



ICC Restricted

Transcript of Interview

Name of Interviewee	Hillary LAGEN Daniel
Location of Interview	KAMPALA, Uganda
Date of Interview	21/8/2004
Name of Interviewer 1	Peter NICHOLSON (PN)
Name of Interviewer 2	Christine CHUNG (CC)
Name of Interviewer 3	Akingbolahan ADENIRAN (AA)
Name of Interpreter	[REDACTED] (Interpreter)
Names of Other Persons Present	Michael LEES (Technician)
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- 1 [00:00:13. Start of transcript]
- 2 **Peter NICHOLSON [PN]:** We resume the Interview of Hillary LAGEN on 21 August, time is
3 12:25. The same people are in the room that are those that have been present all the way
4 through the interview and Hillary could you confirm for us if you would that we haven't continued
5 interviewing you or spoken with you or questioned you ... uh ... in the pause that we just had to
6 change the tape?
- 7 **Interpreter:** Aa ... kong dok ilok, me gine, me moko ni meno pe ki, pe ki bedo kapenyo in i kare
8 ma kiwacc ni meno kitye ka loko tape ni.
- 9 **Interviewee:** Aa ... ngat mo keken pe omedo ki penyo an, Wa lok mo bene pe w a *discussing*.
- 10 **Interpreter:** Uhh ... no-body interviewed me, and ... uh ... I did not have any discussion at all.
- 11 **PN:** Thanks.
- 12 **Interviewee:** Yes.
- 13 **PN:** Hillary, we would like to clarify ... uh ... appoint about the SOROTI attack or attacks and the
14 BARLONYO attack.
- 15 **Interpreter:** Aa ... tye lok ... aa ... lok ma wamito kong niang tere dok wamed, tutwal ne i lok
16 kom mony ma otime i kom SOROTI, kidok mony ma otime i BARLONYO.
- 17 **PN:** In your mind, did SOROTI come first, or did BARLONYO come first?
- 18 **Interpreter:** Ki kit ma in ipso kwede ... aa ... lweny ma otime i BARLONYO ni ko ... kong otime
19 ma okwongo, kece man me SOROTI ni otime ma okwongo?
- 20 **Interviewee:** Hmm ... kit ma aniang kwede, pien ni ... aa ... pol dano onongo dong tye ka dwogo
21 adwoga ki SOROTI, ka dong, BARLONYO dong obedo tye.
- 22 **Interpreter:** Uhh ... from what I remember, the people were coming back from SOROTI ...
23 uhh ... when the BARLONYO ...
- 24 **PN:** Sorry, can you say that again?
- 25 **Interpreter:** ... uhh ... from what I remember ...
- 26 **PN:** Yeah.
- 27 **Interpreter:** ... the people who are coming back from BAR... from SOROTI ... uh ... were the
28 ones who may have been involved in BARLONYO.
- 29 **PN:** OK. But which attacks or attack took place first in time, SOROTI or BARLONYO?
- 30 **Interpreter:** Mene ma kikwonggo monyo ne, BARLONYO, kece gin man me SOROTI ni?
- 31 **Interviewee:** Ii SOROTI, gin gubedo mere ka wot nen calo *operation*, Ki dong, kabedo ma
32 gubedo ka *attacking* iye pe aniang. Ento lweny obedo mere i SOROTI ikare endo ni, ki lweny bene
33 obedo i Lango.
- 34 **Interpreter:** Now, what I know is that ... uhh ... there was generally operation in ... in SORO... in
35 SOROTI ...
- 36 **PN:** Hmm ... hmmm ...
- 37 **Interpreter:** ... in Teso, but at the same time, there was also operation in Lango.

38. **PN:** Hmm ... hmm.
39. **Interpreter:** But ... uh ... in terms of time, I don't really know, which was first, which was the last.
40. **Interviewee:** Hmm ... kit ma an awaco li acaki ne ni, wac ... ee ... KONY owaco ni *operation*
41. obed i Lango ki i SOROTI.
42. **Interpreter:** Ehh ... from what I know of what KONY... uh ... the order that KONY gave, he gave
43. orders for attacks in Teso and ... uh ...
44. **Interviewee:** Lango.
45. **Interpreter:** ... and Lango.
46. **PN:** Hmm ... hmm.
47. **Interpreter:** Now this meant attacks in different places ...
48. **PN:** Uhh ... uhh.
49. **Interpreter:** ... in both places.
50. **Interviewee:** Ci omiyo dong niang ne matek ni lweny ma obedo eno ni, obedo iyi acaki lwiye ni,
51. ento *attack*, lweny obedo mere dong i LANGO ki i SOROTI. *Operation* ne obedo en i kabedo aryo
52. ma KONY owaco ni.
53. **Interpreter:** There were operations going on at the same time.
54. **PN:** Hmm ... hmm.
55. **Interpreter:** In both Lango and Teso.
56. **PN:** Hmm ... hmm.
57. **Interpreter:** And ... uhh ... in terms of which particular places were attacked first or last, that's
58. difficult for me to know.
59. **Christine CHUNG [CC]:** Were you, were you with KONY on the banks of the AGAGO one time
60. or more than one time?
61. **Interpreter:** Uhh ... irwate ki KONY i gine, i but ... ee ... inget gine, AGAGO kicel nyo tyen
62. makato kicel?
63. **Interviewee:** Uh ... an arwate kwede kicel eno ni keken dong wa tin dong amedo ki dwogo pe.
64. amedo ki rwate kwede.
65. **Interpreter:** This was only once, and ... uhh ... the last time since ... also up to the time when I
66. came back.
67. **PN:** OK. Just before the break we were talking about KONY ordering a... attacks in a general
68. region and sometimes having special instructions for special places.
69. **Interpreter:** Ma pwod pe ya wacito gine ... e... ywe... ma gine ... uh ... lok pa tape ni ... uh ...
70. wabe... wabedo ka lok pi gine KONY goto *order* me mony, kabedo mafac mere. Kidong, pi
71. kabedo mogo ma pir gi ... pire tego, en golo en kikome bene onongo, *order* mapat.
72. **Interviewee:** [Nodding]
73. **Interpreter:** Yes.
74. **PN:** And you mentioned OLILIM, PABBO and PAJULE as three special places.

- 75 **Interpreter:** Dok iwaco, pi kabedo ma in iwaco ni gine, pirgi onongo tego mada bot KONY, nying
76 ilwongo OLILIM, PABBO, ki PAJULE.
- 77 **PN:** Why are they special places?
- 78 **Interpreter:** Pingo itamo ni pirgi onongo tego tutwal bot KONY?
- 79 **Interviewee:** Niang ne kibot an romo bedo tek. Ento kit ma an atamo kwede, en waco ni omiyero
80 efim aranyi kamo ma dano dwong iye, wek wii lobo onge ni en atye ka lweny.
- 81 **Interpreter:** Now, it's difficult for me to know precise ... uh ... reasons but there was the other
82 point that ... uh ... that I believe was important here, his idea was that when they are doing such
83 operations, they should be in places were there are a lot of people ... uh ...
- 84 **Interviewee:** Wek wilobo onge ni en etek.
- 85 **Interpreter:** ... so that the rest of the world may know, about what is going on.
- 86 **PN:** And you mentioned that ... uhm ... that KONY ordered that ALERO Camp to be attacked.
- 87 **Interpreter:** Iwaco ni ...
- 88 **CC:** Yeah.
- 89 **PN:** Yes, ALERO Camp ...
- 90 **Interpreter:** ... iwaco ni meno gine, KONY ogolo *order* me gine, me monyo ALERO gine Camp,
91 me AL... me ALERO.
- 92 **PN:** Did he say, did he order that camp particularly or was it more of a general order?
- 93 **Interpreter:** Ma en ogolo *order* ni eno ni, onongo, ni meno myero kicit ki mony en ALERO ni kece
94 gine, en kit man me Teso ki Lango me... mere ocito mere en gine kaka mo... kakare ni ego ni?
- 95 **Interviewee:** Ikare eno ni en omiyo *order* onongo me *attacking* Camp. Ento en kadong mito miyo
96 ne dong, miyo ki *call sign*, wek pe UPDF onge nongo.
- 97 **Interpreter:** Now, at this time he gave orders for attacking camps but ... uh ... when he's... he's
98 giving now specific orders then these were coded, so that the UPDF will not ... uh ... get that
99 information.
- 100 **Interviewee:** Ento, yes, en waco ki nying mogo ma romo waco ni ... "OKWONGA, OKWONGA,
101 amito ni kicel OKWONGA woko" ... Ci nongo pien OKWONGA nyinge OKWONGA ALERO, ci
102 nongo in dong iniang ni OKWONGA ni anga? En ALERO. En aye *point* mogo ma iniang.
- 103 **Interpreter:** For example ... uh ... one of the things he will say is for instance ... "Let's shoot
104 OKWONGA, OKWONGA, OKWONGA." And ... uh ... everybody know that OKWONGA is also
105 called ALERO also, OKWONGA ALERO. So by talking of go and shoot OKWONGA
106 ALE... OKWONGA, people should understand that he is going to shoot ALERO.
- 107 **PN:** And you knew, you knew this when you were in the LRA or after you came out along with the
108 UPDF?

