

9 challenges between the two of them until people started talking also about Captain

10 Kamezolaï.

11 Q. [15:02:04] In the first part of 2014, Mr Witness, you said that there were

12 leadership tussles of the movement. Did you realise that those tussles led to the split

13 of the movements, to separate allegiances so that Mr Ngaïssona's wishes, for example,

14 were less likely to be listened to by the movement at the national level?

15 A. [15:02:47] What I can say is because personally I did not see the Anti-Balaka of

16 Kokaté, I did not see the Anti-Balaka of Kamezolaï, but I saw the Anti-Balaka of

17 Wenezoui. I saw the Anti-Balaka of Mokom.

18 So, as far as I'm concerned, the person who was really challenging Ngaïssona's

19 leadership could only be Maxime Mokom. Because, in the final analysis, Joachim

20 Kokaté actually joined with Maxime Mokom, and he started working with him at the

21 end. So it was Maxime, he was really the main challenger.

22 And the Central African Republic, I think people used dishonest means. People

23 wanted to bring peace, but others wanted to use individuals to harm others. And

24 this depends on what they say, which has an effect.

25 Q. [15:04:21] I'm going to show you another document. I think you have already

- 1 seen it during your -- it -- it is CAR-OTP-2059-0021 -- 0024, actually.
- 2 I will wait for the document to be displayed, then I will ask you a few questions.
- 3 Do you remember that document, Mr Witness?
- 4 A. [15:05:17] Yes.
- 5 Q. [15:05:18] (No interpretation)
- 6 A. [15:05:19] Can it be enlarged a little bit?
- 7 Yes, I remember this document very well.

8 Q. [15:05:42] Am I correct, Mr Witness, that this document was a draft? It was not

9 the finalised document that was published at the end. Do you agree?

10 A. [15:06:01] What I know about this document is that it was prepared, and I have

already said that it was not during a meeting. It was just a gathering of people,

12 while the others were not there. So they took these names and included in the list

13 for representation in the Brazzaville forum. So these people were going to come to

14 the Brazzaville forum from everywhere; the international community, the European

15 Union. They were going to ask questions about the Anti-Balaka, because the Seleka

16 was already organised. And here, the idea was to set up something to indicate that

17 there was some sort of coordination. And, as I said, Maxime Mokom appeared as

18 the coordinator of operations. So I already gave some explanations previously

19 regarding this organigram.

And after that, there was something else that was published, but there was nothing
official. So that just means that some -- each person had to play their role. It only
existed on paper.

Q. [15:07:54] I understand your answer very well. This organisation chart was
drawn up prior to the Brazzaville forum. So I think it was during the days and
weeks before the meeting at the headquarters of UNDP with *l'ONG* Mouda?

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A. [15:08:29] I think it was after, it was after the meeting with the NGO Mouda. It
 was after that meeting.

Q. [15:08:43] You have talked about the hidden agenda of Mokom. This time,
when there were discussions on this organisation chart, did Mokom still have the
hidden agenda, and did he still intend to prevent Mr Ngaïssona from engaging on the
political path?

A. [15:09:11] Ngaïssona had already taken contact with the transitional government.
Even before he arrived Bangui, Ngaïssona had already taken contact with the
ambassadors, for example, of France and the US, the senior officials of the UN. So he
had actually made a lot of progress in his relationship with the competent authorities
in the CAR.

As I 12 So Mokom arrived, and he could not say: "Ngaïssona, leave your position." 13 have said, he had his hidden agenda. He did not speak it out, but it was in his heart. 14 It was his way of acting. Even though he came through Ngaïssona, he was trying to 15 find out how Ngaïssona was doing things. So he still had his hidden agenda. And, 16 in the final analysis, he ended up leaving so as to pursue his own hidden agenda. 17 Q. [15:10:36] To your knowledge, Mr Witness - and maybe you do not know, and 18 just say it if you don't know - but was Mr Ngaïssona was aware -- was Ngaïssona 19 aware that people were trying to sabotage his political ambitions at that period? 20 [15:11:05] Personally, I don't know whether Ngaïssona knew that Mokom was A. 21 trying to sabotage his political ambitions. But before Mokom used the movement, 22 Ngaïssona knew that Mokom was not in agreement with him, that he did not share 23 the same ideology as himself.

