



ICC Restricted

### Transcript of Interview

Name of Interviewee	Hillary LAGEN Daniel
Nickname / Alias of Interviewee	Hilla
Location of Interview	KAMPALA, Uganda
Date of Interview	21/8/2004
Name of Interviewer 1	Peter NICHOLSON (PN)
Name of Interviewer 2	Christine CHUNG (CC)
Name of Interviewer 3	Akingbolahan ADENIRAN (AA)
Name of Interpreter	[REDACTED] (Interpreter)
Names of Other Persons Present	Michael LEES (Technician)
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1 [00:00:09, Start of transcript]

2 Peter NICHOLSON [PN]: OK. So, it is the 21 August, resuming at ...uh ...11:15 ... resuming the  
3 interview of Hillary LAGEN from the previous day. Uh ... the same people are present in the  
4 interview as were present from the start and have been present all the way through.

5 Christine CHUNG [CC]: Yeah. Hillary, we will like to just reconfirm with you that you understand  
6 the, the rights that you we've discussed on the first day?

7 Interpreter: Ah ... ma poyo nongo wic mere keken, kapwod ipoo lok ma watite ki in mapwod  
8 kicako lok acaka ... i ... twero ma itye kwede calo lok man me Lapilida gin ni.

9 CC: Do you continue to understand that you can have a lawyer here if you want?

10 Interpreter: Pwod ipoo ni meno gine, kiwaco ki in ni meno ka imito ni Lapilida ma meggi obed  
11 tye, kiramo gine, kelo ne?

12 Interviewee: Uhm ... an kitung bota an ageno ni, ka pe dok tye kit adic mo, pien an angeyo ni gin  
13 ma aloko ni weng tye atir, kit ma nino caa ni awaco ni, caden matir kadi wa i *Bible* kicoyo ni  
14 Lubanga en caden ma poko kin ber ki rac. Ci an angeyo ni aketo ni Lubanga en obed Lapilida na.

15 Interpreter: Uhh ... I understand what ... uh ... what you've explained before and ... uh ... as I've  
16 already explained before also I don't think, unless there is some other pressure ... uh ... I don't  
17 think there is a need for one because I believe that ... uh ... as also written in the Bible, the only  
18 real ... uh ... lawyer is God himself.

19 CC: OK. Well you have, if there is any point in time when you want to stop and get a lawyer, even  
20 to our expenses, you can do that I just have, I'm going to remind you of that.

21 Interpreter: Omit ... myero waco meno me gin me pooyo wii in keken ka, ka lok dong odoko  
22 gine, odoko tek, ma inongo ni meno pe ngeyo ngo ma myero itim, ka imito kikel lapilida myero  
23 igine, ituru kiwaco ki wan, wek kiyub kikel mukene, ngat maromo cung pir in.

24 Interviewee: Eno ni loko mo mapol pe, ka inen nongo kit ma onongo bene mite, ci nongo bene  
25 loko mo pe, an aramo keme kigin ni eno ni.

26 Interpreter: Hmm ... that's OK.

27 CC: OK. And then I just want to reconfirm that you are proceeding your willing to be interviewed  
28 voluntarily that you've come here voluntarily.

29 Interpreter: Aa ... amito ni kong itit inyim camera, ni meno kombedf ni ma itye ka...ibino ka penyo  
30 in kany ene ni, pe kidiyo in adiya ni loin, dok ... ee ... pe kitye kadiyo in ni igam peny adiya.

31 [Interviewee clears his throat.]

32 Interpreter: Kong ilok matat tek.

33 **Interviewee:** An ageno ni, kadi wa jo ma diki maca nongo gibino winyo kit ni eni. Angoyo ni an pe  
34 ki diyo an adiya me bino kany. Ento wabino wek gin ma tye kayelo wa eni, wanongo kit kacungu  
35 ne.

36 **Interpreter:** Uhh ... I want to also make it clear that ... uh ... even people who may see the  
37 video, know that ... uh ... nobody has forced me to come here and to answer the questions  
38 and ... uh ... it is just my strong desire to help to bring peace.

39 **CC:** OK. And if there is any ... uh ... if there is any point you want to discontinue the questioning  
40 and discontinue making statements, you can do it.

41 **Interpreter:** Kace cawa mo keken ma tam ni oloke pe imito dong gamo peny, fromo gine, fromo  
42 waco bene wek kigik woko.

43 **CC:** Do you understand that?

44 **Interpreter:** Iniang ma eno ni?

45 **Interviewee:** Eno ni weng an aniang. Pien ni li acaki bene kiwaco ki an kumeno ni, ka gin ma an  
46 anongo ni pe aromo gamo ne omyero pe agam, ka gin ma anongo ni aromo gamo ne aye agam.

47 **PN:** Hmm ... hmm.

48 **Interpreter:** I ... I understand that and also it has been explained to me that if there are things  
49 that I can not answer, I should not answer.

50 **CC:** Exactly, right. OK.

51 **PN:** Thank you Hillary. So, this morning ... uhm ... we though we would ...

52 **Interpreter:** Maybe he has been interviewed in the meantime.

53 **CC:** Oh ... yeah ...

54 **PN:** Uhh ... uh ...

55 **CC:** ... Hillary, can you confirmed that we, since we've broke last night we have not  
56 conversations with you or quetioning of you?

57 **Interpreter:** Uh ... kit ma wabedo katimo ne ni, kong liit inyim camera, me nyuto ni meno gine, ka  
58 ngati onyo dok obedo kapenyo in, kit ma obedo katimo ne kene ni, madong wan oweko of ka eni  
59 ni.

60 **Interviewee:** Ahh ... an ma wapoke laworo ni, pe amedo kirwate ki ngatimo keken ikinwu. Ci  
61 omiyo ngat mo keken omedi ki penya dong peke wa icawa ni eni ma warwate eni ni.

62 **Interpreter:** Uhh ... since we stopped interview yesterday none of the people in this room met me  
63 again. This is the first time we are meeting again so nobody has interviewed me since the last  
64 interview.

65 PN: Thank you.

66 Interviewee: Apwoyo.

67 PN: This morning we like to go through some of the ... uh ... comments and information that  
68 you've given over the last two days ... uh ... and try to find out a little bit more detail about those,  
69 those comments and about that information.

70 Interpreter: Aa ... tin tic wa madit ne tutwal ne en aye me bedo, ka ngiyo penyo in doki kore ki  
71 kore en jami mogo madong wabedo loko ne inino aryo mukato anged ni.

72 PN: And one of the things that you've mentioned yesterday was the, the fact that KONY had  
73 ordered an attack on SOROTI.

74 Interpreter: Ee ... ikin jami ma in iwaco laworo, obedo ni in iwinyo ka KONY golo *order* ni kicit ki  
75 gine, kimony SOROTI.

76 PN: Is that correct?

77 Interpreter: Man ada?

78 Interviewee: Yes, gin ne onongo obedo tye ma an awinyo ki ita i *radio*, ma en aye obedo ka  
79 waco.

80 Interpreter: Yes. This is something that I heard him ... uh ... say over the radio.

81 PN: OK. And where were you and KONY when he gave that order?

82 Interpreter: In onongo dang itye kwene ikare ma iwinyo gine, lok man ki i *radio*. En ... ki dok  
83 KONY ingeyo ni onongo tye kwene ikare ma en golo *order* ni eno ni?

84 Interviewee: Hmm ... kit ma laworo an awaco ni, me acel me cito SOROTI, ogolo *order* ne inino  
85 dwe ... acel me mwaka 2003, inino dwe acel eno ni. Meno *order* me acel eno, ma en onongo wa  
86 idog AGAGO.

87 Interpreter: Uhh ... as I've mentioned already, the first time I heard him give this order was on  
88 the 1 January 2003. This was when we were in AGAGO.

89 Interviewee: Aya, kidong mo... end ni, inge ni eni ni, dok ogolo *order* madong en ocwalo *radio*  
90 bot wa i *Sick Bay*.

91 Interpreter: The second time was when he ... he gave ordered, when he ordered, when ... uh ...  
92 there was a *radio* with us in the *Sick Bay*.

93 PN: In the same place, in AGAGO or in somewhere else?

94 Interviewee: No, gin end ni pe bor tutwal onongo watye kwene idog nam, idog nam ACHWA.

95 Interpreter: Uhh ... it was not far away but we're near the banks of River ACHWA.

96 Interviewee: Ci, en omiyo *order* eno ni ki jo ma giye i *convoy* ma gi ... jo ma giwoto ma kom gi  
97 yot.

98 Interpreter: This was ... uh ... this was an order which he gave to people who were in the  
99 convoy, the Mobile Brigade.

100 PN: And what did he actually say?

101 Interpreter: Owaco kono ningo eni ni gine, en lok ni eno ni ma iwinyo?

102 Interviewee: Eno ni en, pien en ka golo *order* loko woko atir ki *order* mukene ma golo ni. Wac ki  
103 en.

104 Interpreter: Uh ... when he gives orders, he gives very straight forward instructions.

105 PN: Hmm ... hmm.

106 Interviewee: Ci owaco ni, emito ni OTTI ocit woko SOROTI. OTTI Vincent.

107 Interpreter: So, he instructed OTTI to go to SOROTI.

108 Interviewee: Ki okwany *brigade* mukene ni pale ni weng gucit woko i SOROTI.

109 Interpreter: Uhh ... that OTTI Vincent ...

110 PN: Hmm ... hmm.

111 Interpreter: ... eh ... should take also the other brigade along with him to SOROT.

112 Interviewee: Ki dong *operation* omyero bed matek i Lango. Jo mukene ocit woko i Lango gucak  
113 neko *civilian* woko matek!