- 109 **Interpreter:** Man en kit lok ma kit ni egi ni ... ee ... ma iwaco pwod awaco ni en lok kom nying
110 OKWONGA gin ni. Ingeyo ma pwod itye i lum kece Ingeyo madong itye ki gine, ki bot jo UPDF.
- 111 **Interviewee:** *Call sign* eno ni en ikare ma wan otye kuno ni en aye yoo ma en, the late OMONA
112 *Field opwonyo* k en.
- 113 **Interpreter:** OMONA?
- 114 **Interviewee:** *The late OMONA. OMONA Field, Field Commander.*
- 115 **Interpreter:** Uhh ... this is, while I was still in the bush this is one of the things that he
116 was...KONY was taught by the Field Commander OMONA ... OMONA who is now dead.
- 117 **Interviewee:** OMONA George.
- 118 **Interpreter:** Joyce OMONA.
- 119 **PN:** KONY was taught?
- 120 **Interviewee:** Was, OMONA aye opwonyo ki en.
- 121 **Interpreter:** Yeah, it was Joyce OMONA ... uh ... who actually taught KONY, this.
- 122 **PN:** Hmm.
- 123 **Interviewee:** Pien en obedo i UNLA onongo tye *Signaller*.
- 124 **Interpreter:** Because ... uh ... she was with the ...when ... when she was with the previous
125 Ugandan Army, she was with the Signals Section.
- 126 **Interviewee:** Oi omiyo dong lok me *[unintelligible]* kono *verbal*, kono *verbals words* pe niango an
127 kit ma kilwongo kwede.
- 128 **Interpreter:** Uh ... which ... uh ... involved a lot of use of words ... uh ... to convey specific ...
129 other messages, but I don't know the technicalities of this.
- 130 **Interviewee:** Hmm.
- 131 **CC:** But the example that you used of "Let's shoot OKWONGA" is that a example that you made
132 up or that KONY used "Let's shoot OKWONGA" as "Let's get ALERO"?
- 133 **Interviewee:** Hmm.
- 134 **Interpreter:** Uhh ... man ma in igine ni, ma in inyutu me ki me celo gine, OKWONGA ni ... ee ...
135 man en aye gin ma otime kece gine, iwaco mere me nyutu kit me kit cike, kit ma lok ne woto
136 kwede onongo?
- 137 **Interviewee:** Hmm ... awaco kit lok ne manongo kit ma lok ne woto kwede. Pien en dong eni ni
138 en dong pango apanga, pol ok ne weng gin pango en kit ni eno ni.

- 139 **Interpreter:** No, I used this only to illustrate ... uh ... the manner of command. Because that's the
140 kind of command that he was using quite a lot.
- 141 **Interviewee:** Hmm ... *pien en loko woko lcaro lok, i parables.*
- 142 **Interpreter:** Because he quite often uses parables and ... uh ... uh ... sayings and things like
143 that.
- 144 **Interviewee:** Kit ma lawor an awaco ni, owaco ni kigony Hillary woko ki mi bot *civilian*. Ento tyen
145 lok ne ni ginaka aneka, ni kigony calo ogonyo LAGONY ni.
- 146 **Interpreter:** Uh ... is... is the same as what, what I was saying ... uh ... last, the other time
147 about ... "Let's release Hillary, just like we released LAGONY". By doing ... they ... b... when
148 he's saying this he doesn't really, he did not really mean ... uh ... "Let's... let him go free to the
149 civilians" ...
- 150 **PN:** Hmm ... hmm.
- 151 **Interpreter:** ... what actually meant is ... "Let's ... he should be killed."
- 152 **PN:** Hmm ... hmm.
- 153 **Interpreter:** And people generally understood this type of instruction.
- 154 **Interviewee:** Kine mukene romo waco ni, ... "Ogoo dud nyer ni odo pyere abic" ... *iwi ati nyo*
155 *odoo apar wiye abic, dong gbinoko in aneka.*
- 156 **Interpreter:** And another example of the...that type of instruction, felt...coded but not really
157 generally understood was ... "Let's ... uh ... give such and such a person 50 ...
- 158 **Interviewee:** Nyo...
- 159 **Interpreter:** ... on the buttocks.
- 160 **Interviewee:** ... *apar wiye abic.*
- 161 **Interpreter:** Or 15. And people understood this to mean "kill him."
- 162 **CC:** Let ... let so let's talk about some of the examples that you gave like PABBO and PAJULE?
- 163 **Interpreter:** Kong dok wamede kilok ikom gine, labol mogo ma imiyo lok ikom PABBO ki PAJULE
164 ni.
- 165 **CC:** What were the orders that KONY gave?
- 166 **Interpreter:** Aa ... kit *order* ma nining ma KONY ogine ogolo, lok ikom PABBO ki lok ikom
167 PAJULE?
- 168 **Interviewee:** Eno ni me ace! *jo mu aa kibote kuno, ma gukelo megilotino bot wa ni ...*

- 169 **Interpreter:** Uh ... first; the women who came to us ... uh ... with children ...
- 170 **Interviewee:** Nen calo ... idwe me aboro me mwaka okati.
- 171 **Interpreter:** ... that must have been about August last year.
- 172 **Interviewee:** En owaco ni opwonyo gin ni, ikin PAJULE ki PABBO omyero kigoo woko ma
173 gilwongo ni *Baghdad Operation*.
- 174 **Interpreter:** Uh ... it was, these women were telling us that KONY had been ... uh ... talking of
175 between PAJULE and PABBO ... uh ... there must be a, a throughout beating which should be
176 called "Baghdad Operation".
- 177 **Interviewee:** Wa officers ma guwoto ni ducu weng gitito en lok acal ni. Ni lok me *Baghdad*
178 *Operation*.
- 179 **Interpreter:** Even officers ... uh ... who came, were talking were talking of the same ... uh ...
180 plan, "The Baghdad Operation".
- 181 **CC:** So, this is information that you have from people who've escaped, is that right?
- 182 **Interpreter:** Man eni lok ma gine, ingeyo ki bot jo madong o ... o... odok gine, guwoko dong lum
183 wo'ko?
- 184 **Interviewee:** Aa ... aa! Eno ni onongo pwod atye i lum, i mwaka mukato ni, i dwe me abongwen
185 aboro gi ni, ii mwaka ma okato ni.
- 186 **Interpreter:** This is ... these are pieces of information ... uh ... from the time when I was still in
187 the bush.
- 188 **CC:** OK.
- 189 **Interpreter:** ... [Unintelligible] ... August –September last year.
- 190 **CC:** OK. When you said that you had that information from "Women who came to us with
191 children", you mean women who you met while you're still in the LRA?
- 192 **Interpreter:** Manyute ni gine, ma ibiwaco ni en aye gine, dano ma irwate kwed gi manongo in
193 pwod itye i lum?
- 194 **Interviewee:** Oo, eno ni *officer* ma gukelo mon i LRA bot wakenyo, mogo pa kibot KONY i
195 Sudan.
- 196 **Interpreter:** Uh ... what ... what I'm talking of are people, officers who brought women from
197 KONY in Sudan, to us, in the, in the Sick Bay.
- 198 **CC:** Why don't we do this? Yesterday you've mentioned ... Let's make the first category, this, this
199 category that I'm about to name. Yesterday we asked you on which occasions you heard KONY
200 given orders about attacks. You yourself heard KONY giving orders about attacks.

201 **Interpreter:** Laworo ma obedo kalok ... uh ... pien wamito gine, poko lok ne woko tare ki ... kidul
202 ne ki dul ne mapat pat. Ki ma okwongo laworo wabedo kawaco ni meno gine, tye *order* mogo ma
203 in iwinyo in ki iti, nyo ma ineno KONY gine, golo me, me cito ka mony.

204 **CC:** So, yesterday we talked about BARLONYO.

205 **Interpreter:** Laworo waloko pi BARLONYO.

206 **CC:** And today we talked about SOROTI series of attacks.

207 **Interpreter:** Tin waloko pi lweny ma obedo ka time i gine, i Teso.

208 **CC:** Another one that you mentioned yesterday was ATIAK.

209 **Interpreter:** Laworo bene lwaco lok kom gin ma otime ATIAK.

210 **CC:** Was that the times that you heard KONY him... that you, yourself heard KONY giving
211 directions?

212 **Interpreter:** Eni bene en ma ... me ATIAK bene iwinyo in ki iti ka KONY gine, golo *order* ma kit ni
213 eno ni?

214 **Interviewee:** Me ATIAK ni, pien ni ikara ma oyubo dul mony ci omiyo bot OTTI LAGONY ma en
215 oneko ni. Ci owaco ni OTTI ocit ocel ATIAK woko ma o *addressing* ki dano, i PALUTAKA.

216 **Interpreter:** Now, for the ATIAK ... uh ... KONY ... uh ... they had put together a troop ... uh ...
217 some troops and gave it to OTTI LAGONY to go and attack ... uh ... ATIAK.

218 **CC:** And how do you know this?

219 **Interpreter:** Eni kono Ingeyo nining?