Q. [15:11:37] And still in the first part of 2014, would I be correct to say that
Bernard Mokom, Magistrate Dede, and maybe even Lin Banoukepa, were working

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1 against the political path of Mr Ngaïssona?

A. [15:12:02] Yes. But Banoukepa, I do not know whether he was working with
them. I cannot confirm that. But I know that Bernard Mokom, Magistrate Dede
were working against Ngaïssona. And, in fact, they were the ones who were the
advisers of Maxime Mokom. They were the ones who decided and told things to
Maxime Mokom.

Q. [15:12:43] Now, am I correct to say that neither Bernard Mokom, Magistrate
Dede or Banoukepa, they never had any role to play in the coordination of Ngaïssona;
is that correct?

A. [15:13:07] They did not play any role in Ngaïssona's coordination. But if I remember correctly, Ngaïssona wanted competent people to draft the statute and the internal rules and regulations for the PCUD party. So he appealed to Magistrate Dede, who has the competence to be a magistrate. So he called on him to join with other competent people to draft the statute and internal rules and regulations of that party. But Dede was not in agreement with that. He refused to help Ngaïssona in

16 that task at the request of Bernard Mokom. So he refused to do that.

17 Q. [15:14:20] I would like to show you another document. It is

18 CAR-OTP-2039-0019.

19 PRESIDING JUDGE SCHMITT: [15:14:38] Do you have a tab number?

20 MS PROULX: [15:14:38] (Interpretation) It is tab number 36.

21 Q. [15:15:12] Mr Witness, am I correct to say that this organisation chart is the final

22 version on which the Anti-Balaka agreed during the meeting at the UNDP

23 headquarters with the NGO Mouda?

A. [15:15:41] I can tell you that it is the same organigram that you showed me a

25 short while ago. It was the same people. So after the meeting with Mouda, it

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1 was -- they brought people -- they were appealing to people working with

2 Mr Yekatom to join Ngaïssona's coordination. So you have Romaric Vomitiade,

3 Paleon Zilabo. There was also the -- there was already the team working with Alfred

4 Yekatom who were already in that organisation chart. So it's the same thing.

5 The organisation chart was drawn up. This one that you have seen, and I repeat, it

6 was to be presented during the Brazzaville forum. Without the Brazzaville forum,

7 before, after, Ngaïssona was coordinator, Mokom was also coordinator of operations,

8 but all the others had no position. There was no one working on any specific duties

9 on this organigram. That is why I confirm to you that this organigram existed only

10 on paper. Without the work done by Maxime Mokom, Ngaïssona, the others were11 totally new. They didn't do anything.

Q. [15:17:39] I don't want to dwell too much here, Mr Witness, but if you look at
number 14 on the document that you see, you can see that the political adviser was
Alfred Ngaya, and on the other document that I had shown you, there was no name
attached to that position.

So do you agree with me that Mr Ngaya later on became the political adviser, afterthat meeting?

A. [15:18:24] In fact, it was not the NGO Mouda that prepared that organigram.
They were there to assist because Yekatom, with his team, was working with
Ngaïssona team, both of them, for the restoration of peace. That is what the NGO
Mouda was looking for. And Ngaya was also working for the PCUD party of