114 Interpreter: And some of the soldiers should go into Lango and they should kill a lot of people.

115 Interviewee: Pien ka kinoko matek, kinoko Langi matek ci, miyo wiloo dong ooi yee kilok aloka  
116 ki en KONY.

117 Interpreter: Because if ... uh ... they kill a lot of civilians then the rest of the world will accept ...  
118 ah ... will accept that ... uh ... with KONY there should be a talk.

119 Interviewee: Wilobo macalo *European Union*, ki USA ki nga ... nga gin ni weng gubiye ni dong  
120 gilok ki KONY. Pien KONY tye kaneko *civilian* mapot.

121 Interpreter: Uhh ... all the other countries like the European Union countries, the US ... uh ...  
122 and others will then ... uh ... force that there is a peace talk because KONY is finishing many  
123 civilians.

124 PN: OK. So ... did KONY give the orders to go into ... ah ... the LAN... going to ... attack the  
125 Langi and attack SOROTI at the same time?

126 **Interpreter:** Uh ... in iwaco nime... gine, gin ma iwaco ni en ogolo *order* me gine, me nek ii Teso  
127 ki igine, ki i Lango ni, ogolo gin aryo eno ni weng kakare acele?

128 **Interviewee:** Yes, gin ni eno en owaco kacel. Ma owaco ni, en opoko mere jo mukene dong, kit  
129 ma opoko kwede pe aniang, ni jo mukene ocit SOROTI mukene odong woko i Lango, mukene  
130 odong GULU.

131 **Interpreter:** Yes ... uh ... he gave order...the same, the orders at the same time. In fact the  
132 orders were that; some of the soldiers will go to Teso, some of them will come into Lango and  
133 some had to remain in Acholi.

134 **Interviewee:** Ento *operation* matek omyero obed i SOROTI ki i Lango.

135 **Interpreter:** Now, the main operation should be in Teso and Lango but ... uh ... in the first part ...  
136 uh ... couldn't remember ... uh ... I mean I don't know the actual details, of which, and ... uh ...  
137 which group had to go where but he gave these orders at the same time.

138 **PN:** OK. When he gives, when he gave that order, did he order attacks of the area, or did he  
139 order ... uh ... how did he phrase it? What he actually say?

140 **Interpreter:** Kon ... kong itit ki wan dok kit ma en o ... kong item gine waco ne kore ki kore kit ma  
141 in iwinyo kwede ... ehh ... ileb ma ma mege kikome.

142 **Interviewee:** En owaco ni, dano omyero gucit woko i Lango, wek ka eni odongo *free* nongo  
143 omiyo ki en kare me donyo. Ki jo mukene ocit woko i SOROTI.

144 **Interpreter:** Uh ... he said ... uh ... his people should move into Teso and Lango to give him  
145 space to move ... uh ... into the area.

146 **Interviewee:** Hmm ... pien ni en owaco ni en ...

147 **PN:** Sorry, sorry. Into the area of, SOROTI?

148 **Interpreter:** Kwene ma en mito cito onongo iye?

149 **Interviewee:** En onongo mite egam jami lweny ma ekano Sudan, kikel wek nongo *border* obed  
150 twolo. Ci nongo dong mony weng tye ka ngo? Tye ka neko *civilian* i LANGO ki i SOROTI.

151 **Interpreter:** Uhh ... what he was saying was that ... uh ... with the movement of ... uh ... his  
152 soldiers into Teso and to Lango Ugan... UPDF will move and concentrate into those areas ...

153 **PN:** Hmm ...hmm.

154 **Interpreter:** ... so then the border between Uganda and Sudan will be free and he can freely  
155 then move his weaponry from Sudan into Northern Uganda.

156 **PN:** Hmm ... hmm ... and for the attack on SOROTI do you know who he was ordering?

- 157 **Interpreter:** Aa ... lweny man ma otime gine, mony ikom SOROTI ni, ipoo gine, nga ma en  
158 onongo tye ka lok ni omyero ocit igine, otel?
- 159 **Interviewee:** Aa ... ngat ma an aniang me acel aye obedo, obedo TABULEY, *The late* TABULEY  
160 en aye aniang, ento jo mukene dong pe aniang.
- 161 **Interpreter:** Uh ... the only one that I know was meant was TABULEY ... uh ... but the rest I  
162 don't know and TABULEY is now dead.
- 163 **PN:** And, and who else did he ordered for Teso?
- 164 **Interpreter:** Nga mukene ma dok ogine, ocwalo bene en me lweny i Teso ni?
- 165 **Interviewee:** Ki OCAN BUNIA. Brigade Commander me Gilva.
- 166 **Interpreter:** Also OCAN BUNIA, the Brigade Commander of Gilva.
- 167 **Interviewee:** Ento OCAN okwero woko, ocito ogik woko i *border* ocwogo.
- 168 **Interpreter:** But OCAN ... uh ... reject, refused to do so, he went but stopped at the border and  
169 came back.
- 170 **PN:** Why did he do that?
- 171 **Interpreter:** Pingo? Okwero gine, ocwogo woko?
- 172 **Interviewee:** OCAN eno ni dong ori kombedi dong tye mwaka aryo ma *order* ma KONY golo ni  
173 ocit olweny i *camp* en dong pe timo pol ne. Dong tye mwaka aryo wa gamente me UPDF ngeyo.
- 174 **Interpreter:** Uhh ... this OCAN has now for more than two years not been taking part in any of  
175 the KONY operations, even UPDF know that.
- 176 **PN:** Hmm ... hmm.
- 177 **Interviewee:** Pien *order* me acel kigolo onongo ni ocit olweny ii ALERO *Camp*, okwero ducu eno  
178 ni woko.
- 179 **Interpreter:** One of the orders which he had received from KONY was to go and attack the  
180 ALERO Camp, the camp in ALERO but he also refused to do so.
- 181 **Interviewee:** Ci dong *unit* mukene madong kiwaco ni ocit SOROTI dong pe aniang. Pien bot wa i  
182 *Sick Bay* iyabo *radio* manok nak keken iloro woko.
- 183 **Interpreter:** Now, any other details on the attack on SOROTI I don't know because we had to use  
184 the radio very very sparingly.
- 185 **Interviewee:** Hmm ... pien ni kit ma laworo awaco ni ngo? *Helicopter gunship* ikare eno ni gwa  
186 ma konye pe. Tek ni iloko ki *radio* dwogo celo *position*.

- 187 **Interpreter:** The, this was because the gunship was very, very active and ... uh ... if you  
 188 communicate with the radio you could be easily [unintelligible] and killed.
- 189 **PN:** Hmm.
- 190 **Interviewee:** Cidong order ma en omiyo wa, owaco ni, wan pe omyero wabed kalok ki *radio*,  
 191 wawiny manok nok keken nyo wa... wator woko, tek waweko dege ocelo megi lotino ci eneko  
 192 wan woko weng.
- 193 **Interpreter:** Because then KONY had ... uh ... given order to us that we should only use the  
 194 radio very, very rarely ...
- 195 **PN:** OK.
- 196 **Interpreter:** ... turn it on and off because if we use the radio and the UPDF kill the women and  
 197 children he will come and kill all of us.
- 198 **CC:** I think we need to straighten now that. Wh... when you use the radio. First of all the  
 199 instructions that you des... described, were given by KONY. These are all instructions that you  
 200 heard over the radio?
- 201 **Interpreter:** Lok ma egi ma in iwaco ni gine ma ni KONY aye obedo ka gine, ciko ki bot jo ne ni,  
 202 iwinyo ma egi ni weng in ki komi ki i *radio*?
- 203 **Interviewee:** Ehh ... en cwalo ki i *radio*, ento an aye pe alcko ki *radio* ba. Ento cwalo ki *radio*  
 204 manongo *signaller* manongo tye kalok ki *radio* ni, ci nongo an bene, ci abino awinyo bene.
- 205 **Interpreter:** Yeah, he sent ... uh ... more to this ... eh ... communication over the radio, I did not  
 206 have ... uh ... uh ... control over the radio but could hear thoroughly [unintelligible].
- 207 **CC:** OK. The first time you talked about instructions you said that KONY was instructing Vincent  
 208 OTTI. Is that true?
- 209 **Interpreter:** Ma in icako lok ki odiko ni, ibedo kong kawaco ni meno KONY obedo ka gonyo ...  
 210 golo *order* bot ... bot gi ... gine, OTTI, man ada?
- 211 **Interviewee:** Hmm. En golo *order* bot OTTI, kigolo bene ngo? ...
- 212 **Interpreter:** Hmm ...
- 213 **Interviewee:** ... bot jo mukene bene.
- 214 **Interpreter:** ... he gave the orders to OTTI, but he also gave orders to the other commanders.
- 215 **PN:** Hmm.
- 216 **Interviewee:** Kit ma nino ca an awaco ni, romo miyo *order* bot ngat mo keken .Ma en pe lubo  
 217 *Chain of Command* ni.



218 **Interpreter:** Uhh ... as I mentioned before he could give orders to almost anybody, not always  
219 tied to the chain of command.

220 **CC:** OK. And you also mentioned, one of your first sentences today was that, in January 1<sup>st</sup> in  
221 AGAGO, you also heard some instructions about SOROTI. Were those instructions that you  
222 heard in person or also by the radio?

223 **Interpreter:** Aa ... kong nanen iwaco pi gine, lok man me, ni in iwinyo en ka cwalo gine, golo  
224 *order* ki li AGAGO ni. Eno ni bene iwinyo ki i *radio* kece iwinyo ki ki bot en atir?

225 **Interviewee:** Eno ni ma an awaco ni ma en oa ki i Sudan ci warwate kwed gi wapoke uu...  
226 ocwalo dano bot wa, ci warwate kwed gi ni, eno onongo an atye. Meno inira dwe acel me, ma an  
227 awaco ni, me dwe me acel.

228 **Interpreter:** Uhh ... when gave the orders in AGAGO I was present.