220 **Interviewee:** Ma onongo en tye kalok ki i *stand by*, mony ma gimyo bot LAGONY me bino i
221 Uganda kany. Onongo watye PALUTAKA i Sudan.

222 **Interpreter:** This is when I was still in PALUTAKA, in Sudan and ... uh ... this was also open,
223 public ... uh ... statement, and public address from KONY.

224 **Interviewee:** Onongo tye ka *addressing* ki mony madong giyero eno me bino kalweny dong me
225 timo *operation* i Uganda.

226 **Interpreter:** This was an address to the soldiers who have been selected to go for this operation
227 in Uganda.

228 **CC:** What did KONY say as part of his address to the soldiers?

229 **Interpreter:** Ee ... jami ngo mukene ma en oloko eni i ilok ni eno ki gine ni, ki jo madong guguro
230 gin ni ocit kamony?

231 **Interviewee:** Hmm! Lok ne dong orif ba, ento ena aye *point* madit ma wiya oluru ki...wiya opoo
232 iye ni. Pien lok dong pe aromo makone *detail* ne weng.

233 **Interpreter:** Now. It is quite some time now. I can't really remember much of the detail but I know
234 is an important part.

235 **CC:** You know that it... you know that it?

236 **Interpreter:** An important part of, what happened.

237 **Interviewee:** En oloko mere ma owaco ni gicit ki cel ngo, oguro *officers* madong obitiyo kimony ni
238 kicit ocel ATIAK dong. En aye *point* ma an aniang eno.

239 **Interpreter:** Uh...The only thing, which I've mentioned already, that he told the officers, he...he
240 addressed the officers and the people who were going for this attack in...while in PALUTAKA.

241 **CC:** And what about...another one that you've mentioned was the ABOKE Girls?

242 **Interpreter:** Mukene ma, labol mukene ma laworo iwaco ma en KONY aye ogine, ogolo *order* me
243 tie ma obedo lok ikom anyira ABOKE. Man kakare?

244 **Interviewee:** Oo! Eno ni obedo kakare, ma owaco ni emito ni emak anyira mo ma obiwero wa ii
245 lobo dok guyenyo kama en KONY itye iye. Eni ducu pwonyo iwi idano.

246 **Interpreter:** Yes. It's true. Uh ... in fact, what he, what he was saying was that ... "We have to do
247 this, take the girls, to make the rest of the world ... uh ... feel so bad that they'll start wanting to
248 find KONY."

249 **CC:** Why ... why what did ... did KONY say, did you ever hear him explain why he wanted the
250 rest of the world to find him?

251 **Interpreter:** Ee ... ipoo gine, kare mo ma nyo KONY obedo katito pingo en emito ni gine, wilobo
252 ononge, pingo omyero wilobo onge en, dok ononge ... ocit kayenyo en?

253 **Interviewee:** En waiyo waco ni, jami ma en etimo eno ni, wek olo wilobo onong yoo me konyo
254 en, nyo wilobo onong yoo me keto *sanction* ikom gamente ni, gamente ni pe romo keto LRA, ci
255 owaco ni en aye etimo gin ma kit ni eno ni.

256 **Interpreter:** Uh ... there were 2 particular aspects, one was that to persuade the, to convince the
257 rest of the world that ... uh ... they have to intervene, to put pressure on the government,
258 because they are not able to, to do their job of protecting the people ... uh ... secondly, to
259 give ...to help him, to give support to him.

260 **CC:** OK. Now ... now what I like you to do is to think about, think about the period after operation
261 Iron Fist.

262 **Interpreter:** Man, wamito dong lok pi kare madong ocake, inge gine, *operation* man me *Iron Fist*
263 ni.

- 264 **CC:** And I ... I know in that period you were not with KONY very often.
- 265 **Interpreter:** Dok angeyo ni meno gine, aniang ni meno ikare no eno ni, nicake ikare ni eno ni, pe
266 lbedo karwate ki KONY madli.
- 267 **CC:** But, were there times when he gave orders and you heard them through the radio or, or
268 some other way that you knew he was giving orders to attack particular places?
- 269 **Interpreter:** Tye kare mo ma ipoo ma en ogine, ki labol, ma en obedo ka gine, ma ogolo *order*,
270 me cito ka Iweny ma iwinyo nyo ki i *radio* gi?
- 271 **Interviewee:** Hmm ... Ingeye madong an aa i *Iron Fist* en? En tye kapenyo inge ... inge wot ma
272 en madong wacako i *Iron Fist* eni?
- 273 **Interpreter:** Yes. Uhh ... are you ... are you asking about ... uh ... after the Iron Fist Operation?
- 274 **CC:** Yeah, which ... we are asking about a more recent time period.
- 275 **Interpreter:** Aa ... pi kare madok cokcok, pe macon ne, ikare madong gine *Iron Fist* dong otime
276 dong.
- 277 **CC:** An example is, you heard through the radio instructions about attacking Lango.
- 278 **Interpreter:** Macalo labol, en lok ma in iwaco ma gine, ni en ogolo *order* me cito kamonyo gine
279 Lango gin ni.
- 280 **CC:** So, other than the time we've already talked about, were there other times when you heard
281 instructions through the radio or you directly heard instructions that KONY was giving about
282 attacking particular places?
- 283 **Interpreter:** Tye gine, labol mo mukene ma iromo miyo, macalo en gine man me BARLONYO ki
284 man ... ma ... man me Teso ki Lango gin ni. Mapat ki madong kiwaco ni, ma iwinyo in ki iti, ma en
285 golo *order* me gine, me cwalo, me cwalo ... me cito kamonyo kabedo moni en, pi...
- 286 **Interviewee:** Pien wan me bino wa i *Iron Fist* en, wadonyo idwe me abiro, i mwaka alip aryo ki
287 aryo. Ci, dong wabedo labongo radio me gwoko megi lotino. Kare eno ni onongo pwod wabedo
288 *radio* paka dong wamede nongo kwede en warwate ki en eno, madong golo *order* me cito otime
289 *operation* i SOROTI i dwe me acel.
- 290 **Interpreter:** Now, from the time of the Iron Fist Opera... Operation Iron Fist, we were moved into
291 ACHOLI, into the Ca... Sick Bay ... uh ...
- 292 **Interviewee:** Idwe me abiro.
- 293 **Interpreter:** ... uh ... this was in July, then we didn't really have ... uh ... regular access to radio,
294 so it's only the few times which I already talked about when we, when I overheard some of these
295 things.
- 296 **PN:** And you also mentioned ... uh ... Hillary, that KONY had ordered the attack on ABIA.

- 297 **Interpreter:** lwaco bene ni iwinye gine, KONY ogolo *order* me manyo gine, ABIA.
- 298 **PN:** How do you know that?
- 299 **Interpreter:** Eni kono ingeyo ningning?
- 300 **Interviewee:** Eno ni, en ikare madong jo mukene ma aa kibot o... pien ikare eno ni, en owaco ni
301 dano opoke matino tino. Kong itit ki en.
- 302 **Interpreter:** Yeah, at this time ... uh ... what instructions he had given was ... uh ... for the LRA
303 troops to move in small ... small ... small groups.
- 304 **Interviewee:** Ci *brigades* en calo pa ODHIAMBO guket madwong, opoke madwong.
- 305 **Interpreter:** So, brigades such as that of ODHIAMBO split into very small groups.
- 306 **Interviewee:** Hmm ... ci, ikare ma gin oiwenyo ABIA eno ni, cidong guwaco ki wan ni, wanongo
307 en lotino mukene ma aa kibot jo no eno, owaco ni ... aa ... KONY omyo gi *order* ni gicel ABIA.
308 Dong pe gutito ki wan *detail* ne.
- 309 **Interpreter:** So, what information I've given, was what actually we got from the some of the
310 soldiers who were involved in that attack on ABIA.
- 311 **Interviewee:** Hmm. Pien *convoy* ka gimito lwany kong gipoke matino tino, ka gimito lweny ci
312 girwate, ka gulwenyo ci poka woko dano apar, apar, apar.
- 313 **Interpreter:** What normally happened is that ... uh ... this, the soldiers go in large groups but split
314 in small groups before the attack and actually come together at the point of attack itself ...
- 315 **PN:** Hmm ... hmm..
- 316 **Interpreter:** ... and soon after the attack split again into the smaller groups up to maybe ten
317 people.
- 318 **Interviewee:** Pi lok me lworo *Helicopter Gunship*.
- 319 **Interpreter:** To minimize the risk from the helicopter ...
- 320 **Interviewee:** Hmm.
- 321 **Interpreter:** ... gunships.
- 322 **Interviewee:** Ci gin ni eri wariang kibot jo mukene manongo gupoke ni. Ni KONY en aye owaco,
323 cidong pe wapenyo *detail* ne.
- 324 **Interpreter:** So, the information about attack in ABIA, which I've given, was what some of this
325 people ...
- 326 **PN:** Hmm.