22 Ngaïssona.

23 So I can tell you that, apart from the -- Maxime Mokom, the other people were

24 working for the PCUD in this organigram. And when you look at this PCUD, the

25 Anti-Balakas were not directly controlled by that party. This party was set up, and

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1 *Ngaïssona used that organigramme only for those who agreed and joined the PCUD 2 party to go and work with the Anti-Balaka. Apart from Wenezoui or Mokom, who 3 were not working for the PCUD party, all the rest were sensitising the Anti-Balaka in 4 favour of the party, PCUD, including Ngaya. 5 Q. [15:20:09] *I would like to show another document at tab 88 on the Defence list, 6 CAR-OTP-2084-0164. That is on the Defence list. It is a press communiqué dated 7 24 June 2014, signed by Mr Ngaïssona, and in which it is announced that the 8 Anti-Balaka had met to try to find solutions to the problems in the CAR in order to 9 find sustainable peace in the CAR. And further on it is stated that there should no 10 longer be division, but there should be harmony in the movement so as to create the 11 conditions for national reconciliation. 12 Did you have the opportunity to speak with Mr Ngaïssona during the days before or after this press communiqué? So does this really reflect the thinking of 13 14 Mr Ngaïssona, according to you? 15 [15:22:08] As I said previously, Ngaïssona's intention was to raise the awareness A. 16 of the Anti-Balaka to abandon weapons in favour of the PCUD party and of peace. 17 So he was asking them to support the PCUD party. 18 During that time, there were many splits, many divisions, many contradictory ideas 19 by people who said they were Anti-Balaka leaders. Now, since there were different 20 ideas, Ngaïssona was working for the restoration of peace, for example. But the 21 people who did not agree with him at that time, what did they do? We cannot know. 22 Because they continued using violence and the weapons. 23 So what had to be done to agree on a single idea? That is why the Mouda 24 association took that initiative to bring back Wenezoui towards Ngaïssona. And he 25 came back and was considered as the deputy coordinator to Ngaïssona. So he was

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1 working next to Ngaïssona, alongside Ngaïssona, but, subsequently, he left again. 2 Q. [15:24:02] I would like to show another document, tab 89, CAR-OTP-2084-0173. 3 It's a document dated on the same day, 24 June 2014, and it is a decision dismissing 4 Leopold Narcisse Bara as a member of the Anti-Balaka. You know that at that time 5 Mr Bara was a minister in the transitional government representing the Anti-Balaka. 6 So my question is as follows: According to you, what you were able to observe or 7 hear from Mr Bara, did he effectively represent the Anti-Balaka as a minister in the 8 transitional government? 9 [15:25:16] According to what I can remember about Leopold Narcisse Bara, at A. 10 one point he was representing the Anti-Balaka in the government, but the 11 Anti-Balaka -- the Anti-Balaka leaders, such as Mokom, started asking questions. "Bara, where are his own Anti-Balakas?" Because all those leaders did not recognise 12 13 him. Who were his own Anti-Balakas, or did he simply use the name of the 14 Anti-Balaka to find a position in the government? Or he had to specify where his 15 own Anti-Balaka. 16 When you talk of Anti-Balaka, many people say that they have Anti-Balaka. So they 17 were saying, "Where are his Anti-Balaka? What are they doing? We have not seen 18 them. So we have to find out where his own Anti-Balaka are." 19 So I know Leopold Bara. He was saying that he was an Anti-Balaka himself. But, 20 personally, I do not know him. I have never met with him, so I can only hear his 21 name being spoken about. 22 [15:26:53] I do not know whether you had enough information about Leopold Q. 23 Bara to answer. But, according to you, did the dismissal -- was the dismissal of 24 Leopold Bara from the Anti-Balaka justified?

A. [15:27:14] Talking about the dismissal or the exclusion, it was to say that the

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Anti-Balaka, led by Ngaïssona, did not recognise someone known as Leopold Bara,
 because those who were working with Ngaïssona did not know him. But he was
 there as a representative of the Anti-Balaka. But on the side of the Ngaïssona wing
 of the Anti-Balaka, they did not recognise him.

5 Q. [15:27:59] I would like to go back a little bit in time, to the very beginning of

6 2014. That is after the return of Mr Ngaïssona and the arrival of Maxime Mokom in7 the CAR in Bangui.

8 Am I correct to believe that at that time, at the very beginning of 2014, the Anti-Balaka 9 movement had a very skeletal structure? Apart from the fact that Ngaïssona had 10 been appointed national coordinator, there were not many positions occupied by 11 other people running the structure; am I correct?

A. [15:28:52] Yes, there was no structure. Right up to the return of Maxime
Mokom, as I have said, the Anti-Balaka were not structured. The organisation chart
that you have just said was just there in name, and it would not have existed on paper
if there was no Brazzaville forum. So this existed only on paper. There was only
Ngaïssona and Mokom who had their positions. So the Anti-Balaka were not
structured.