229 **CC:** OK. And what, what ... how much time passed between when you heard the orders in  
230 AGAGO and when you heard the orders over the radio, in the Sick Bay?

231 **Interpreter:** Ee ... kare onongo dong okato marom mene, nicake ikare ma in iwinyo ki gine, ka en  
232 golo *order* ki AGAGO, kidong ma iwinyo man ire ki i *radio* ki i *Sick Bay* ni?

233 **Interviewee:** li AGAGO ni obedo i dwe me acel, en me mwaka 2003 ni.

234 **Interpreter:** Hmm ... hmm ...

235 **Interviewee:** ... nino ne bene acel.

236 **Interpreter:** ... yes ...

237 **Interviewee:** Aya! Ento eno ni romo bedo ikine dwe me aboro ki abiro gin ni, madong pe romo,  
238 wiya pe romo poo maber, ento kine dwe me aboro ki dwe me abiro ni ...

239 **Interpreter:** ... hmm ... hmm ...

240 **Interviewee:** ... me mwaka eni ... mia ... me mwaka okali, Eni me dwe me adek, eni me mwaka  
241 alip aryo i adek ni.

242 **Interpreter:** ... now, the AGAGO ... instructions was beginning of 2003, 1 January, 2003. The  
243 second ... eh ... communication was sometime in July or August, 2003.

244 **Interviewee:** Madong wiya dong pe romo poo maber tutwal.

245 **Interpreter:** I can't remember very clearly now.

246 **CC:** But that far apart, like six months apart?

247 **Interpreter:** Itamo ni tye cok nucu mwaka kulo?

248 Interviewee: Ee ... romo kine dwe aboro gin ni mere, ocake idwe me aboro ... abongwen ki abiro  
249 ni, ikine eno ni.

250 Interpreter: Uhh ... anything between 6, 7, 8 months.

251 PN: Uhm ... so, the second ... the second time he ma...made, he made orders in July-August,  
252 what did he say that time?

253 Interpreter: Ikare eno ni kono dong owaco ningo?

254 Interviewee: Eno ni dong pe warwate kwede arwata, ento dong awinyo i radio.

255 Interpreter: Uh ... this time we did not meet but I overheard it from the radio communications.

256 PN: OK. Hmm ... and, and what you overhear?

257 Interpreter: Iwinyo kono owaco ningo? Ileb ma en oloko kwede ba.

258 Interviewee: En owaco kit ma an awaco ni ogolo order ni, cmyero kinen ni operation obedo i  
259 SOROTI ki Lango matek ni.

260 Interpreter: Uhh ... this is what I just mentioned, that he gave orders, for operations to take place  
261 in Teso and Lango.

262 PN: And did he give orders at that stage for SOROTI?

263 Interpreter: Aa ... en ikare eni ogolo order me gine, me monyo SOROTI?

264 Interviewee: Wi ati ni? En ma ... madong an awinyo radio, en idwe me aboro ki kono aboro,  
265 abwongwen gin ni. Eni ni en aye ogolo order me SOROTI ki Teso ni operation obed kuno.

266 Interpreter: Uh ... he order for SO... SO... SOROTI, Teso, LIRA, Lango, that is the order of ... for  
267 the second order over the radio. Not the first one near AGAGO.

268 PN: Uhh ... uh ...OK. So, let's go the second order. Teso, Lango, SOROTI, LIRA?

269 Interpreter: LIRA.

270 PN: Anywhere else?

271 Interpreter: Uhh ...

272 Interviewee: Ii GULU en owaco ni operation dong gitimo iye okato. GULU ki PADER dong  
273 operation dong ... operation dong gitimo iye okato. Ma en owaco ni kono pe dong pe kifl kuno.

274 Interpreter: Uhh ... his instructions was that; GULU, PADER ... uh ... KITGUM there, there've  
275 been enou... already enough operations, so people should now leave it, and move to the new  
276 districts.

277 PN: OK.

278 Interpreter: Uhh ... in Teso and Lango.

279 PN: OK.

280 Interpreter: Which include then the SOROTI, LIRA and the towns.

281 PN: OK. Which other commanders, were given orders to go to ... you said that sorry, start again.  
282 You said TABULEY was to SOROTI. Is that correct?

283 Interpreter: Uhh ...iwaco nying dano gine, ma acel TABULEY ... ee ... nying ... ee ... nga gi  
284 mukene doki ma ingeyo ma ogine, ocwalo gi en SOROTI onongo?

285 Interviewee: Kit ma an awaco ni, awaco ni, jo ma aniang TABULEY gin OCAN BUNIA. Ento  
286 dong jo mukene pe aniang, pien *radio* pe waromo winyo ne naka naka. Dok pe rwate ki *convoy*.

287 Interpreter: Uhh ... I've already mentioned that ... uhh ... the only names that ... uhh ... I  
288 know ...

289 PN: Yeah ...

290 Interpreter: ... are the two I've mentioned, OCAN BUNIA ...

291 PN: ... yeah ...

292 Interpreter: ... TABULEY. The other ones I don't know because the *radio*, the radio wasn't on  
293 and then secondly I never met KONY again.

294 Interviewee: Dok *convoy* pe warwate kwedgi ...

295 Interpreter: And then we did not ...

296 Interviewee: ... pe kiyee.

297 Interpreter: ... also meet any of the convoys going to the operations.

298 PN: OK. OK.

299 Interviewee: Hmm.

300 PN: But for the SOROTI ... uh ... order, you knew it was TABULEY. How did you know it was  
301 TABULEY?

302 Interpreter: Ingeyo kono nining ni meno obedo TABULEY?

303 Interviewee: Ku. Ki *order* ma an owaco eno ni, ni TABULEY ocli woko kwene? Ocit woko  
304 SOROTI. Ma awinyo en ki i *radio* eno ni.

305 **Interpreter:** I specifically heard this over the radio communication, the name of TABULEY.

306 **PN:** When you said, the attack on SOROTI, which attack are you talking about?

307 **Interpreter:** Ee ... ka in iwaco pi gine, Iweny ma otime SOROTI ... uh ... Iweny, gine Iweny ma  
308 mene ma in iwaco ni? SOROTI macalo gine, ma *District* ma gine, man me *Town* ni?

309 **Interviewee:** En dong, pien ni i SOROTI, en dong owaco ni SOROTI *District* ki LIRA *District*  
310 owaco mere kit ni eno ni. Ni *operation* myero obed ikom mony onyo ikom *civilian* weng.

311 **Interpreter:** Yeah ... ehh ... there is a distinction ... uh ... one ... the op... his instructions was the  
312 ope... the operations must take place on the civilians and the, and the soldiers ...

313 **PN:** Hmm ... hmm ...

314 **Interpreter:** ... In the two disses... in the two districts...

315 **PN:** ... hmm ... hmm ...

316 **Interpreter:** ... uh ... in SOROTI as well as in ... uh ... Lango ...

317 **Interviewee:** LIRA.

318 **Interpreter:** LIRA.

319 **PN:** And ... and did you hear after those orders were given, did you ever hear that of any attacks  
320 that had taken place?

321 **Interpreter:** Inge gine, Inge golo en *order* ni eno ni tye mony mo otime ma iwinyo pire atir, ma  
322 itamo ni rwate en ki *order* ni *direc*... ee ... gine atir mere?

323 **Interviewee:** Tye mukene dong wawinyo mere ni LIRA tye kalweny, wawinyo i *radio* mogo Radio  
324 LIRA gin ni. Hmm ... ikare ma onongo en kong onyono *radio* ci oyabo dok radio, wawinyo manok  
325 nok wabedo kawinyo dong ki i *Radio* FM ni.

326 **Interpreter:** Uhh ... some of the things ... uh ... that tie the, actual instruction, with the, with the  
327 after attacks, you could only hear it over the radio, the FM radio stations, especially the ones from  
328 LIRA.

329 **PN:** OK.

330 **Interviewee:** M... ma gin eno ni, ka dok dano mubedo kawot i *convoy* aye romo niang *detail* ne  
331 maber. Calo wan ma wabedo i *Sick Bay* niang ne tek.

332 **Interpreter:** Uhh ... more details, you might only be able to get it from people who were in any of  
333 one, in one of these convoys, some of us who were in the Sick Bay do not have this type of  
334 details.

- 335 PN: Di... did anybody else overhear the orders that KONY made to ... uh ... TABULEY for the  
 336 attack on SOROTI, of the attacks on SOROTI?
- 337 **Interpreter:** Ingeyo nyo ngatimo ma owinyo gine ... ee ... lok mogo dok mapai ki madong in  
 338 iwaco ni? Ma KONY tito ki TABULEY kit mamyero kilweny kwede i gine, i Teso?
- 339 **Interviewee:** Eno ni lutino mogo, keti *officers* mukene manongo kare mukene gwok gucito nongo  
 340 li *operation* kuno giromo niang. Ento ki *signaller* mogo calo *signaller* ma pwod edonyo lawor maca  
 341 eni, romo niang eno ni maber.
- 342 **Interpreter:** Uhh ... the p... the people ... *kong inwo kong*.
- 343 **Interviewee:** Tye calo *signaller* mo pwod edonyo adonya, *Director* me *Signal*. Ci pwod ... uhm ...  
 344 onongo laworo kibino ka kelo GULU kenyo. Ci dano eni ni aye romo niang maber pien en loko ki  
 345 *radio communication*.
- 346 **Interpreter:** Now, the only person that ... uh ... would be useful for this ... uh ... there's one of  
 347 the people who just crossed over and was brought to GULU yesterday ...
- 348 PN: Hmm ... hmm ...
- 349 **Interpreter:** ... uhh ... he used to be the Director of the Signaling ...
- 350 PN: ... hmm ... hmm ...
- 351 **Interpreter:** ... section in KONY, for KONY. So, he definitely would know a lot more about the  
 352 details of instructions.
- 353 **Interviewee:** Gilwongo ni Lt. Col. ANYWAR, Franco, Lt. Col. ANYWAR.
- 354 **Interpreter:** Uhh ... this is called Lieutenant Colonel ANYWAR ... A-N-Y-O...
- 355 **Interviewee:** Ci en aye ageno ni kit ma nongo en aye onongo loyo lok ikom *radio*  
 356 *communication* i *convoy* ni, *Director General* me *Signal* ngeyo gin ni eni ni nongo romo niang.
- 357 **Interpreter:** He is the one who was directly in charge of all the radio communication, and the  
 358 signalling, so he would definitely have a lot of information of what is the instructions been given.
- 359 PN: Does he stay with KONY or does he ... uhh ... work somewhere else from KONY?
- 360 **Interpreter:** En onongo bedo ki kwene, onongo tye kacel kama KONY nongo tye iye kece  
 361 onongo en gine, bedo ka ka mukene.
- 362 **Interviewee:** En onongo bedo ki *Army Commander*, RASKA LUKWIYA. En aye gimaro bedo  
 363 gino kwede onongo.
- 364 **Interpreter:** He was most of the time with RASKA LUKWIYA.
- 365 **Interviewee:** *Army Commander*.