- 327 **Interpreter:** ... in the small groups, told us.
- 328 **PN:** C... can you remember when ABIA, when the ABIA attack ... attack took place?
- 329 **Interpreter:** Ipoo awene kikome ma lweny man me ABIA ni obedo iye?
- 330 **Interviewee:** Hmm ... niang ne tek, pien madong jo ni ocelo ABIA, ci wawinyo ki *i radio FM*. Ento
331 dong otero dwe maromo cokook aryo adi kadok warwate ki jo mukene ni, cidong niang ikom dwe
332 ne kikome tek. Pien adoko lagoba woko.
- 333 **Interpreter:** Now, it's difficult to remember ...
- 334 **PN:** Hmm ... hmm.
- 335 **Interpreter:** ... when exactly this attack took place but he heard also over rad... the FM radio and
336 then ...
- 337 **Interviewee:** En inge mere warwate kwed gi.
- 338 **Interpreter:** ... and then, afterward, we also met some of the people who took part in this attack.
- 339 **PN:** Do ... do you remember it taking place this year or last year or before Iron Fist or after Iron
340 Fist, how would you ... how?
- 341 **Interpreter:** Ipoo nyo ka gine lweny ni eni ni otime ma pwod peya *Iron Fist* otime iye, kece nyo
342 otime gine, pwod i mwaka ni, onyo mwaka mukato ni?
- 343 **Interviewee:** Ahh! Eno ni otime i mwaka ni. Ento dwe ne aye pe wiya pe romo poo.
- 344 **Interpreter:** This took ... this ... uh ... this happened this year but I just can't remember the
345 month.
- 346 **Interviewee:** HGmm.
- 347 **PN:** And you... you mentioned about ODHIAMBO's men who was split down into small groups. Is
348 this an example or is this, or was ODHIAMBO the Commander when ABIA took place?
- 349 **Interpreter:** Aa ... iwaco pi gine, pi nying ODHIAMBO ... ee ... en aye obedo onongo ladit
350 maloyo mony me timo gine, ma ocito monyo gine ALER ... ee ... ABIA, kece gine, iye... itiyi
351 nyinge mere me nyuto gine, kit ma lomony poko kwede ka inge lweny kin gi oket.
- 352 **Interviewee:** Hmm ... kit ma lawar an awaco ningo, *attack* eno ni, *attack* me ABIA ki me
353 BARLONYO obedo *group* pa ODHIAMBO.
- 354 **Interpreter:** As I was mentioning yesterday, the attack on ... uh ... ABIA and BARLONYO
355 actually were under the command of ... uh ... of ODHIAMBO.
- 356 **Interviewee:** Ento en pe ocito iye en kikome, en yubo kadong dano cito.

357 **Interpreter:** But, he did not take part in those attacks himself, he just organised the people who
358 attacked.

359 **PN:** OK.

360 **CC:** What did he do to ... to organise the attacks?

361 **Interpreter:** En dong kono tic ne madli me gine, me yubo en lweny ni ego ni, mony ni ego ni,
362 obedo ngo?

363 **Interviewee:** Hmm ... dong pe aniang ki *convoy*, kibote kuno, ento lotino manongo warwate
364 kwede wapenyo ni nga ocito kuno, en aye dong gin tito, cidong tic pa en ODHIAMBO ni dong, pe
365 aniang dong tutwal ne dong.

366 **Interpreter:** Now, I don't know what exactly ... uh ... he did or did not do because ... uh ... what I
367 told you is just more what the soldiers who ... were telling us of the operation itself.

368 **Interviewee:** Kidong jo madongo, tic gi me lubo ... gamo *order* bot KONY gin dong yubo lok me
369 cito ka ngo, kalweny eno ni.

370 **Interpreter:** But in most cases what actually happen is that ... uh ... the commanders got orders
371 from KONY and then implemented these orders on the ground.

372 **PN:** Do you know the names of any of the soldiers or officers who told you about ABIA after the
373 attack?

374 **Interpreter:** Ipoo nying ngatimo keken jo ma, ma otito ki in gine, ngo ma otime ABIA ni, inge
375 lweny ni eno ni?

376 **Interviewee:** Aa ... lotino eno ma warwate kwede gi lotino ma gilwongo ni *Iron Fist*, ma tyen lok
377 ne lotino ma kimako gi ikare me *Iron Fist*. Cidong niang nying gi tek, ento guwaco ni LABONGO
378 obedo tye iye. En ate ngat ma an aniang me acel eno, *officer* ma ocito ABIA obedo LABONGO,
379 bene niongo dbk pwod iye.

380 **Interpreter:** Now ... uh ... what information I have, is only from ... uh ... the LRA fighters who
381 were captured during the Iron Fist Operation and people who actually took part in this attack on,
382 on ABIA. But ... uh ... from then, what I know is that ... uh ... that LABONGO was involved in this
383 attack.

384 **Interviewee:** LABONGO OKASI.

385 **Interpreter:** LABONGO OKASI.

386 **Interviewee:** Hmm. En ngat ma obedo i BARLONYO ni.

387 **PN:** OK.

388 **Interpreter:** Hmm?

389 PN: Sorry?

390 Interpreter: This was al... this is the same person who was also involved in BARLONYO.

391 PN: OK. OK. You also ... uh ... said yesterday that ... uh ... Vincent OTTI ordered an attack on
392 WIANONO camp, in June, this year.

393 Interpreter: Lawor bene iwaco nimene Vincent OTTI ogolo order me gine, me monyo WIA...
394 WIANONO gine, Camp.

395 PN: Did you know about that order when you were still with the LRA or did you know about it after
396 you came out of the LRA?

397 Interpreter: Lok ma eni, ingeyo ma, ma onongo pwod itye i lum, kece dong ingeyo kigine ki bot jo
398 UPDF madong itye woko?

399 Interviewee: Aa, eno ni dong angeyo kibot Officers mukene madong oa en kibot OTTI. Dong pe
400 aniang ki i lum ento aniang bot officers mukene madong oaa kibot OTTI.

401 Interpreter: Now, this is something that I have learned ... uh ... from other officers who have left
402 the bush.

403 PN: And can you tell me a name or names of the other officers?

404 Interpreter: Ehe ... iromo tito ki wan nying en jo ma guwaci lok ma kiti eno ni?

405 Interviewee: Hmm ... calo Major ICAYA, LUWUM ICAYA.

406 Interpreter: One of them was Major ICAYA, ICAYA LUWUM.

407 Interviewee: Ma oloke aloka.

408 Interpreter: Who has just ... uh ... crossed over.

409 Interviewee: Aa ... ki me aryo awinyo bot escort pa en OTTI ma kimako amaka iwang Iweny.

410 Interpreter: And then another person was, OTTI, who was actually captured On the fighting.

411 Interviewee: Escort pa en OTTI!

412 Interpreter: Oh esco... the escort of OTTI. Someone who was actually captured in ... in action.

413 PN: OK.

414 Interviewee: Nyinge kilwongo ni OM... OM... OMON Lieutenant ... Lieutenant, yes, OMON.
415 OMON, kimaka iwang Iweny.

416 Interpreter: Uh ... he was a Lieutenant OMON, OMON.

417 PN: OK. Let's see.

418 Interviewee: Oh ... excuse. OMON is a 2nd Lieutenant. Sorry, sorry. Excuse. 2nd Lieutenant!!

419 Interpreter: Yeah, OMON is a 2nd Lieutenant.

420 PN: Hmm ... hmm.

421 Interviewee: Hmm.

422 PN: OK. Uhm ... Hillary, after Iron Fist can you remember any other attacks that took place
423 min ... uh ... [unintelligible] ... by the LRA, in Uganda?

424 Interpreter: Aa ... iromo paa nyo gine, ki label ... aa ... lweny mo mukene ma otime ma LRA
425 omonyoo, ogine, okelo inge operation man me Iron Fist ni, i Uganda?

426 Interviewee: Aa ... end ni ikare ma onongo wan pwod wadong woko i Sudan, wawinyo ni OTTI i
427 ocelo ... MARA AWOBI Camp i PABBO.

428 Interpreter: Uh ... while...while we were still in Sudan what I, I remember hearing was that OTTI,
429 had attacked ... uh ... MARA AWOBI.

430 Interviewee: Hmm ... MARA AWOBI.

431 Interpreter: The Camp called MARA AWOBI.

432 Interviewee: MARA ...

433 CC: MARA?

434 Interpreter: ... AWOBI.

435 CC: Which District, do you know?

436 Interpreter: In PABBO.

437 Interviewee: District GULU.

438 Interpreter: GULU District?

439 Interviewee: GULU District, PABBO Division.

440 Interpreter: In GULU District, PABBO Division.

441 Interviewee: Aa ... ki MATATA. Olwenyo i ... i Camp ANAKA bene.

442 Interpreter: And MATATA attacked ... uh ... the Camp in ANAKA.

443 Interviewee: Hmm.

444 PN: When were these attacks?

445 Interpreter: Meno ni obedo awene?

446 PN: Can you remember?

447 Interpreter: Ipoa?

448 Interviewee: Ocake madong pien ni, ma kilwenyo ikom wadong i KATIRE, ci OTTI dong opoke
449 obino en idwa me aryo, *I mean, sorry, nen ni ...* madong kituko wan ki LUBANGA TEK, ci OTTI
450 dong opoke odonyo ii Uganda. Wan watemo me bino UPDF o... odwoko wan woko.