Q. [15:29:43] So now, at the very beginning of 2014, what was the purpose of thecoordination? What was its role?

A. [15:29:58] At the very beginning, when you asked me this question, the
coordination, as you have heard from other witnesses confirming that the Anti-Balaka
with -- asking Ngaïssona to represent them, but to represent them where? The
international community? Trying to resolve the crisis? You had the embassies of
France and the United States, for example, who were helping them. And in the
international mediation, trying to manage the crisis, the Anti-Balaka thought that

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1 amongst them there was no one who was capable of communicating with those 2 entities. So this is why they asked Ngaïssona to take the floor or to go into contact 3 with those entities and then report back to them. So there was the issue of speaking, 4 negotiating and resorting to dialogue, rather than weapons. So dialogue was the 5 way out of the crisis. 6 [15:31:30] *So if I understand you correctly, Mr Witness, Mr Ngaïssona's role Q. 7 was essentially political. It did not include the operational side of things. Am I right 8 in so saying? 9 [15:31:46] Yes, you are correct. Because I personally do not see an operational A. 10 side when we are talking about coordination, and I do not see an operational side. 11 But I would say, and I would specify, that there was a gentleman who was still operational. 12 13 THE INTERPRETER: [15:32:13] Inaudible. 14 MS PROULX: [15:32:18](Interpretation) 15 [15:32:18] In your interview with the Office of the Prosecutor you said that the Q. 16 only individual who had contact with the leaders, the Anti-Balaka leaders, was 17 Maxime Mokom. So, if I understand you correctly, logically speaking, to your 18 knowledge, Mr Ngaïssona was not himself in contact, direct contact with those -- had 19 frequent contact with those leaders. 20 A. [15:32:45] During the operation, the Anti-Balaka would lead military operations 21 against the Seleka, and Ngaïssona did not have contact with the Anti-Balaka. It was 22 Mokom who was in contact with the Anti-Balakas at that moment in time, until 23 Ngaïssona arrived in Bangui. And once in Bangui, I can say that Ngaïssona was not 24 in contact. 25 He did not have contact with the Anti-Balaka. Some came to visit him, and then

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they exchanged telephone numbers. You will agree with me on that. Some of them
 did come and visit him, and they exchanged telephone numbers.

Q. [15:33:40] I'd like to now talk about the meetings of the coordination. There
might have been some discussions that took place at Mr Ngaïssona's residence, but
am I right in saying that the meetings of the movement were held at the Azimut
Hotel?

7 A. [15:34:04] Yes. I can tell you that meetings were held at the Azimut Hotel, and 8 all of these meetings were always about the PCUD party. Whether these were 9 meetings at Ngaïssona's residence -- but for the most part, they were held at the 10 Azimut Hotel, and it was always on the subject of the PCUD party, and the fact that it 11 was an advantage to be a part of that party, or that he had been in contact with the 12 international community and that the international community had noted certain 13 facts or violence or breaches of peace agreements in the provinces. And then they 14 would call upon Ngaïssona, who convened a meeting, to say to the Anti-Balaka that such-and-such a thing was going on. 15

Q. [15:35:13] I would like to show you another document, document 90, in the
Defence list, D30-0008-0086. And I'm going to be waiting for it to be shown up on
the screen for you to be in a position to see it yourself.

Mr Witness, this is a plan of a part of Bangui, a small part of Bangui where the HotelAzimut is visible.

Maybe we could zoom in on this a little bit for the witness to be able to see Hotel
Azimut, which is a bit further up. Could you scroll up a lit bit, please. A little bit
more. There we are. You can see it.