366 PN: Yeah.

367 Interviewee: Ento weng gitye i Control Altar.

368 Interpreter: But ... uh ... he was also in the Control Altar.

369 PN: And ... OK. Which brigade was TABULEY in command of when he went to make these  
370 attacks, when he was ordered to make this attacks on SOROTI?

371 Interpreter: Aa ... en gine TABULEY onongo tye ladit me ... me gine, me *group* ... dul mene ni,  
372 ikare ma ma kiwalo onongo kalwony en i SOROTI ni?

373 Interviewee: Hmm ... TABULEY kiwalo SOROTI ma romo wang aryo. Me acei onongo tye  
374 *Brigade Commander* me Stockree.

375 Interpreter: Uhh ... he was sent about two times, to attack SOROTI. For the first time he was the  
376 *Brigade Commander* of the Stockree *Brigade*.

377 Interviewee: Aya, ki me aryo en madong kinoko ki tye ni onongo tye *Division Commander* me  
378 Jogo. Jogo *Division*.

379 Interpreter: Uhh ... in the second trip, during which was ... uh ... he was killed, he was then the  
380 *Division Commander* of the Jogo.

381 Interviewee: Pien ikare ma dong en oliyo matek i SOROTI ci KONY a *promoting* en, i *Colonel* i  
382 *Brigadier* kidong *Divison Commander*.

383 Interpreter: Uhh ... this was because he did a, an excellent job on the first trip so KONY  
384 promoted him to the *Commander* of the *Division*.

385 Interviewee: Onongo tye *Brigadier* dong, from: ...from *Colonel* ...

386 Interpreter: He has become *Brigadier*.

387 PN: And how do you know he was promoted for an excellent job?

388 Interpreter: Ingeyo nining pi gine, ni meno rwom ma en onongo ni kimiyo ki en pi tic ma en oliyo  
389 maber?

390 Interviewee: Eno ni, ducu awinyo *through radio*, ma owaco ni *Commander* weng kono onong tiyo  
391 calo TABU, onongo ber matek.

392 Interpreter: Uhh ... this more from what KONY was saying ... uh ... after this operation that ... "if  
393 ever ... if all the *Commanders* were working as ... uh ... hard as TABU, TABULEY also called  
394 TABU then there would be a lot of success".

395 Interviewee: Dok en onongo geno TABU, pien *order* ma ogolo ki TABU, TABU tubo.

396 **Interpreter:** And he trusted TABULEY very, very much because all the orders that he gave to  
397 TABULEY ... uh ... were always executed.

398 **Interviewee:** Ento *Commanders* mukene ka en ogolo *order* gikwero woko, wigi diro gi *dodging*  
399 eno.

400 **Interpreter:** A number of the other commanders always found ways to not do exactly what ...  
401 uh ... he had instructed them to do ...

402 **Interviewee:** Kit ma awaco kwede ni OCAN BUNIA pe maro gin ni eno ni.

403 **Interpreter:** Just like I've mentioned, OCAN BUNIA did not like ... uh ... to do some of the things  
404 KONY ordered.

405 **CC:** *[Unintelligible]* ... I'm just confused about one point. Was the set of instructions that were  
406 given to Vincent OTTI a different set of instructions than the ones that were given to TABULEY  
407 and BUNIA?

408 **Interpreter:** Aa ... me nlang mere keken ... ee ... pien dong wanongo ni nying dano madwong,  
409 ku ... ee ... lok ma kicwalo gine ... ee ... *order* ma kicwalo ki TABULEY gini, gin ki OCAN BUNIA  
410 ki OTTI gin ni, weng *order* mapat pat? Kece weng en acel?

411 **Interviewee:** Uh ... en me acel miyo *order direct* bot OTTI, pien OTTI iye *Chairman Two*. Ci  
412 OTTI, en waco ni OTTI pe romo golo *order* ki jo ni eni ni, ci omiyo en dong medo *order* ki jo  
413 mukene ni. Ento *generally* kong miyo *direct* bot OTTI. Ci ka onongo ni OTTI pe romo lubo kor cik  
414 eni dong golo ki jo mukene ni weng.

415 **Interpreter:** Now, what actually happened was that ... uh ... uh ... first line of instructions was to  
416 OTTI and then, if ... uh ... just to be sure, he would also give extra instructions to the other  
417 commanders below.

418 **CC:** So, was OTTI involved in the first and second trips to SOROTI or just one of the other?

419 **Interpreter:** Uhh ... OTTI obedo bene, ocito bene ilweny aryo ni weng man ma SOROTI ni? Kece  
420 ocito li acel keken?

421 **Interviewee:** OTTI kit nlang ne tek, ento ma an aniang, ocito en kicelo iye ... kicelo iye CEASAR  
422 ACELAM, Kicelo iye aduno ne.

423 **Interpreter:** Uhh ... I don't know which is which but I know he went for the attack in which ...  
424 uh ... CEASAR ACELAM ...

425 **Interviewee:** *Brigadier* CEASAR.

426 **Interpreter:** ... *Brigadier* CEASAR ACELAM was, was injured.

427 **Interpreter:** Kineko?

428 **Interviewee:** Ku.

- 429 **Interpreter:** Was killed.
- 430 **Interviewee:** *No, he was injured* ... pe kinoko. li aduno ne ...
- 431 **Interpreter:** He was injured....
- 432 **Interviewee:** ... li obo ne.
- 433 **CC:** So, OTTI was actually present in SOROTI when that happened?
- 434 **Interpreter:** OTTI onongo tye en igine, ilweny ni eni i SOROTI?
- 435 **Interviewee:** Ocifo SOROTI do. Ma CEASAR owane iye ki ACEL CALO APAR bene kifuro tye  
436 tyene, eni ma aniang maber, ento mukene ni pe aniang.
- 437 **Interpreter:** Uh ... I know he went on this ... uh ... trip but the other ones I don't know.
- 438 **CC:** How do you know that?
- 439 **Interpreter:** Eni kono ingeyo nining?
- 440 **Interviewee:** Hmm ... pien ni ikare ma jo mukene oa ki SOROTI, mogo opoka gudonyo bot wa.
- 441 **Interpreter:** Uh .... some of the people who were involved in the SOROTI attack ... uh ... when  
442 they now saattered, passed through the camp where we were.
- 443 **PN:** OK. You say "The SOROTI attack". What do you mean by that?
- 444 **Interpreter:** Uhh ... pien waloko pi lweny ayo matego, i SOROTI.
- 445 **Interviewee:** Hmm.
- 446 **Interpreter:** ... ma mene mere ma in iwaco ma gine, ma en OTTI ogine, ma dano dong lwenyo  
447 guket mogo owok ongolo kibot wu ni ...
- 448 **Interviewee:** Ee ...
- 449 **Interpreter:** ... ma mene ni?
- 450 **Interviewee:** ... eno onongo dong en OTTI iye kadwogo adwoga. Ci gurwa ... mony olubo kor gi  
451 kadong ocelo gidong. Onongo dong gitye kadwogo adwoga, dong gicelo gi wai, wa tung  
452 OMWONY DAYO.
- 453 **Interpreter:** Mamene?
- 454 **Interviewee:** Pien pe angeyo *trip* mene en owoto iye, ento eno ni, obedo iye agiki ne eni. Ento  
455 oweko an atito ni, pe aniang /of mene ma en owoto iye, ento eni dong me li agiki ne eni, ma gice  
456 kwede ... ee ... ingee neko TABULEY, en bene onongo tye kadwogo adwoga. Eni ma an aniang  
457 eno ni.



458 **Interpreter:** I ... I don't really know which is which but I know is one very last incidences ...

459 **PN:** Hmm ...

460 **Interpreter:** ... uh ... because it, it definitely went, they were now ... uh ...

461 **Interviewee:** Ma gineko TABULEY ni.

462 **Interpreter:** ... when TABULEY has been killed and they were scattered, and being chased by  
463 the UPDF that some of the people passed through our camp and from these people then I  
464 learned of OTTI been there and TABULEY been killed.

465 **PN:** So, so TABULEY was killed during this particular attack on SOROTI, that you are talking  
466 about?

467 **Interpreter:** Manyute ni gine, TABULEY kineko en i lweny ma aryo ma in iwaco ni?

468 **Interviewee:** Hmm ... en ii *operation* eno madong wa OTTI bene ocito ni.

469 **Interpreter:** Uh ... yes, that's the operation, the second operation in which OTTI took place, took  
470 part!

471 **CC:** So, let's try to associate the things that should be associated together: There is a...an attack  
472 on SOROTI where TABULEY gets, TABULEY gets killed, and that's the same attack where you  
473 had information that OTTI was there. Is that right so far?