451 Interpreter: This was ... uh ... when we have been attacked while in the camps in Sudan ...
452 uh ... those of OTTI had managed to get into Uganda, but when we tried to cross into Uganda the
453 UPDF ... uh ... blocked our way, this is when these attack took place.

454 Interviewee: Ento i mwaka alip aryo ki aryo ni mere.

455 Interpreter: But, this was in 2002.

456 Interviewee: Hmm ... pien wan onongo wadong woko ki KONY, onongo watye kawot i *group* ma
457 KONY iye iye, cidong kicelo wa i OWINY KI BUL, ci wadok woko.

458 Interpreter: I, I was in the group with KONY and then we were attacked ... uh ... in OWINY
459 KIBUL.

460 CC: You were attacked in?

461 Interpreter: OWINY, OWINY... O-W-I-N-Y.

462 CC: Hmm ... hmm.

463 Interviewee: Ma kineko iye Lt. Col ...

464 PN: Hmm ... hmm.

465 Interpreter: KIBUL.

466 Interviewee: ... kineko iye Lieutenant Colonel LUMUMBA.

467 CC: ... hang, hang, hang, hang... *[inaudible]* ...

468 Interviewee: Sorry, sorry.

469 Interpreter: OWINY KI BUL.

470 CC: OWINY KIBUL is where you were attack that's 1 place?

471 Interpreter: Yes.

- 472 Interviewee: Ikare madong watye kabino abina me donyo i Uganda.
- 473 Interpreter: Uhh ... this is where we were attacked when we were on our way with KONY ...
- 474 CC: Hmm ... hmm.
- 475 Interpreter: ... to come back into Uganda.
- 476 Interviewee: OTTI onongo tye ka ngolo ki ikin godi li AGORO me donyo dong il Uganda.
- 477 Interpreter: OTTI, in the meantime had been going through AGO... AGORO, on his way to
478 Uganda.
- 479 Interviewee: li OWINY KI BUL ni kineko iye *Director of Signal, Lieutenant Colonel* Patrick
480 LUMUMBA.
- 481 Interpreter: Uh ... at that... in that attack, in OWINY KI BUL ...
- 482 CC: Hmm ... hmm.
- 483 Interpreter: ... uh ... the Lt. Colonel ...
- 484 Interviewee: Patrick LUMUMBA.
- 485 CC: Patrick LUMUMBA, yes....
- 486 Interpreter: Patrick LUMUMBA
- 487 CC: ... yeah ...
- 488 Interpreter: ... was killed. He was the Director of Signal.
- 489 Interviewee: Ma ANYWAR ma lawor oloke en *Lieutenant Colonel* en aye oleyo kakare .
- 490 Interpreter: And he was replaced by the Lt. Colonel ANYWAR who only crossed yesterday.
- 491 PN: Hmm ... hmm.
- 492 Interviewee: Ma awaco ni en romo ngeyo lok kom *order* ma KONY ogolo i *operation* ni, SOROTI
493 ni maber.
- 494 Interpreter: And then, so. When all of these operations took place this ANYWAR was now the
495 one who was in charge of the signals so he would know a lot more details on what ...
- 496 PN: Hmm ... hmm.
- 497 Interpreter: ... exactly was [unintelligible: Interviewee speaking at the same time with Interpreter].
- 498 Interviewee: En tye GULU. Tye onongo gibikelo i GULU onongo laworo maca ma wabino ni.

499 **Interpreter:** Yester... ee ... he was brought to GULU.

500 **CC:** Yeah.

501 **PN:** Yeah.

502 **Interviewee:** Cidong *attack* mukene ka mukene dong wiya pe romo poo, ento ikare endo ni mere
503 OTTI obedo kacelo *camp* mapol, ikare me *Iron Fist* ni.

504 **Interpreter:** But ... uh ... I can remember any more specific things but I am aware of is that
505 during this period OTTI attacked a number of camps in ACHOLI.

506 **PN:** OK. And how do you know that?

507 **Interpreter:** Egi ni Ingeyo gi nining?

508 **Interviewee:** Pien ni eno ni onongo pwod ma wan otye kawot onongo watye kawot wan ki KONY
509 ma en tye kamito ni edony bene i Uganda. Ci owaco ni "Oh! OTTI tin ocelo *Camp*, Oh! OTTI tin
510 ocelo *camp*" ... Erito nongo dong pe waco kabedo ne.

511 **Interpreter:** Yeah, this was the time when I was ... uh ... in the group were KONY was. And he
512 would talk. "Today OTTI has done this, he's attacked this camp, he's attacked that camp"

513 **Interviewee:** Nongo guru dano mere ci tito ki gin, tito ki gin.

514 **Interpreter:** He would call people together and tell them what has happened.

515 **Interviewee:** Cidong oo idwe me abiro, en aye dong en ocwalo wan dong wadonyo, en dong ogik
516 odoko woko i Sudan.

517 **Interpreter:** Then it was in July that he sent us to further into Uganda he went back into Sudan.

518 **Interviewee:** I mwaka alip aryo ki aryo ni.

519 **Interpreter:** This was in the year 2002.

520 **CC:** Hmm ... hmm.

521 **PN:** OK.

522 **CC:** Maybe we should do? [*For the purpose of this tape, Inaudible CC whispering to PN for 8*
523 *seconds*].

524 **PN:** Yeah, yeah. OK. Hillary, you've talked a little bit earlier about the way in which, for
525 example ... uh ... ODHIAMBO split his group into small groups.

526 **Interpreter:** Ibedo kawaco kit ma gine, ladit ODHIAMBO, onongo poko dule woko, i *group* matino
527 tino, lino, tino.

- 528 **PN:** Uhm ... since Iron Fist and with regards to attacks in Northern Uganda was this typical or
529 there other ways in which LRA would attack?
- 530 **Interpreter:** Aa ... kit ma in ilito ni, kadong ipoo gine, kit ma lweny obedo katime kwede l
531 ACHOLI ... aa ... en ma kicifo kalweny kacelo, giket woko, kadong kiguru dong ka gine, mony,
532 kadong mony otum, gimonyo kabedo, giket woko niweng ni. Eni keken ma gine, kit ma gilwenyo
533 kwede kece ti... tye gilwenyo kit mapat pat, *style* mapat pat.
- 534 **Interviewee:** Aa ... eno ni, pe ni *group*, *group* pa ODHIAMBO keken, ento ikare eno ni LRA woko
535 weng KONY owaco ni gupoke matino tino, pi lok me dege, *helicopter gunship*.
- 536 **Interpreter:** Uh ... this was not... this was fairly standard because ... uh ... KONY specifically
537 instructed ... uh ... all the soldiers to split up in smaller groups after attacks ...
- 538 **Interviewee:** Kadi wa OTTI ...
- 539 **Interpreter:** ... for security because of the, the gunship.
- 540 **Interviewee:** ... aya omlyo ka gilwenyo ci gipoke woko, pien ginongo ni mony nongo obilubo kor
541 gi woko, ci keto gi woko, en oweko, gin gi... gicito gilwenyo ci giket woko. Ma *unit* weng timo eno
542 ni.
- 543 **Interpreter:** All the units did this ... uh ... as soon as they've attacked they will split into small
544 groups, to make, to minimize the risk, because they were aware every time there was an attack
545 the UPDF would be following.
- 546 **PN:** And did you hear KONY give those instructions yourself?
- 547 **Interpreter:** lwinyo gine en gine, *order* ma kuman ni kibot, ma aa kibot KONY ni, ki iti kece nyo
548 dong?
- 549 **Interviewee:** Aa... eno ni awinyo en ducu ki i *radio*, ni dano omvero ... ikare madong dege tye
550 magwa, owaco ni dano weng gupoke matino tino, kadi iromo bedo wun abic abic, eno awinyo ki i
551 *radio*. Onongo pwod *radio* tye bot wa.
- 552 **Interpreter:** Uh ...yes, I ...this I've picked from the radio communication ... uh ...we still had the
553 radio ...uh ... it's all started with the time when the government tro...forces start using very
554 heavily the gunship ...
- 555 **PN:** Hmm ... OK.
- 556 **Interpreter:** ... that ... uh ... whenever there was attack, the instruction was, the standing
557 instruction was that you must split into smaller group, even 5.
- 558 **PN:** OK.
- 559 **Interpreter:** This I heard myself from the radio communication.

560 PN: OK. Now, we... we talked about the LRA making attacks, attacks. But what it's meant by
561 attack. How do you understand what an attack was supposed to be in terms of what things were
562 supposed to be done during an attack?

563 Interpreter: Aa ... ibedo kawaco gine, ibedo kalok pi mony ma obedo... mony matime calo me
564 cito ka monyo *camp* ma kuman, nyo ngo ni. Kadong ki bigine ... ee ... ngo kikome ma kono
565 kimonyo *Camp*, ngo mahongo time. Kicito kicelo dano mere acela keken, nyo kitimo ngo kikome.
566 Kong litit ki wan kore ki kore.