24 Do you see the Hotel Azimut, Mr Witness?

25 A. [15:36:20] Yes, I can see Hotel Azimut.

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1 Q. [15:36:24] Could you confirm that the other locations visible on this map -- I can 2 see here the headquarters of the CEMAC. I can also see the Chinese embassy, the 3 ministry of foreign affairs, the NGO premises. These are all located on the same 4 avenue as the Hotel Azimut, would you agree? 5 A. [15:36:50] I would agree with you. That is correct. 6 Q. [15:36:57] So this is an avenue that is quite lengthy; am I right? 7 A. [15:37:06] Yes. 8 Q. [15:37:14] And, Mr Witness, I imagine that you will agree with me when I say 9 that the Hotel Azimut is a public location. So the meetings of the movement held at 10 the Azimut Hotel were not secret in any way. Do you agree? 11 A. [15:37:31] I do agree with you. 12 Q. [15:37:40] You explained in your statement that the ComZones that were in 13 agreement with the -- Mr Ngaïssona's political project were in attendance at the 14 But I would like to know whether Mr Ngaïssona could force the meetings. 15 ComZones to come to the meetings, or could he punish any individuals who did not 16 turn up? 17 Α. [15:38:10] I could say in a response to that, well, how could he punish any 18 ComZones who did not come to the meetings? There is no means of punishment. 19 And by that I say, what kind of power could he use to punish a ComZone? 20 What is more, I would go on to say that, at the time when the ComZones were still 21 using weapons, they could punish Ngaïssona, but he could not punish the ComZones. 22 And at each meeting, those who accepted the political idea would come of their own 23 volition to the meeting. They did not come coerced in any way. They came of their 24 own volition, and they participated in that meeting willingly. 25 And I can ensure you that there were even some of them who did not accept. But

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1 when they heard that there was a meeting, they would come, despite that, to hear

2 what was going on. And once -- even when coming out of the meeting, they would
3 stay there. They would start criticising.

Q. [15:39:36] So if I understand you correctly, the fact that some ComZones would
come to the meetings did not mean that they accepted the authority of Mr Ngaïssona.
Do you agree?

7 A. [15:39:50] Yes.

8 Q. [15:39:54] So you told us at an earlier stage that during those meetings, people 9 talked about the PCUD. Now, I'd also like to know whether people would talk 10 about public takings of position, that is to say, press releases or Anti-Balaka claims or 11 as to the quartering or the DDR, et cetera, et cetera?

A. [15:40:28] Yes, indeed. When -- during this process of the restoration of peace
in the Central African Republic, a lot of things were put on the table, such as
disarmament. But if you want to disarm, if there are no meetings held, how is the
person in power going to communicate a message received from those who are in a
position to help the CAR out of this crisis? You have to find a way out of this crisis.
So the subject of disarmament was on the table. There were many subjects that were
discussed during these meetings.

If it is not the PCUD, well, it's all going to come round or back to the PCUD at the end of the day. There were meetings, and meetings were held in order to discuss how to mobilise, how to retrieve all of these weapons, how to -- or what methods to use in order to manage the situation for the country to be devoid of weapons, which is something that was often mentioned.

Q. [15:41:55] There was a person who was met by the Office of the Prosecutor who
said, on the subject of the role played by Mr Ngaïssona during those meetings, that

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Mr Ngaïssona gave advice to the ComZones for them to better control their soldiers and that he asked them to respect that -- the civilian population and said to them that if he captured people with weapons, that they would be handed over to the authorities. Does that correspond to your memory? Did you hear Mr Ngaïssona make any remarks of this type?

6 [15:42:38] Ngaïssona is always involved in sensitising Anti-Balaka ComZones A. 7 who come to the meetings. He always says things of this type. Because at a given 8 moment in time, he will ask the ComZones to keep an eye on their soldiers. At a 9 given moment in time in the capital and even when there is no exchange of gunfire, 10 or -- between the Anti-Balaka and the Seleka, there were many other cases such as 11 robbery of mobile telephones, sometimes at nighttimes, sometimes during the day, 12 and there were many cases of burglary, and it was always put on the heads of the 13 Anti-Balaka. Everyone would say, "Oh, it's the Anti-Balaka, it's the Anti-Balaka." 14 And if it was in the sectors occupied by the Anti-Balakas, so whether it was the 15 Anti-Balakas or not, the answer would be given that it was they who organised these 16 burglaries. And that is when Ngaïssona would then ask the chiefs to keep an eye on 17 their soldiers, because it is, after all, their responsibility to try and avoid these 18 incidents of burglary upon the civilian population.

Q. [15:44:15] Just for the record, the document that I was referring to is
*CAR-OTP-2111-0385, and this is at paragraph 62, but it is not to be found in our
dossier or file.