474 **Interpreter:** Aa ... me temo niang maber maloyo, aa ... lweny otime SOROTI, OTTI obedo tye  
475 iye, i lweny ni eno ni TABULEY kineko. Eni tye kakare?

476 **Interviewee:** Lweny eno ni, pe obedo calo *attack*, pien ni gin oo kuno TABULEY woto ki *group* ne  
477 OTTI bene woto ki *group* ne. Cidong mony manongo lubo kor gi en aye gilwenyo kwed gi ni.

478 **Interpreter:** Now, it was not just one attack ...

479 **CC:** Right ... *[nodding]* ...

480 **Interpreter:** ...uh ... OTTI had his group, TABULEY had his group.

481 **CC:** ... hmm ... hmm ...

482 **Interpreter:** ... and the people who were moving behind them ...

483 **CC:** Hmm ... hmm ...

484 **Interpreter:** ... are the ones who are normally involved in actual fighting..

485 **Interviewee:** Hmm. UPDF manongo lubo kor gi.

486 **Interpreter:** And with the UPDF pursuing.

- 487 CC: OK. But did, did TABULEY and CEASAR ACELAM die in the same attack or did they die in  
488 different attacks?
- 489 Interpreter: Uhh ... ee ... CEASAR ...
- 490 CC: I am sorry, was CEASAR ACELAM injured in the same attack that TABULEY was killed?
- 491 Interpreter: ... uhh ... gine, wan ma ACELAM onongo ni, obedo en ilweny acej ma kineko iye  
492 TABULEY ni?
- 493 Interviewee: CEASAR onongo gitye kawot gin ki ... gin ki OTTI Vincent. TABULEY onongo mere  
494 tye ki *group* ne.
- 495 Interpreter: Now, CEASAR was moving with OTTI ... uh ... TABULEY was in his own group.
- 496 CC: OK. Even do they were moving separately, were they coordinating to attack SOROTI or were  
497 there two separate attacks?
- 498 Interpreter: Aa ... kadi bed onongo gitye kawot keken gi, patpat ni ... uh ... onongo gi gine,  
499 gileko ki gine, giporo lok mapwod peya gine, kit ma myero gi gine, gimony kwede gine, gimony  
500 kwede kuno?
- 501 Interviewee: Gin ka calo lok ma ikin gi nongo dong gileko ki *radio* dong kikuno, *communication*.
- 502 Interpreter: Now, if there was any communication then it may have been over the radio.
- 503 PN: Hmm ... hmm ...
- 504 Interviewee: I don't know.
- 505 Interviewee: Hmm ... ento lok me rwate en awinyo KONY owaco ni, pe tye rwate, jo ma, wan  
506 lugero pe warwate ki *convoy*. *Convoy* mo keken bene pe gutim RV, pe gurwate ikin gi, guloka  
507 aloka ki *radio*, en gin ma an awinyo en end.
- 508 Interpreter: Uh ... the only thing that I heard over the, from the radio communication was, clear  
509 instructions that there should be no contact between the people in the Convoy and the people in  
510 the Camp.
- 511 Interviewee: *Sick Bay*.
- 512 Interpreter: In the Sick Bay.
- 513 PN: Hmm ... hmm ...
- 514 Interpreter: And then secondly also, no contact between the convoys ...
- 515 Interviewee: Ki *convoy*.
- 516 Interpreter: ... and but they may communicate by radio. One group, one convoy and the next ...

- 517 PN: Hmm ... hmm ...
- 518 Interpreter: ... may communicate by radio.
- 519 PN: OK.
- 520 Interviewee: Myero pe gubin gurwate kacel, kit ma nongo *convoy* moni bino, bino girwate  
521 kacel ... [unintelligible] ...
- 522 Interpreter: But they should never meet ... uh ... directly, there should be no physical contact.
- 523 PN: OK. Who ... who became Brigade Commander when TABULEY was promoted to Divisional  
524 Commander?
- 525 Interpreter: Anga madong oleyo ka TABULEY ikare madong TABULEY dong onongo rwom man  
526 omede dong oo wa igine ni, i *Division Commander* ni?
- 527 Interviewee: Aa ... eno ni obedo ... uh ... *Brig...* *Brigadier* BUK ABUDEMA, ORINGA SISTO,  
528 ORINGA SISTO BUK.
- 529 Interpreter: ORING ..., uh ... he was replaced by Brigadier ORINGA ...
- 530 Interviewee: ORINGA Sisto.
- 531 Interpreter: ... Sisto.
- 532 PN: ORINGA?
- 533 Interviewee: Sisto. Ma ...
- 534 PN: And he became commander of which Brigade?
- 535 Interpreter: Odoko gine, *Commander* me *Brigade* ma mene?
- 536 Interviewee: Hmm ... *Stockree Brigade*. Pien TABULEY onongo tye i *Stockree*, cidong mere dong  
537 ocito i *Division*.
- 538 Interpreter: So, this was the *Stockree* Brigade.
- 539 PN: And was, was Brigadier Sisto also involved in the attack or the attacks in SOROTI?
- 540 Interpreter: En gine, *Brigadier* ni eni bene obedo igine, ocito bene ilweny ni? Me SOROTI ni?
- 541 Interviewee: Dong kit ni eno ni dong pe ariango niang maber dong.
- 542 Interpreter: Now, I don't really know.
- 543 Interviewee: Dong pe ariango eni mere. Ento en obedo mere li *operation* mere ma en onongo  
544 koma yot onongo tye i Uganda kany, cidong pe ariango kono ocito kono pe ocito.

- 545 **Interpreter:** Uh ... I believe he was in ... uh ... Uganda and was also involved in operations but I  
546 don't know if he took part in the SOROTI attack.
- 547 **PN:** OK. You've mentioned a little earlier that ... uh ... OCAN BUNIA ... uh ... refused an order to  
548 attack ALERO Camp and that for two years he did not participate in operations.
- 549 **Interpreter:** Iwaco nanen ni gine, OCAN BUNIA, okwero gine *order* mogo me cwalo, me cito ka  
550 gine, ka monyo ALERO *Camp*.
- 551 **Interviewee:** Hmm ... ni eno ni awaco.
- 552 **Interpreter:** Yes, I've said that.
- 553 **PN:** What was KONY's reaction to that?
- 554 **Interpreter:** KONY kono dong gine, otimo, oneno, otimo ngo pi ni eno ni ni, macalo lapwod.
- 555 **Interviewee:** Ni eno ni, inino ma an awaco awinyo ni KONY obedo kagolo *order* onongo ngeyo ni  
556 ape iter *radio*, ci owaco ni kineka woko ni.
- 557 **Interpreter:** Now, this was the time when ... uh ... KONY was giving orders that I should be killed  
558 and not knowing that I was actually listening.
- 559 **Interviewee:** Ogolo *order* ikom BUNIA bene.
- 560 **Interpreter:** Uh ... the same order was also covering BUNIA.
- 561 **Interviewee:** Ni omyero OTTI onong yoo me *demoting* BUNIA woko, pien pe tye katimo gino mo  
562 keken.
- 563 **Interpreter:** Uh ... he, KONY instructed OTTI to demote BUNIA because BUNIA was not doing  
564 anything.
- 565 **Interviewee:** Pien owaco ni *Major General* ma kimiyo ki in ni, kimiyo in ki kit tic ni eno, ci omyero  
566 in iti iye iyub woko.
- 567 **Interpreter:** Because, they, he say ... uh ... "The Major General we gave you, was for a specific  
568 responsibility but since you are not doing so, you should be demoted."
- 569 **Interviewee:** Ci OTTI owaco ni gin ni eno ni en bene onongo etye kiyub ma onongo emito ni  
570 eyub dong ka eniang en KONY.
- 571 **Interpreter:** OTTI responded, "Yeah, that's exactly also what I wanted to do, I first wanted to  
572 inform you before doing anything."
- 573 **Interviewee:** Ci ingeye dano ma olwi, madong an ononge dong abino woko, dano ma olwii  
574 owaco ni, OTTI ogamo ci ... BUNIA obedo onongo kong bote.

575 **Interpreter:** Now, from some of the people who have escaped ... uh ... I understand that ...  
576 uh ... OTTI also brought ... uh ... OCAN BUNIA to his, to where he was.

577 **Interviewee:** Hmm ... cidong lok me attack ALERO ni. Lt. Col. OKWONGA ALERO ma kimako  
578 ni, en owaco ni order onongo kimiyo ni gin gicel ALERO, ci gikwero woko gin ki BUNIA.

579 **Interpreter:** Now, another person ...

580 **Interviewee:** Lt. Colonel OKWONGA.

581 **Interpreter:** ... Lt. Colonel OKWONGA.

582 **Interviewee:** ALERO.

583 **Interpreter:** ALERO.

584 **Interviewee:** Gikwongo mako en kadong gimako *Brigadier* BANYA.

585 **Interpreter:** Uh ... has been captured but he was there, he was captured before Brigadier  
586 BANYA was captured, according to OKWONGA ... uh ... KONY had given them instructions to  
587 attack ALERO Camp.

588 **PN:** Yeah.

589 **CC:** Yeah, let me, let me ask you to do something Hillary. When...when Peter ask you questions,  
590 make an effort to answer them first based on what you knew when you were in the LRA.

591 **Interpreter:** Ee ... ka kipenyo in peny, ee? Kong item kong gamo ne, macek, tutwal ni, ngo ma in  
592 ingeyo, in kit ma ineno nyo ma iwinyo awinya kit ma, ma onongo in pwod itye i fum, kidong kalok  
593 ma eno ni peke, ci iwac mere Igine ...

594 **CC:** And then ...

595 **Interpreter:** ... ma ingeyo ma kiwoko.