567 Interviewee: Eno ni ...

568 Interpreter: Ka mony otime ngo matime?

569 Interviewee: ... eno ni kit ma an aniang kwede, pien ka ikit me leb mere bene pe omywero
570 kiwaco nidong *attack*; pien ni myero dong lwong mere ni ... "Gamo cam", pien ni yoo ma en
571 KONY owaco ni, kit ma dong gamo cam tek ni, in dong icit icel *civilian* acela dong, ka igam cam
572 eno ni. Pien *civilian* tye ka owako UPDF.

573 Interpreter: Yeah, probably the word ... uh ... attack it is not really the correct ... uh ...
574 expression ...

575 PN: Hmm ...

576 Interpreter: ... because ... uh ... the real instruction was "Go and shoot at the civilians so that
577 they run away or they're killed and then you can take their foodstuff".

578 Interviewee: Ma eno ni ka leb mere gilwong mere ni "Gamo cam."

579 Interpreter: So, put literally in ... uh ... the language it's "Going to collect food" ...

580 Interviewee: Kitimo dong aranyi mere kom *civilian*.

581 Interpreter: ... "And to just cause havoc."

582 PN: ... so, the instructions that KONY gave, were they to conduct an attack or were they more
583 detailed and did they include, "Go and shoot civilians"?

584 Interpreter: Aa ... me ... pien gine niang ne tye kabedo tek ni ... aa ... en cik ma en gine, en
585 order ma en KONY golo ni, tutwal ne ni meno ileb mamege ba, me cito wucito igam cam nyo cito
586 wucel onek *civilian*?

587 Interviewee: En kit ma nen an awaco ni order ma en ogolo i SOROTI me acel, owaco ni, gicit
588 kinek, kicel mony, cel bene wa *civilian* kigam bene cam.

589 Interpreter: There were... for the case of SOROTI, for instance, there were 3 instructions, 1: Kill
590 the soldiers, 2: Kill the civilians, 3: Collect food. These were the 3 separate items which were very
591 specific.

592 PN: And, was there ever any instruction to abduct people and if so what sort of people?

- 593 **Interpreter:** Man dong me gine ni kono? Me mako dano ni kono? Ka en ogolo *order* me gine,
594 og... golo bene *order* me mako dano, ka ogolo *order* me mako dano kit dano makit mene?
- 595 **Interviewee:** Aa ... kit ma laworo pwod awaco ni, ni, tye kare mo ma en ogolo *order* ni jo mutegi,
596 ocake i mwaka apar aboro dok kwede anyim kinek woko. Kimak jo mucake i mwaka apar abicel,
597 apar abic gi dwogo kwede piny.
- 598 **Interpreter:** Yes. As I have said yesterday ... uh...he gave instructions that people who are
599 above 18 years should be killed ... uh ... and they should, we should only take people who are 16
600 years and less, below 16 down wards.
- 601 **Interviewee:** Hmm. Pien owaco ni jo ni eno ni ka en epwonyo gi, gilubo cik ne ento jo mutegi,
602 gilwi woko.
- 603 **Interpreter:** Uh ... because...the, the, the... the older people would ... uh ... be difficult because
604 they run away were as the younger ones, once he's stopped them they don't go away they stay
605 with him.
- 606 **PN:** Uhm ... are these the instructions, are these still the instructions from Iron Fist to the time
607 that you escaped from the LRA?
- 608 **Interpreter:** Man eno ni gine, kit *order* ma en ogolo ma... macake en ikare me *Iron Fist* wa
609 kombedi ni?
- 610 **Interviewee:** *Order* ni eno ni en ogolo ma bene paya *Iron Fist* onongo tye.
- 611 **Interpreter:** This actually, this type of order started even before the Operation Iron Fist.
- 612 **Interviewee:** Mawaco ni tek ni dong ngat ma yer tike tye dong, mapat ma ngat ma yer tike dong
613 olot i LRA myero... tek ni Inongo nek woko aneka dong.
- 614 **Interpreter:** Uh ... another part of the...the example was ... uh ... anybody that you meet who
615 has beard already, that should be killed. Only those without, should be taken.
- 616 **Interviewee:** Ma gin eno ni obedo kapwonyo wa i JEBELEN, ocake wa i pyere abongwan wiye
617 abiro ento dano aye onongo, ludito mony obedo kayee me bedo karek ikare eno ni.
- 618 **Interpreter:** Uh ...this is something that he was teaching already while in JEBELEN, in Sudan but
619 a number of the officers did not really do this.
- 620 **Interviewee:** Hmm ... ni jo mo keken madong otegi konye peke, pe obiwinyo *policy* wa, dok gin
621 lukweny ikom wa eno.
- 622 **Interpreter:** Uh ... that ... uh ... people who, who already have beard are useless, they will not
623 be able to fight for us, they'll not be, they, they'll not listen to us.
- 624 **Interviewee:** Hmm ... ci ogolo *order* ni gicak neko *civilian* ento *commander* mukene dong obedo
625 kawango odi keken ci ryemo *civilian* woko, wango odi keken ci, pe wango medo ki *civilian*, ci
626 waco ni eneko dano, ento kun nongo pe oneko.

- 627 **Interpreter:** So, some of the commanders... what some of the commanders did was, they go into
 628 the camp or into a village and they set their house on fire and say they have killed the people
 629 were as they have not really done so.
- 630 **Interviewee:** Ci ingeye, ikare madong oriang, dong ocako golo *order* ni dong ebineko
 631 *Commander* makit eno. Cidong oweko *Iron Fist* en dong ocako neko dano ni.
- 632 **Interpreter:** So, then after he understood what was happening then he ... gave another order, a
 633 threat, an order that if ...uh ... anybody does that again he was going to start killing those people,
 634 the officers who were doing that.
- 635 **CC:** When did ... *[inaudible]*.
- 636 **Interpreter:** And then this is, this now coincided with the time of the Operation Iron Fist.
- 637 **PN:** When ... Oh! Did KONY ever order ... uh... to ... uh... attack only the UPDF? Can you ever
 638 remember a time when he ordered such an attack?
- 639 **Interpreter:** Ipoo nyo kare mo ma KONY ogine, ogolo *order* me monyo, pe... pe ci... pe dano
 640 mukene nipoko, kono lumony gine, pa gamente keken. Ipoo?
- 641 **Interviewee:** En pol *order* ne wacon golo woko wa ikom *civilian* woko weng, ento nicake i pyere
 642 87 ma bene apeke i lum ni, 87 gin ni eno onongo pe maro golo *order* ikom *civilian* tutwal. Ento
 643 dong ocake dong ingeye ni eno ni maro golo *order* weng ikom monyo wa ikom *civilian*.
- 644 **Interpreter:** Uh ... 8 ... uh ... from above 87 most of his orders were against the UPDF ... uh ...
 645 up to this time it was not against ... uh ... civilians.
- 646 **PN:** Hmm ... hmm.
- 647 **Interpreter:** It changed much later. This time I was not even in the bush.
- 648 **PN:** Wh... OK. So, when, when did it change? When did KONY change from orders against the
 649 UPDF to orders against the population?
- 650 **Interpreter:** Man oloke zwene madong en ocako golo *order* me neko wa *civilian* bene ni?
- 651 **Interviewee:** *Order* me neko *civilian*, madong rac loyo ocake i *Iron Fist* eni, *Iron Fist*. Madong rac
 652 nel
- 653 **Interpreter:** Uh ... the worst of that started during the Operation, after the Operation Iron Fist.
- 654 **Interviewee:** Eri aye omiya wa lu *officer* mogo madong, madongo dongo tye ka aa woko ni, pi lok
 655 ni eno ni dong.
- 656 **Interpreter:** This is precisely why a number of even very high ranking officers have decided to
 657 move, to quit, to leave him.
- 658 **Interviewee:** Con mere onongo gineko *civilian* ento pe oo to the extent ni eni.