22 Now, Mr Witness, in your statement you said that you did not know whether the

23 ComZones would pass on the message received from Mr Ngaïssona to their soldiers

24 out in the field. Now, according to you, were you able to observe whether

25 Mr Ngaïssona did have means to send out his advice and instructions, and could he

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1 ensure that this advice and instructions were indeed adhered to?

A. [15:45:05] No, he could not. And even I, as a Central African living in Bangui,
when I went back to Bangui, I noted that if you asked soldiers questions, well, their
chief would never tell them anything. They were never informed of anything that
was going on. Even with regard to the DDR, did these soldiers know that there was
going to be disarmament the next day? Many did not.

7 There was the issue of raising awareness amongst each and every Central African. If

8 we wanted to restore peace in our country, we really had to work as much as we

9 possibly could to raise awareness amongst the civilian population, amongst the

10 Anti-Balaka, for the restoration of definitive peace in the Central African Republic.

But the police -- well, a chief who has soldiers and to ascertain whether he is going to
transmit that message or not, well, it's a question of raising awareness. And I can

assure you that there were some chiefs who did not. The chiefs would come to themeetings, they heard everything, they would leave, and that was it.

Q. [15:46:40] Am I right in saying that Mr Ngaïssona did not discuss operationsduring the meetings?

17 A. [15:46:57] Are you -- or what type of operations are you referring to, please?

Q. [15:47:07] That's a very good question, Mr Witness. Have you never heard
speak of any specific military operations or combat operations as such?

A. [15:47:23] I never heard Ngaïssona speak about any possible operations. What I heard was awareness raising and the restoration of peace as subject matter in those meetings. And as you said at an earlier stage, at the Hotel Azimut, there was the sound system that was used for those meetings. So nothing was hidden. Nothing could be hidden at those operation meetings. You couldn't hold an operations meeting in the capital amongst those figures of authority. There was no such

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1 meeting on operations.

2 Q. [15:48:13] At a given moment in time during a meeting, did you hear

3 Mr Ngaïssona encourage or support or voluntarily ignore the commission of violent

4 acts upon the civilian population?

5 A. [15:48:36] No. What I did note about Ngaïssona is that, if something bad

6 was -- happened, whether it be committed by an Anti-Balaka soldier or not, he would

7 get in a real state. That is the truth. He would really get in quite a state. He

8 would shout, and the Anti-Balaka leaders would then ask him questions. And those

9 who will tell you the truth will say that he was well known for that. He would get in

10 such a state, and he would say that, "When I see that person, he" -- well, he shouts a

11 lot and then he calms down, and then he says it twice or three times, and then that's it.

12 The Anti-Balaka chiefs would know him for this behaviour.

And as for acts upon the civilian population, I remember that there were some Peuhl
Muslims who were taken as a target by certain Anti-Balakas who wanted to kill them,
and there were people -- some people who called some leaders to go on that

16 location -- to that location in Bangui, and they got those Muslims. And he sent other

17 people there, too, subsequent to which he was taken back to the residence of his

18 father, and he kept those Muslims at his very own residence. And he called the

19 Imam Layama Kobine, he called Monsignor Nzapalainga to come and get them, to

20 pick them up. And at the *Tribunal de grande instance* in Bangui, an appointment was

21 made with a view to having -- handing over those Muslim civilians to the imam,

22 Imam Kobine, and Monsignor Nzapalainga. And that is what he did.

23 He also did that for a lorry belonging to a Muslim individual at PK5. This was a

24 trolleyed lorry. This was stolen by a soldier. Ngaïssona was put in the know, and

25 he did everything in his power to retrieve that lorry. And he went and seized the

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competent authorities with a view to retrieving that lorry. He drove it to the tribunal
 and handed it over to the rightful owners.

Q. [15:51:44] Now, Mr Witness, do you recall a meeting in the presence of Mr
Ngaïssona and Mr Maxime Mokom during which Mokom is alleged to have said that
they needed to continue with a view to attaining their final objective, that is, to take
over power and that each person would have or obtain recompense?