596 **CC:** ... and then if you know other things but you, if you know other things because of your  
597 current position in the UPDF, other things that you learned since you came out of the LRA, you  
598 can add that, but please let us know that you are adding that.

599 **Interpreter:** Kadong imito medo lok ma iwinyo ma in itye i, kit madong yoo me tic ma kombedi  
600 itye iye bot UPDF ni, eno ni, ka iwaco, wac bene wek wangeyo woko, wek pe ki...pe kirub gi  
601 woko.

602 **CC:** Because it is important for us to understand how you know what you know, and we want to  
603 make sure that we understand what you new went you were in the LRA and then what additional  
604 things you learn after you came out of the LRA.

605 **Interpreter:** Pien ki wan, pire tek me niang, ngo ma in onongo ingeyo mapwod pe ya onongo  
606 ikati woko, ngo madong in ingeyo madong in itiyi ki UPDF. Eno ni kibot wa tye jami mapat.

607 CC: So ...

608 Interpreter: ... mito waniang apoka poka matye ni, konyo wa matek.

609 CC: ... so, so your last answer was good, is good for us to be told like you've told us ... "From  
610 what I've learned from people who escaped from the LRA". That's what we need to know is. But  
611 first you should answer based on what knew while you were in the LRA and then add the rest.

612 Interpreter: Mukwongo kong mito wapwoyo gine, pien lok ma lwaco ki wan kombedi ni, jami ma  
613 itito bene kamaleng ni ma eni angeyo dong kibot jo madong gu aa woko ki i lum, madong giloko  
614 kwed wa, ee? Ee ... ento ma pire tek ne bene, jami ma in ingeyo mapwod nongo pwod pe ikati  
615 woko, myero gubed woko pat.

616 CC: So, so as to ALERO, for example, the ordering on the attack on ALERO. Is that something  
617 that you knew while you were in the LRA or did you only learn about KONY's instructions after  
618 you came out the LRA?

619 Interpreter: Ga... kadong wadok dong ilok ikom en gine, mony ma onongo myero otime ALERO.  
620 Ma eni lok ma onongo ingeyo ma onongo pwod itye i lum kece lok ma in ingeyo ma in dong itye  
621 dong kama in dong itye iye kombedi ni?

622 Interviewee: Ahh ... ni eni ni, en oweko bene an aloko, eno aniang ki kany wa kikwica weng. Ma  
623 atye i lum bene, en ogolo *order* ni omyero BUNIA ocit ofi kuno.

624 Interpreter: Uhh ...

625 Interviewee: BUNIA okwero woko.

626 Interpreter: ... when I was still in the bush he gave orders for BUNIA to go and attack on ALERO  
627 but BUNIA refused to do so.

628 Interviewee: Ci omiyo an dok amedo bene ni, ikare ma bene dok OKWONGA kimako bene dok  
629 pwod owaco rigo, lok acel ni kimiyo gi ni kicel ALERO. Ci man *information* oweka awaco ni eni  
630 wun kong iniang ni.

631 Interpreter: So, the information that I was talking of ... uh ... that was gathered from OKWONGA  
632 ALERO ...

633 CC: Yeah ...

634 Interpreter: ... was more complementary, it's something OKWONGA has known from people  
635 who have surrendered.

636 Interviewee: Hmm ... ki me agiki ne, ikare ma kigolo en *order* me acel, ma awaco ni KONY ogolo  
637 me acel me cito SOROTI ni, BUNIA okwero matwal pe omedo ki cito.

638 Interpreter: Uhh ... now, also the ... in the first instructions on attack of SOROTI, KONY gave  
639 orders for BUNIA to go to SOROTI but BUNIA refused to go.

- 640 Interviewee: Hmm.
- 641 CC: So, those were the instructions in AGAGO, the ones that you heard in person?
- 642 Interpreter: Meno ni en dong gine, lok ma, *order* ma en KONY ogolo ma onongo wun liye  
643 AGAGO ni?
- 644 Interviewee: En eno, wa en BUNIA bene onongo obino woko, obedo woko tung mego lutino  
645 bedo iye, KONY ni en pe obed kama lutino bedo iye, obin obedo idye lum dong ata.
- 646 Interpreter: Ehh ... this was the instructions while in AGAGO. And in fact BUNIA did come close  
647 to where we were staying but KONY specifically forbade him from going into where women and  
648 children were.
- 649 Interviewee: Hmm. Dok wa RASKA bene owaco ni omyero emak BUNIA woko, pien ni en cito  
650 kama lugoro tye iye, kadong oweko UPDF olubo kore cidong oketo lugoro dong ... hmm ...
- 651 Interpreter: And even RASKA gave extra orders that ... uh ... he did not want BUNIA to go  
652 where the weak people and women and children were, what if because of him the UPDF came  
653 and kill those people?
- 654 Interviewee: ... hmm ... en ocit ka lweny! Rwom ma kimiyo ki en ni me lweny. En RASKA bene  
655 ebicito woko i SOROTI, owaco kit ni eno ni.
- 656 Interpreter: He must, he must go to fight. The title he got was to fight not to just seat around.
- 657 Interviewee: Hmm ... cidong pe aninag ka RASKA ...
- 658 Interpreter: Even, even, even "I Ros... RASKA, I am going to SOROTI."
- 659 Interviewee: ... hmm ... cidong pe aniang ka RASKA ocito SOROTI.
- 660 Interpreter: But I don't know whether actually RASKA went to SOROTI.
- 661 Interviewee: Meno en gin me oweko an awaco ni BUNIA kare mukene kwero *order* pa KONY  
662 woko.
- 663 Interpreter: That's why I've mentioned that BUNIA occasional refuse the order, to follow the  
664 orders of KONY.
- 665 PN: Do you know why he refused?
- 666 Interpreter: Ingeyo pingo en okwero? Bedo ka kwero ne woko.
- 667 Interviewee: Ahh ... ni ano ni dong ka ... en pe owaca mere, ento kit ma an abyeko kwede  
668 nongo dang nongo ni lok mogo me neko dano i *camp* ni nongo dong nongo pe ber. Kit ma an  
669 atamo mere kwede. Ento pe angeyo ki i cwinye.

- 670 **Interpreter:** Now, he didn't tell me that. I can only speculate ... uh ... with my own understanding  
671 that it must be because he did not feel comfortable with deciding of killing peoples in the camp.
- 672 **CC:** Were there times when he did, did participate in attacks? Are there examples of that?
- 673 **Interpreter:** Ingeyo gine, kare ma en otimo gine, ocito monyo monyo kama kaneko iye dano  
674 mere?
- 675 **Interviewee:** Aa ... aa ... pwod pe aniang.
- 676 **Interpreter:** Not that I am aware of.
- 677 **PN:** When did KONY give him the order to attack ALERO camp?
- 678 **Interpreter:** *Order* kono ma okwongo ma gine, en omiyo ni, me monyo ALERO ni kono obedo  
679 awene?
- 680 **Interviewee:** Eno omiyo o... ocake ikine dwe me angwen ki abic gin ni. Pien eno ni dong en  
681 omiyo *order* ni ngat acel dong onong kama ocel woko. *Order* mere en omiyo mere *generally* eno  
682 ni.
- 683 **Interpreter:** Now, I don't really remember ... uh ... when exactly but it must have been some time  
684 in April-May, this year ...
- 685 **PN:** Hmm ... hmm ...
- 686 **Interpreter:** ... but the, there...it was a fairly general instruction that ... uh ... at some places,  
687 some place has to be attacked ...
- 688 **PN:** Hmm ... hmm ...
- 689 **Interviewee:** Eno *the same order* en omiyo Dominic. Dominic gin OTULU bene dong gin oturu  
690 kicelo kwede kwene, gucelo kwede ... ee ... gucelo LOKODI, LOKODI Camp. Yes LOKODI  
691 Camp.
- 692 **Interpreter:** Ehh ... but, as a result of this general order ... uh ... I know Dominic and OTULU  
693 attacked LOKODI Camp.
- 694 **CC:** Dominic and ...?
- 695 **Interpreter:** OTULU.
- 696 **CC:** OTULU?
- 697 **Interviewee:** OTULU OLAK, OLAK OTULU, OTULU, yes.
- 698 **CC:** OTULU OLAK?
- 699 **Interviewee:** Yes.



- 700 CC: Attacked ... ?
- 701 Interviewee: LOKODI *Camp*.
- 702 Interpreter: LOKODI, LOKODI *Camp*. L-O-K-OD-I.
- 703 Interviewee: En idwe me abic eno ni.
- 704 Interpreter: In May.
- 705 CC: And Dominic you mean ... ? What's Dominic's other name?
- 706 Interpreter: Nying Dominic mukene anga?
- 707 Interviewee: Dominic ONGWEN.
- 708 CC: ONGWEN.
- 709 Interviewee: *Colonel, Brigade Commander of Sinia*.
- 710 Interpreter: Uh ... Dominic ONGWEN ... uh ... who is a Brigadier ...
- 711 Interviewee: *Brigade Commander!*
- 712 Interpreter: Brigade Commander of ...
- 713 Interviewee: Sinia.
- 714 Interpreter: Sinia ...
- 715 Interviewee: *Colonel, his rank was Colonel*.
- 716 Interpreter: Colonel Dominic ONGWEN.
- 717 Interviewee: *Brigade Commander* me Sinia.
- 718 Interpreter: The Brigade Commander of Sinia.
- 719 CC: And what about OTULU OLAK? What was his rank and Brigade?
- 720 Interpreter: OTULU kono?
- 721 Interviewee: Tye *Lieutenant Colonel*.
- 722 Interpreter: He was Lt. Colonel.
- 723 PN: In the same brigade?
- 724 Interpreter: *In gine ... igine en Brigade acei ni?*