- 659 **Interpreter:** Uh ... before this new instructions civilians were killed but not ... uh ... to such extent.
- 660 **Interviewee:** ONongo neko calo *RC*, *RC* gin ni.
- 661 **Interpreter:** Uh ... most of the killings were targeted at ... uh ... people who were politically
662 involved like the Chairman of the RC, the Resistance Committee and things like that.
- 663 **PN:** Yeah.
- 664 **CC:** And after?
- 665 **Interpreter:** And Government Agents.
- 666 **CC:** And after the change?
- 667 **Interpreter:** Inge aloka loka kono?
- 668 **Interviewee:** En aye dong ocake i *Iron Fist* en dong ocako neko dano magwar ni.
- 669 **Interpreter:** Is after the Iron fist that he started killing everybody, and a lot.
- 670 **PN:** What...what, why do the LRA sometimes perform ambushes and some times attacks
671 against ... uh ... the people? What is the difference, why would you do an ambush one time and
672 some time you will attack a camp? Is there any reason?
- 673 **Interpreter:** Ee ... pingo gine, kare mogo inongo ni meno gine, aduyi bino monyo gine, keto
674 *ambush*, ikine mogo cito ka gine kamonyo calo *camp* gin ni, apoka poka tye gine ... ee ... awene
675 ma gitiyo ki man nyo gitiyo kimaca eni?
- 676 **Interviewee:** Ka kit ma an aniang kwede, ma onongo pwod atye bot en KONY kuno, ka iwiny en
677 ocako ni *ambush* nongo UPDF tye katic matek! Ci nongo dano tye kabedo i *group* mogo manok
678 nok. Ma pe giromo lweny, ma pe giromo i lum bedo kagure madwong.
- 679 **Interpreter:** Now ... uh ... ambush was mainly used when UPDF was very active and ... uh ...
680 LRA had to operate in very small groups. This is... so they couldn't launch major attacks so they
681 relay heavily on ambush then. This is something I know from the time when I was in the bush.
- 682 **PN:** OK. Who, after Iron Fist and up till the time you left the LRA by escaping, who were KONY's
683 most trusted commanders?
- 684 **Interpreter:** Ikare mapwod in itye i lum, nio ikare ma in dong ia ki i lum ... ee ... ludito mony ma
685 mene ma onongo ladit KONY onongo dong geno gi maloyo pwodi?
- 686 **Interviewee:** Ikare ma an atye i lum ma onongo peya gineko TABULEY, onongo geno TABULEY
687 *number* acel.
- 688 **Interpreter:** While I was still in the bush, before TABULEY was killed that is the one he trusted
689 the most.

- 690 Interviewee: Ki geno RASKA LUKWIYA, *Army Commander kabisa*.
- 691 Interpreter: And the other one was RASKA LUKWIYA, the Commander of ...
- 692 Interviewee: Army Commander!
- 693 Interpreter: ... army Commander.
- 694 Interviewee: Ki geno Dominic. Pien ka owaco ni ocit onek dano kamoni Dominic lubo.
- 695 Interpreter: And he also trusted Dominic because if he gave orders for ... uh ... to go out and kill
696 people Dominic could follow it.
- 697 Interviewee: Ki geno ODHIAMBO matek *kabisa kabisa kabisa!*
- 698 Interpreter: And he trusted ODHIAMBO, a lot!
- 699 Interviewee: Ki geno OTTI Vincent.
- 700 Interpreter: And then OTTI Vincent.
- 701 Interviewee: Ki geno OWOR LAKATI.
- 702 Interpreter: And then OWOR LAKATI. OWOR IS O-W-O-R. LAKATI.
- 703 PN: And what...what did he ...
- 704 Interviewee: KI GENO ABUDEMA BUK.
- 705 Interpreter: ABUDEMA.
- 706 Interviewee: ORINGA SISTO.
- 707 Interpreter: ORINGA SISTO.
- 708 Interviewee: Ci wek ki nge maber i lum bone nongo icyo ABUDEMA ne ni.
- 709 Interpreter: Uh ... ORINGA SISTO is the real name ...
- 710 PN: ... hrrm ...
- 711 Interpreter: but ABUDEMA ...
- 712 Interviewee: *Nick name* ne. Ma kingeye maber.
- 713 Interpreter: ... ABUDEMA, ABUDEMA is the nickname and that's the name by which people
714 know him in the bush.
- 715 CC: And BUK?

716 Interpreter: BUK, ABUDEMA BUK, B-U-K,

717 Interviewee: Yeah ... ki ...

718 Interpreter: ABUDEMA BUK.

719 Interviewee: ... ki dok tye *Commander* mo aryo, geno OTULU.

720 Interpreter: OTULU was the other one.

721 Interviewee: OLAK OTULU.

722 Interpreter: Lak OTULU.

723 Interviewee: OLAK.

724 Interpreter: OLAK OTULU.

725 CC: OLAK OTULU.

726 PN: Hmm.

727 Interviewee: Ki KAPERRE.

728 Interpreter: KAPERRE.

729 Interviewee: KAPERRE.

730 PN: What was the ... uh ... role or function or appointment of OWOR LAKATI?

731 Interpreter: Ee ... rwom pa gine, rwom ki tic pa LAKATI kono onongo ngo?

732 Interviewee: Rwom ne, pien ni onongo tye *Brig...* *Brigadier* cidong awinyo ni kimeddo tye *Major*
733 *General*. Ki ingeya ni.

734 Interpreter: He was Brigadier but I understand, after I left the bush, that he has been promoted to
735 Major General.

736 PN: And he...which Brigade he used to command?

737 Interpreter: Ma yang onogo kong gine, ladit *Brigade* ma mene?

738 Interviewee: Aa ... en onongo tye *number* angwen ikor KONY, pe onongo tye ...bedo i Control
739 Altar. Ento nongo *number* angwen ikor KONY.

740 Interpreter: He was the 4 th in Command after KONY and he was at the Control Altar.

741 Interviewee: Ento en tye *senior* oloyo wa OTTI, wa jo mukene ni wa RASKA gin niwong i LRA.

742 **Interpreter:** He was more senior than even those of RASKA or OTTI.

743 **Interviewee:** En aye obedo *group* me acel me ngo, me *joining* KONY.

744 **Interpreter:** He was one of the first to join... uh ... KONY.

745 **Interviewee:** Pien onongo obedo i UPDA ni "CILIL", CILIL gilwongo ni ngo? Mony en ... mony,
746 UPDA ku?

747 **Interpreter:** Yeah, because he was in ... uh ... he was one of the first to join. He has been in the
748 Army before.

749 **CC:** So he voluntarily joined he is not an abductee?

750 **Interpreter:** Peki gine, pe kimako en amaka?

751 **Interviewee:** En obedo "CILIL" ci awinyo ni KONY nen calo ocito adonyo adonya botgi. Ma *detail*
752 ne pe aniang maber.

753 **Interpreter:** No. It's not very clear whether actually he joined KONY or KONY joined them.

754 **Interviewee:** Hmm.

755 **PN:** And OK. OLAK OTULU. What about him? Where did he fit in to the organisation?

756 **Interpreter:** Uh ... OTULU ni kono onongo rwom ki ka...ka iporo ki pa gine, LAKATI ni kono?

757 **Interviewee:** OTULU tye i *Brigade*, onongo en tye *C.O.*

758 **PN:** [For the purpose of this tape, Inaudible PN whispering to CC, for 4 to 5 seconds]

759 **CC:** [Inintelligible].

760 **Interpreter:** OTULU was ... uh ...

761 **Interviewee:** *Battalion Commander.*

762 **Interpreter:** ... he was a Battalion commander.

763 **Interviewee:** Ento en lubo *order* pa KONY dok tye *serious* me nek.

764 **Interpreter:** He follows very strictly the orders from KONY and he kill very easily.

765 **PN:** And which Brigade he was in?

766 **Interpreter:** *Brigade* ma mene ni?

767 **Interviewee:** En tye i *3 rd* Brigade Gilva.

- 768 **Interpreter:** He was in the 3rd Brigade Gilva.
- 769 **PN:** And who was his commander?
- 770 **Interpreter:** Ladit ma mege kono anga?
- 771 **Interviewee:** Ladit ma mege BUNIA, ento en dok kwanyo *action* loyo BUNIA woko.
- 772 **Interpreter:** He was under BUNIA but, he was more active than BUNIA.
- 773 **Interviewee:** Ma BUNIA pe timo *attack*, wa inino ca KONY bene owaco ni, OTULU ma CO timo
774 *attack* cidong BUNIA kule ma *Brigade Commmander* ni.
- 775 **Interpreter:** Even KONY was commenting that "Now, OTULU, even at his low rank was
776 conducting attacks where as his boss, BUNIA, did not do so."
- 777 **PN:** OK. Thank you and how about ... can I ask you another couple of names to see if you
778 recognise them?
- 779 **Interpreter:** Kong wapenya in dok nying mogo me poo ka gine, ka nyo ingeyo gi?
- 780 **Interviewee:** Yes.
- 781 **PN:** OK. Major Charles LABONGO NONO.
- 782 **Interpreter:** Charles, *Major* Charles LABONGO NONO.
- 783 **Interviewee:** LABONGO.
- 784 **Interpreter:** LABONGO NONO.
- 785 **Interviewee:** OCAN NONO. OCAN *Major* OCAN LABONGO NONO. OCAN NONO. En tye CO.
- 786 **Interpreter:** Eht ...
- 787 **Interviewee:** En tye Major OCAN NONO.
- 788 **Interpreter:** ... it is possible Major OCAN ...
- 789 **PN:** Yeah ...
- 790 **Interpreter:** ... NONO LABONGO ... is a Major ...
- 791 **Interviewee:** En aye ma laworo awaco ni la ...
- 792 **PN:** Where, where is he fit in?
- 793 **Interpreter:** Yes?