7 A. [15:52:18] Well, I don't remember what meeting between Maxime, Ngaïssona 8 we're talking about when Maxime asked for this recompense, but what I know is that 9 the two ideas are not the same. Ngaïssona is different -- Ngaïssona's idea is different 10 from that of Mokom. So the meetings that were held, well, Maxime was often absent 11 at those meetings. He was often absent at the meetings convened by Ngaïssona 12 because he knows what is going to be said with regard to raising awareness, to DDR, 13 to the cessation of the hostilities, et cetera. That's why he doesn't take part in those 14 meetings.

Q. [15:53:19] And during one of those meetings of the movement, did you hear
Mr Ngaïssona suggest that it was he who had asked the Anti-Balaka to walk towards
Bangui or to advance towards Bangui?

A. [15:53:42] Well, who -- or, which Anti-Balaka is he going to say that before him?
Well, it was the Anti-Balaka who said to him, to him himself, that it was Mokom who
was in contact with the Anti-Balaka and who took the decision to advance on Bangui.
It was Maxime who was in contact with them until they advanced on Bangui. He
was the person who -- who was really at the forefront of everything that was
happening with the Anti-Balaka.

Q. [15:54:24] Would you agree with me that the coordination did not have anymoney, did not have the financial means?

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1 A. [15:54:38] I shall repeat once again here. I would repeat once again that

2 Ngaïssona is the coordination. I said to you, do not rely on what has been written on
3 the organisational chart of this coordination.

4 According to what I know, it is Ngaïssona. And Maxime Mokom was the one who

5 was managing the operations of the Anti-Balaka until they arrived in Bangui, after

6 which the policy was put in place by Ngaïssona who was really working on

7 sensitising and on the PCUD party.

8 Q. [15:55:34] Mr Witness, to your knowledge, was there a meeting before the

9 Brazzaville forum during which the coordination decided to buy weapons and

10 ammunition for the ComZones and their soldiers?

11 A. [15:55:56] By what means could the coordination decide to buy weapons and

12 ammunition? I do not recall attending a meeting during which the coordination

13 decided to buy weapons and ammunition. It might have been in my absence, but to14 my mind, I do not know. I do not know.

Q. [15:56:26] Have you already seen or heard speak of the fact that Mr Ngaïssona
distributed weapons or ammunition to the Anti-Balaka in 2014?

17 A. [15:56:40] I have never heard it said that Ngaïssona distributed weapons to the

18 Anti-Balaka. What I heard of the Anti-Balaka, that if something happened,

19 Mr Ngaïssona would intervene, and the Anti-Balaka would say, "Well, I did not get

20 this weapon from you. It's not you who gave me a weapon or the ammunition. I

21 suffered out in the field in order to get my hands on this weapon." So that is what I

22 heard from the Anti-Balaka chiefs or leaders.

23 Q. [15:57:23] Do you recall having seen Yagouzou arriving at Ngaïssona's residence

24 in a white pickup with ammunition, weapons and grenades? And on that occasion,

25 did you see Mokom giving him money in the presence of Mr Ngaïssona and Dede

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- 1 Feissona?
- 2 A. [15:57:54] (Redacted)
- 3 (Redacted)
- 4 (Redacted)
- 5 (Redacted)
- 6 (Redacted)
- 7 (Redacted)
- 8 (Redacted)
- 9 (Redacted)
- 10 (Redacted)
- 11 (Redacted)
- 12 (Redacted)
- 13 (Redacted)
- 14 (Redacted)
- 15 (Redacted)
- 16 MS PROULX: [15:59:26] Mr President, I see the time, but I have five or six questions
- 17 to finish a section for today before the break.
- 18 PRESIDING JUDGE SCHMITT: [15:59:31] Yes, I think continue then, yeah.
- 19 MS PROULX: [15:59:41](Interpretation)
- 20 Q. [15:59:42] Mr Witness, do you remember having seen Yanoue Aubin, who was
- also known by the name of Chocolat, at the coordination meeting?
- 22 A. [15:59:55] Yanoue Aubin, Chocolat, I only have heard his name. I have never
- 23 seen him. He never came to the coordination meeting. He is there as a combatant,
- 24 but he never came to the coordination meetings.
- 25 I have heard his name being said around Bangui, but it's not easy to clap eyes on him.