- 725 Interviewee: En tye i Gilva *Brigade* ento gwoko ... aa ... en tye i Gilva *Brigade*.
- 726 Interpreter: He was in the Gilva Brigade but ...
- 727 Interviewee: En pole maro wot woko bene en ki cok ccki ki ODOMI.
- 728 Interpreter: ... uh ... but ... uh ... he was quite often together with ODOMI, Dominic.
- 729 Interviewee: Gimaro yubo tic gin ki ODOMI.
- 730 Interpreter: He was quite often working together with Dominic ...
- 731 PN: Hmm ... hmm ...
- 732 Interpreter: ... ONGWEN, Dominic ONGWEN is also called ODOMI.
- 733 CC: How do you know about these set of directions about LOKODI Camp?
- 734 Interpreter: Ee ... Ingeyo kono nining ... ee ... pi gine, *order* pa KONY me monyo gine, monyo  
735 gine, LOKODI *Camp* ni?
- 736 Interviewee: En omiyo mere *order* ikare eno ni mere *generally* ni, ngai acel onong kama en  
737 *strength* ne romo ngo, *time attack* iye.
- 738 Interpreter: Uh ... there was a standing instruction ... uh ... uh ... a general instruction from  
739 KONY that ... uh ... everyone had to look around for places to attack.
- 740 Interviewee: Cidong eno ni dong ... oo ... obedo dong *network* ma ODOMI gin nongo dong  
741 guyubo gin ki OTULU.
- 742 Interpreter: So, this must have been just ... uh ... one of the things ... uh ... one of the places  
743 that Dominic and OTULU saw and ... uh ... we could do and act and carry out some attack.
- 744 PN: And did you see Dominic and OTULU after the attack on the Camp?
- 745 Interpreter: Ineno en gine, Dominic gin ki OTULU inge lweny ni eno ni? I *camp* ni eno ni?
- 746 Interviewee: Hmm ... hmm ... pien ni, gin ni eno otime madong an aa ni, ma, madong onongo  
747 dong, gin omako an atye bot gi ni, me aneka onongo dong ni. Ci, madong an aa, ci gicwalo min  
748 et na dong olubo *kora dong*. Min et na dong nyer mo ogonyo kadong owaco ni jo ni eno ni gubino  
749 gu ... [unintelligible].
- 750 Interpreter: Now, this happened at the time when I've been already arrested to be killed ...
- 751 PN: Hmm ... hmm ...
- 752 Interpreter: ... but ... uh ... my wife ... uh ... later ... uh ... came with this type of information.

753 **Interviewee:** Hmm ... ento ma an kimaka ni en onongo pwod gitye kayenyo ka kwene ma  
754 omyero gicel.

755 **Interpreter:** When I was still under arrest with them, they were still ... uh ... identifying where to  
756 attack.

757 **Interviewee:** Hmm ... cidong ma an abino ni, min ot na madong larema mo okwalo dong obino  
758 ni, en owaco ni ningo ... aa ... jo mu aa kalweny ni igin, gin oput gubino gubedo kalito kit ma  
759 kilwenyo kwede i LOKODI Camp, bot ODOMI.

760 **Interpreter:** And then ... uh ... when my wife escaped ... uh ... with the help of one of my  
761 friends ... uh ... she was saying that these people ... uh ... the people who actually went to this  
762 people to attack the camp, were talking about how it went.

763 **Interviewee:** Hmm ... kidong *information wa pa dano madong dwogo bene ki i lum weng,*  
764 *kimako ... ee ... min latin acel, UPDF bene omako min latin acel ducu weng owaco the same*  
765 *information. NI ODOMI en aye ocelo... [inaudible] ... gucelo LOKODI Camp.*

766 **Interpreter:** Uh ... also from the people, other people who have been, who has been captured by  
767 the UPDF we get the same kind of information confirming that Dominic and OTULU actually were  
768 the ones who attacked this camp.

769 **PN:** Who's Dominic?

770 **Interviewee:** *The Brigade Commander. Brigade Commander me Sinia.*

771 **Interpreter:** Yeah ... he is the Brigade Commander of Sinia.

772 **PN:** Can Dominic choose the target or does he has to get permission before he attacks the  
773 target?

774 **Interpreter:** Ma yero gine, kama dong myero kimony, meno en gine, Dominic onongo romo  
775 tim...yero ne en kikome myero, kece onongo myero kong okur gine, KONY aye owac ki gin  
776 kwene ame myero gi ocif iye kalweny.

777 **Interviewee:** Ikit ma awaco wii ati ni, en KONY owaco ni ngat acel onong kama en romo celo ne  
778 iye, oceli iye, cidong en Dominic nongo okwanyo *intelligent* nongo do. Dong ocito ka *wrecking*.

779 **Interpreter:** Now, as I've mentioned already, it was just a general instruction from KONY one and  
780 then secondly each of the commanders had to identify a target they coul ... uh ... deal with and  
781 based on intelligence of Dominic and OTULU they may have chosen then this ... uh ... camp to  
782 attack.

783 **PN:** OK. Does KONY have to authorize the actual target or is it enough for him to give a general  
784 order to attack the area?

785 **Interpreter:** Aa ... kacalo en gine ni, kit ni ono ni, lweny ma time ni, pol kare kong KONY pe gine,  
786 KONY myero kong dok ogine, ka in dong ineno ni meno gine, calo en pa OTULU gin ni, me  
787 monyo en LOKODI ni, myero kadong wun dong oneno ni ma irono otimo ne KONY myero kong

- 788 oye mapwod peya ocito kalweny ni eno ni, kece kadong en owaco kit ma in iwaco kwede ni gin  
789 giromo cito ne gimonyo mony mere dong?
- 790 **Interviewee:** Aa ... ni eno ni, kacalo dong *order* ma en omiyo ni dong, waco ni in dong ikem mere  
791 tic, labol ne, en owaco ni ODOMI aye tye katic matek, ci jo mukene ni ebitulo gi woko.
- 792 **Interpreter:** Yeah ... uh ... in this particular case the instructions were very general and in ...  
793 quite often he did that as well that he gives such general instructions and the officers were  
794 actually instructed ... "You have to do your best " ...
- 795 **PN:** Hmm ... hmm ...
- 796 **Interpreter:** ... uh ... to achieve this, and ... uh ... he trusted Dominic quite a lot.
- 797 **PN:** Hmm ... hmm ...
- 798 **Interpreter:** And in fact he quite often talked of ... uh ... this is how everybody should be working.
- 799 **PN:** OK. OK. So, when would KONY be aware that LOKODI Camp was going to be attacked or  
800 even after it has been attacked? Would he know before?
- 801 **Interpreter:** Cidong ingec bot KONY ... ee ... calo lweny ma otime LOKODI ni, meno gituru  
802 kiwaco ni meno mapwod peya mony ocito kuno kece kiwac ki en tek dong mony otime wako?
- 803 **Interviewee:** Hmm! Ka inen nongo kama kibicito ka tic iye gitito ki en, Kitito ki en, ento eri dong  
804 pe aniang ka ODOMI otito, pien ikare ni eno onongo dong, kitye kaweyo an kit ni en, pe kimito  
805 aniang ngo ma tye katima.
- 806 **Interpreter:** Now, normally he is informed of ... uh ... informed before hand of an operation which  
807 is planned ...
- 808 **PN:** Hmm ... hmm ...
- 809 **Interpreter:** ... but ... uh ... at the time when this attack at LOKODI Camp took place ... uh ... I  
810 was already been avoided, so it is possible that ... eh ... KONY was informed, maybe not, I don't  
811 really know.
- 812 **Interviewee:** Ki kabedo mukene en ka inen kama nongo tye *special*, ci mukene romo waco atir  
813 ni ... "Cit wulweny kama kit ni en, cit wulweny kama kit ni en", bene bedo tye.
- 814 **Interpreter:** There also sp...places which were especial ... uh ... importance to KONY where he,  
815 he is the one who issued the instructions on what exactly to do.
- 816 **CC:** OK. Let's ... yeah ... let's go back to those, let's go back to the ones that you know that  
817 KONY gave the instructions on.
- 818 **Interpreter:** Aa ... kong wamito winyo gine, ma in ingeyo lok kom ... ee ... en kabedo ma pir gi  
819 tego kit ni eno ma in ingeyo ma KONY aye ogolo *order* me gine, me monyo ne.

- 820 CC: So, today we talked about SOROTI, Tango, Teso, Lango, we just talked, we talked about  
821 ALERO, we talked about ...
- 822 Interpreter: LOKODI.
- 823 CC: ... LOKODI. What else? What other times?
- 824 Interpreter: Aa ... anwo doki?
- 825 Interviewee: Yes ... *[Inaudible]*.
- 826 *[Laughing.]*
- 827 Interpreter: Uhh ... ma okwongo wabedo ka loko ni meno gine, tye kabedo mogo ma pir gi tego,  
828 ma KONY mito ni en aye egol gine, *order* en kikome, dok me tito kit ma myero gine, kimony  
829 kwede nyo. Ee ... waloko dong kabedo madwong calo SOROTI gi kono ... aa ... TESO, kono  
830 Lango gin ni. Kit kabedo ango kong iwac ki wan nying kabedo, ango gi marwate ki en kit ni enc  
831 ni, ma pir gi onongo tego tutwal bot KONY.
- 832 Interviewee: Calo o ... en maro cwalo *attack* calo li OLILIM gin ni. OLILIM. Tung tung malo me  
833 kwica] an pe aoo iye mere ... *[Interviewee snapping fingers]*.
- 834 Interpreter: Uh ..., one of the ... one of such places was OLILIM ...
- 835 Interviewee: Ki ...
- 836 Interpreter: ... that's in Lango.
- 837 Interviewee: ... ki dong onongo owaco ni, LRA woko weng gucit gugoo PABBO wamony ki iye  
838 weng pe oloyi. Kadi dong ngat ma mulo amula ... kadi ngat ma dong goro oot kalweny kuno.
- 839 Interpreter: Another of the places was PABBO, one of the instructions I remember he gave was  
840 that the LRA should go and finish everybody including people who couldn't walk anymore.
- 841 Interviewee: Hmm ... *Information* enc ni ikare ma an dong abino ci dong aniangi gamente ci  
842 giyuba *deployment*. Pe dong otime.
- 843 Interpreter: Uh ... so, when I had crossed over this is the type of information that I gave to the  
844 UPDF so that they mobilize and prevented so ... some of these attacks.
- 845 Interviewee: Ki bene onongo owaco ni ka pe kigoyo PABBO ci kigoo, kigoo PAJULE.
- 846 Interpreter: Uhh ...
- 847 Interviewee: ... lkin aryo ni. Meno gin ma ah awinyo ki yita.
- 848 Interpreter: Ah ... another of the places was PAJULE ...