- 794 Interviewee: ... ningo?
- 795 Interpreter: En konò tye ka kwene? Ki rwom ne nigo?
- 796 Interviewee: En tye i *Battalion Commander* bot Dominic.
- 797 Interpreter: He is Bri... Battalion commander under Dminic.
- 798 PN: And which Brigade is that?
- 799 Interpreter: *Brigade* ma mene?
- 800 Interviewee: *First Brigade* Sinia.
- 801 Interpreter: First ... uh ... in the 1. st Brigade Sinia.
- 802 PN: Is that the same ... uh ... Major that you told us yesterday ... oh, sorry I beg your pardon. Is
803 that the same Officer as you told us yesterday may have been ... uh ... in charge of the
804 BALONYO attack?
- 805 Interpreter: En aye ladit ma onongo itamo ni, ma iwaco lawaro oyo ni meno gwok obedo en iye
806 lweny man me BARLONYO ni?
- 807 Interviewee: Hmm ... en aye eno, ma an onongo abedo kawaco ne ni.
- 808 Interpreter: Yes, that's the one I was talking of.
- 809 PN: OK. And ... OK. A Lt. Colonel Francis LAPANYIKWARA.
- 810 Interpreter: LAPANYIKWARA.
- 811 Interviewee: Hmm ... kombedi dong en tye *Colonel, Division* ... *Jogo Division* bot BUK.
- 812 Interpreter: He is now in the...
- 813 Interviewee: *Jogo Division*.
- 814 Interpreter: ... *Jogo Division*, with BUK.
- 815 Interviewee: *He is now Colonel*.
- 816 Interpreter: ABUDEMA BUK.
- 817 Interviewee: Hmm.
- 818 Interpreter: He is now a Lt. Colonel.
- 819 Interviewee: Colonel. Colonel!

- 820 **Interpreter:** He is a Colonel now.
- 821 **PN:** How do you know that?
- 822 **Interpreter:** Man kong ingeyo nining?
- 823 **Interviewee:** Jo ma aa ki i lum ni, dok bene ma an peya abimo onongo dong tye *Colonel*.
- 824 **Interpreter:** Even before I left the bush ...
- 825 **PN:** Yeah.
- 826 **Interpreter:** ... he's already Colonel but even the people who come from the bush now say he's
827 still the same.
- 828 **PN:** And what is his function inside the Division?
- 829 **Interpreter:** Tic ne kono madit en li *Division* eno ni?
- 830 **Interviewee:** En tye macalo *Battalion* CO i *Division*.
- 831 **Interpreter:** He is the Battalion ... uh ... Commander ... CEO.
- 832 **Interviewee:** CO, tyen lok ne ni en Battallion Commander, meno nongo ningo, CO!
- 833 **Interpreter:** Chief Intelligent.
- 834 **Interviewee:** No, no, no ... CO, C means Commander ... O ...
- 835 **PN:** Commanding Officer ... Commanding Officer.
- 836 **Interviewee:** Oh, yes, *Commanding officer*.
- 837 **PN:** Yes.
- 838 **Interpreter:** For the battalion.
- 839 **Interviewee:** Ee ... tye i *Battalion* ma kilwongo no Jiga *Battalion*.
- 840 **Interpreter:** He is the commanding Officer Jiga Battalion.
- 841 **Interviewee:** *Division* Jogo.
- 842 **Interpreter:** In the Division called Jogo.
- 843 **PN:** Jiga Battalion? OK.
- 844 **Interviewee:** Jiga Battalion CO.

- 845 PN: Hmm ... hmm ... and Colonel ANGOLA also known as ONEN UNITA?
- 846 Interpreter: Ingeyo ni eno ni?
- 847 Interviewee: ONEN UNITA angeyo. Colonel ONEN UNITA. Kong obedo i ci...*Director of*
848 *Intelligent ci, kombedi office ne peke.*
- 849 Interpreter: Uh ... he was first... I know him. He was first Director of Intelligence but now he
850 doesn't have a function.
- 851 Interviewee: Tye beda i *security* bot KONY, pien onongo dong oyuba yub me lok ne bot
852 gamente.
- 853 Interpreter: He is now ... uh ... with KONY because he was... he also plans to cross over.
- 854 Interviewee: Ci *information* ne kingeyo woko.
- 855 Interpreter: But this leaked out.
- 856 PN: So KONY has him with him now, is that correct?
- 857 Interviewee: Owaco nit ye i CPU dang.
- 858 Interpreter: He's now near KONY.
- 859 PN: And when did that change take place?
- 860 Interpreter: Man kono otime awene? Me kwanye me tere kuno ni.
- 861 Interviewee: Otime i mwaka mukato ni, ento dong dwe na pe aniang, oolo myero ifime i mwaka ni
862 eni ikine dwe me a ... ee... *sorry* otime i mwaka okato ni.
- 863 Interpreter: It must... sometime last year, I can't remember the precise dates.
- 864 PN: OK. Uhm ... ONEN, Brigadier ONEN KAMDULE.
- 865 Interpreter: ONEN KAMDULE kono.
- 866 Interviewee: ONEN KAMDULE tye ... tye *Colonel*, onongo obedo *Director* cidong bene kiwiye
867 mere atata kikwanyo *office* ne bene pe. *Director of Operation.*
- 868 Interpreter: He was Director of Operations but because of... of ill ... ill discipline he has lost that
869 function and is now without a role.
- 870 PN: And is now?
- 871 Interpreter: Without any responsibility.
- 872 PN: OK. And when did that change takes place?

873 **Interpreter:** Man kono otime awene?

874 **Interviewee:** Aa! ... gin eno ni mwaka ki mwaka nongo tye katime.

875 **Interpreter:** Yes, this is something that is happening from time to time, every year.

876 **Interviewee:** Hmm ... pien ni en deg lok ma...me limo aranyi.

877 **Interpreter:** Because ONEN doesn't like this ... uh ... idea of going to torture and do kill people
878 and things like that.

879 **Interviewee:** Ci omiyo KONY kwanyo office dok dwoko, kwanyo dwoko.

880 **Interpreter:** So, then KONY promotes him, demotes him, promotes him, demotes him.

881 **PN:** And one more, we have ... uh ... Lt. Colonel Thomas KWOYELO.

882 **Interpreter:** KWOYELO.

883 **Interviewee:** KWOYELO onongo gibedo bot gin ki OTTI, ci wawinyo ni opoke ikom OTTI, ogonyo
884 men ne woko weng. Madong an atye i lum, ii bot gamente ni.

885 **Interpreter:** Now, he used to be with OTTI but ... uh ... he has se...he has release all his
886 wives ... uh ... since I'm...this is something that I've learned while with the UPDF.

887 **Interviewee:** Dong bedo kene kene.

888 **Interpreter:** He doesn't now operate with OTTI, he is now most of the time by himself.

889 **PN:** But, when did that change take place?

890 **Interpreter:** Aloka loka eno ni kono otime awene?

891 **Interviewee:** Otime idwe mukato ni.

892 **Interpreter:** Last month.

893 **PN:** So, up until last month he was still with OTTI?

894 **Interpreter:** Nio wa igine, idwe mukato ni, onongo pwod gitiyo kacel gin ki OTTI.

895 **Interviewee:** Idwe mukato ni ii acake ne, onongo gitye gin ki OTTI. Ento dong idyere lakite mo
896 kenyo, dong tye kene.

897 **Interpreter:** Up to the beginning of the month ... uh ... last month, he was still with OTTI but
898 towards the middle of the month, not anymore.

899 **PN:** And what was his function when he was with OTTI?

- 900 **Interpreter:** Tic ne kong madii ma onongo pwod tye bot OTTI ni?
- 901 **Interviewee:** OTTI ogamo en ... uhm ... pien ni bene onongo lok ma lok ne owinye bote, ci
902 KONY owaco ni OTTI ogamo obed bote, pien romo lok ne cawa mo keken.
- 903 **Interpreter:** Now ... uh ... the...start... the plan that...it, it leaked that he wanted to, to escape so
904 KONY ordered OTTI to collect him and keep him under watch.
- 905 **CC:** OK. For each of the names let... we are going to give you the names again and...
- 906 **PN:** Two...
- 907 **CC:** We got two minutes? Just tell us whether you know, whether the person was involved in any
908 attacks, participated in any attacks.
- 909 **PN:** After Iron Fist.
- 910 **Interpreter:** Uh ... kong...wawaco nying dano, ci igam mere macek keken, ni otime nyo pe otime,
911 ka kiwaco nying, ka ngato.
- 912 **CC:** OK.
- 913 **PN:** *[Inaudible]* ... a minute and a half ...
- 914 **CC:** OK. Or why we do this, because we are running out of tape. Can you think about?
915 During...during, we're having a lunch break now and will repose the question when we come
916 back, but whether Francis LAPANYIKWARA, ONEN UNITA, ONEN KAMDULE or Thomas
917 KWOYELO which massacres these or...or attacks each of these officers may have participated
918 in?
- 919 **Interpreter:** Ee ... pe dong waromo gamo ne kombedi ni ... ee ... eno ma watye eni iyweyo me
920 cam ni, kong iwot ki tamo ne, ka nying ma kiwaco ni ... ee ... ingeyo ginmo ma gine, lweny mo
921 ma kineko ne nek madwong, ma gin gubedi iye. Pe igam kombedi ni, igamo dong inge cam.
- 922 **Interviewee:** *[Nodding]*.
- 923 **CC:** OK. So we would ask you that after lunch.
- 924 **PN:** OK. *[Unintelligible]*... 13:26.
- 925 *[Time :01:00:57. End of transcript]*