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1 And it is said that his name, it's much bigger. People can see Andjilo, but it is not

2 easy to see Chocolat.

3 THE INTERPRETER: [16:00:44] Says the witness. Unclear.

4 MS PROULX: [16:00:47](Interpretation)

5 Q. [16:00:47] Have you heard speak of a meeting during which Mr Ngaïssona

6 allegedly tried to convince Andjilo and other ComZones to assist him in preparing a

7 coup d'état against Catherine Samba-Panza?

8 A. [16:01:08] No, I never heard of that meeting.

9 Q. [16:01:20] In your statement, you explain that at the end of meetings,

10 Mr Ngaïssona would give some money to enable participants return to their places.

11 Do you agree that this money was handed out publicly?

12 A. [16:01:42] Yes. Everybody would attend. The leaders of the Anti-Balaka from

13 various sectors would attend the meetings. And at the end of the meeting,

14 sometimes he would count the number of persons in attendance and then say, "500

15 francs per person for your transport, so you can get back home." And 500 francs to

16 each participant or 1,000 to each participant. And the amount would be given to one

17 of the leaders who would then share the money publicly, while he left. He would

18 either leave the money on the table or hand it over to another leader, and then he

19 leaves. But then another leader would take the money and share with the others

20 going by the number of persons in attendance for their taxi fare or their motorbike

21 fare in order to get back home.

Q. [16:02:53] According to you, did you notice that the ComZones who received
those amounts of money, were they obliged to obey Mr Ngaïssona's instructions

24 because of that money?

25 A. [16:03:14] (No interpretation)

(Open Session) ICC-01/14-01/18 **Trial Hearing** WITNESS: CAR-OTP-P-0889 1 PRESIDING JUDGE SCHMITT: [16:03:15] Ms Struyven, I think I know your 2 objection, and I think you're right, but perhaps you can put it into wordings -- into 3 words. 4 MS STRUYVEN: [16:03:22] I think we had many instances of that this afternoon. I 5 tried not to intervene too many times, but we're asking this witness repeatedly to -- to 6 identify what other peoples are thinking or what other people have said. 7 PRESIDING JUDGE SCHMITT: [16:03:34] We let it go, but this was a little bit too 8 much, I think, with this question. So this is really the point where I think it's okay to 9 intervene. 10 Please continue. I think that must be question number five, already, if I have 11 counted correctly. 12 MS PROULX: [16:03:58](Interpretation) 13 Q. [16:03:59] Mr Witness, according to you, when he gave money to the ComZones 14 who had attended the meetings, do you have any information which would lead you 15 to believe, or did you observe that Mr Ngaïssona was simply buying the votes of the ComZones? 16 17 A. [16:04:26] Buy? Buy? Well, my personal opinion, even I myself, my -- my 18 ballot cannot be bought for 500 francs, which is not even worth one euro. I can't sell 19 my ballot paper for 1,000. No, no. That's not an amount of money that would buy 20 a ComZone or ComZones. 21 Let me specify that there were some ComZones who attended the meetings but did 22 not accept the PCUD. You see, they would come because issues such as 23 disarmament would be discussed. So even if Ngaïssona was to talk about PCUD 24 and peace, some would not accept it. Others belonged to Maxime Mokom and his

25 ideology and would still attend. So that is not a good enough reason to give -- to say

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- 1 that 500 francs would buy someone's conscience. What would that be worth?
- 2 What is 500 francs worth? What is 1,000 francs worth? You cannot buy somebody's
- 3 conscience for 500 or 1,000 francs just for transport.
- 4 Q. [16:05:47] Thank you, Mr Witness.
- 5 I'll stop here for today, and then we'll resume on Wednesday morning.
- 6 PRESIDING JUDGE SCHMITT: [16:05:55] Thank you very much.
- 7 This concludes the hearing for today.
- 8 And, Mr Witness, we and all the other parties and participants, I hope everybody is
- 9 able to attend then on Wednesday, 9.30.
- 10 THE COURT USHER: [16:06:10] All rise.
- 11 (The hearing ends in open session at 4.06 p.m.)