- 849 **Interviewee:** Wa ki dano mu aa kibote kuno, otito ni ikin PAJULE ki PABBO myero LRA woko  
850 weng guribe gugoo kwici, kwici, kwici, kwici.
- 851 **Interpreter:** Uhh ... from more from the people who were coming out ... uh ...
- 852 **Interviewee:** Oa wa ki bot en i Sudan onongo pwod atye i lum.
- 853 **Interpreter:** ... people who were coming directly from him, from Sudan while I was still in the  
854 bush also and the people who are now out, were confirming that ... eh ... he wanted all,  
855 everybody, UPDF and civilians ... uh ... all killed in PABBO and PAJULE.
- 856 **Interviewee:** Hmm ... ci *mission* eno ni bene otum, otur woko dong. Kungolo *line* ne woko, dong  
857 peke.
- 858 **Interpreter:** But this was, this mission was destroyed by the UPDF.
- 859 **Interviewee:** Hmm ... ikare madong an akelo lok, akelo *information* eno ni.
- 860 **Interpreter:** When I brought, when we brought this type of information to the UPDF.
- 861 **Interviewee:** Ento pwod wa tin tye kiyub me PABBO ki PAJULE ni kadi ningo wang ma egoyo.
- 862 **Interpreter:** But up to now, his plans for PAJULE and PABBO still remains.
- 863 **CC:** PABBO is the one you mentioned yesterday they got stopped because the UPDF knew. Is  
864 that right?
- 865 **Interpreter:** Ah ... PABBO en ma aye ma lawor iwaco ni meno gine, pien UPDF dong ongeyo  
866 woko, ci gugengo pe gine, lweny obedo peke iye ni.
- 867 **Interviewee:** Hmm ... en ma laworo an awaco ni.
- 868 **Interpreter:** Yes,
- 869 **Interviewee:** Ento en owaco ni myero kinong yoo mo too kadi ningo kilweny PABBO. Kadi  
870 mwaka adi.
- 871 **Interpreter:** But he has insisted that PA... there has to be a fight in PABBO how ever long as it  
872 takes.
- 873 **PN:** OK. Uhm ... we'll just pause at that point. It's twelve eleven ... uh ... on the 21 August to  
874 change tapes.
- 875 **PN:** We resume the interview of Hillary LAGEN on 21 August, time is 12:25. The same people  
876 are in the room that are those that have been present all the way through the interview and  
877 Hillary could you confirm for us if you would that we haven't continued interviewing you or spoken  
878 with you or questioned you ... uh ... in the pause that we just had to change the tape?

- 879 **Interpreter:** Aa ... kong dok ilok, me gine, me moko ni meno pe ki, pe ki bedo kapenyo in i kare  
880 ma kiwaco ni meno kitye ka loko tape ni.
- 881 **Interviewee:** Aa ... ngat mo keken pe omedo ki penyo an. Wa lok mo bene pew a discussing.
- 882 **Interpreter:** Uhh ... no body interviewed me, and ... uh ... I did not have any discussion at all.
- 883 **PN:** Thanks.
- 884 **Interviewee:** Yes.
- 885 **PN:** Hillary, we would like to clarify ... uh ... appoint about the SOROTI attack or attacks and the  
886 BARLONYO attack.
- 887 **Interpreter:** Aa ... tye lok ... aa ... lok ma wamitc kong niang tere dok wamed, tutwal ne i lok  
888 kom mony ma otime i kom SOROTI, kidok mony ma otime i BARLONYO.
- 889 **PN:** In your mind, did SOROTI come first, or did BARLONYO come first?
- 890 **Interpreter:** Ki kit ma in ipco kwede ... aa ... lweny ma otime i BARLONYO ni ko ... kong otime  
891 ma okwongo, kece man me SOROTI ni otime ma okwongo?
- 892 **Interviewee:** Hmm ... kit ma aniang kwede, pien ni ... aa ... pol dano onongo dong tye ka dwogo  
893 adwoga ki SOROTI, ka dong, BARLONYO dong obedo tye.
- 894 **Interpreter:** Uhh ... from what I remember, the people were coming back from SOROTI ...  
895 uhh ... when the BARLONYO ...
- 896 **PN:** Sorry, can you say that again?
- 897 **Interpreter:** ... uhh ... from what I remember ...
- 898 **PN:** Yeah ...
- 899 **Interpreter:** ... the people who are coming back from BAR... from SOROTI ... uh ... were the  
900 ones who may have been involved in BARLONYO.
- 901 **PN:** ... OK. But which attacks or attack took place first in time, SOROTI or BARLONYO?
- 902 **Interpreter:** Mene ma kikwonggo monyo ne, BARLONYO, kece gin man me SOROTI ni?
- 903 **Interviewee:** Ii SOROTI, gin gubedo mere ka wof nen calo operation. Ki dong, kabedo ma  
904 gubedo ka *attacking* iye pe aniang. Ento lweny obedo mere i SOROTI ikare end ni, ki lweny bene  
905 obedo i Lango.
- 906 **Interpreter:** Now, what I know is that ... uhh ... there was generally operation in ... in SORO... in  
907 SOROTI ...
- 908 **PN:** Hmm ... hmm.
- 909 **Interpreter:** ... in Teso, but at the same time, there was also operation in Lango.
- 910 **PN:** Hmm ... hmm.
- 911 **Interpreter:** But ... uh ... in terms of time, I don't really know, which was first, which was the last.
- 912 **Interviewee:** Hmm ... kit ma an awaco ii acaki ne ni, wac...ee ... KONY owaco ni *operation* obed  
913 i Lango ki i SOROTI.
- 914 **Interpreter:** Ehh ... from what I know of what KONY... uh ... the order that KONY gave, he gave  
915 orders for attacks in Teso and ... uh ...

- 916 **Interviewee:** Lango.
- 917 **Interpreter:** ... and Lango.
- 918 **PN:** Hmm ... hmm.
- 919 **Interpreter:** Now this man attacks in different places ...
- 920 **PN:** Uhh ... uhh.
- 921 **Interviewee:** Ci omiyo dong niang ne matek ni lweny ma obedo eno ni, obedo iyi acaki lwiye ni,  
922 ento *attack*, lweny obedo mere dong i Lango ki i SOROTI. *Operation* ne obedo en i kabedo aryo  
923 ma KONY owaco ni.
- 924 **Interpreter:** There were operations going on at the same time.
- 925 **PN:** Hmm ... hmm.
- 926 **Interpreter:** In both Lango and Teso.
- 927 **PN:** Hmm ... hmm.
- 928 **Interpreter:** And ... uhh ... in terms of which particular places were attacked first or last, that's  
929 difficult for me to know.
- 930 **CC:** Were you, were you with KONY on the banks of the AGAGO one time or more than one  
931 time?
- 932 **Interpreter:** Uhh ... irwate ki KONY i gine, i but ... ee ... inget gine, AGAGO kicel nyo tyen  
933 makato kicel?
- 934 **Interviewee:** Ahh ... an arwate kwede kicel eno ni kaken dong wa tin dong amedo ki dwogo pe  
935 amedo ki rwate kwede.
- 936 **Interpreter:** This was only once, and ... uhh ... the last time since ... also up to the time when I  
937 came back.
- 938 **PN:** OK. Just before the break we were talking about KONY ordering a ... attacks in a general  
939 region and sometimes having special instructions for special places.
- 940 **Interpreter:** Ma pwod pe ya wacito gine ... e ... ywe... ma gine ... uh ... lok pa tape ni ... uh ...  
941 wabe... wabedo ka lok pi gine KONY golo *order* me mony, kabedo malac mere. Kidong, pi  
942 kabedo mogo ma pir gi ... pire tego, en golo en kikome bene onongo, *order* mapat.
- 943 **Interviewee:** [Nodding.]
- 944 **Interpreter:** Yes.
- 945 **PN:** And you mentioned OLILIM, PABBO and PAJULE as three special places.
- 946 **Interpreter:** Dok iwaco, pi kabedo ma in iwaco ni gine, pirgi onongo tego mada bot KONY, nying  
947 ilwongo OLILIM, PABBO, ki PAJULE.
- 948 **PN:** Why are they special places?
- 949 **Interpreter:** Pingo itamo ni pirgi onongo tego tutwal bot KONY?
- 950 **Interviewee:** Niang ne kibot an romo bedo tek. Ento kit ma an atamo kwede, en waco ni omyero  
951 etim aranyi kamo ma dano dwong iye, wek wii lobo onge ni en atye ka lweny.



952 **Interpreter:** Now, it's difficult for me to know precise ... uh ... reasons but there was the other  
953 point that ... uh ... that I believe was important here, his idea was that when they are doing such  
954 operations, they should be in places where there are a lot of people ... uh ...

955 **Interviewee:** Wek wiloba onge ni en etek.

956 **Interpreter:** ... so that the rest of the world may know, about what is going on.

957 **PN:** And you mentioned that ...

958 *[Time: 01:03:12: End of Transcript]*