

**Cour
Pénale
Internationale**



**International
Criminal
Court**

Original: **English**

No.: **ICC-01/18**
Date: **August 6, 2024**

PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER I

Before:

**Judge Iulia Motoc, Presiding Judge
Judge Reine Adélaïde Sophie Alapini-Gansou
Judge Nicolas Guillou**

SITUATION IN THE STATE OF PALESTINE

Public

**Observations (amicus curiae observations) from the Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs
Pursuant to Rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence**

Source: Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs

Document to be notified in accordance with regulation 31 of the *Regulations of the Court* to:

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University of London); Jerusalem Institute of Justice; Chile and Mexico; Centre for European Legal Studies on Macro-Crime (MACROCRIMES); Dr Robert Heinsch and Dr Giulia Pinzauti; The Hague Initiative for International Cooperation; ICJ Norway and Defend International Law; UN Special Rapporteurs and Working Groups; the United States of America; Professor Neve Gordon; Al-Quds Human Rights Clinic and Al-Quds University; the League of Arab States; L'association des Juristes pour le respect du droit international and la Fédération internationale pour les droits humains; University Network for Human Rights, the International Human Rights Clinic, Boston University School of Law, the International Human Rights Clinic, Cornell Law School and the Lowenstein Human Rights Project, Yale Law School; Professor Richard Falk and Professor Michael Lynk; Professor Adil Ahmad Haque; Open Society Justice Initiative, European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights, REDRESS Trust, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International; Republic of Colombia; Hostages and Missing Families Forum and the Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights; Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association; International Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists; Kingdom of Spain; UK Lawyers for Israel, B'nai B'rith UK, the International Legal Forum, the Jerusalem Initiative and the Simon Wiesenthal Centre; International Commission of Jurists (ICJ); The Palestinian Association for Human Rights (Witness); Guernica 37 Chambers; the Federative Republic of Brazil; ALMA – Association for the Promotion of International Humanitarian Law; Ireland; Avocats pour la Justice au Proche-Orient (AJPO); Federal Republic of Germany; Dr Shahd Hammouri; Al-Haq Law in the Service of Mankind (Al-Haq), Al-Mezan Center for Human Rights (Al-Mezan) and the Palestinian Center for Human Rights (PCHR); République Démocratique du

Congo; Arpit Batra; South Africa, Bangladesh,
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REGISTRY

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INTRODUCTION

1. In its July 22 2024 decision, the Pre-Trial Chamber 1 granted our request to provide *amicus curiae* observations pursuant to Rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence¹.

2. Therefore, the written observations of the Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs (hereafter “CIJA”) seek to aid the Pre-Trial Chamber I in addressing outstanding substantive issues in ruling on the Prosecution’s Article 58 Application for the issuance of arrest warrants in the Palestine Situation under Article 58 of the Statute².

OVERALL CONCLUSIONS AND STRUCTURE OF OBSERVATIONS

3. The overall conclusion of CIJA’s *amicus curiae* observations is that the ICC does not have jurisdiction over crimes allegedly committed in the “territory of the State of Palestine” and that the arrest warrants issued by the Prosecutor against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Israel’s Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant³ are of a pre-emptive, preclusive, and prejudicial nature. This argument is premised on the following submissions:

- (a) First, the Court cannot assert jurisdiction over Israeli nationals in situations where, according to the Oslo Accords, Palestine cannot exercise criminal jurisdiction over Israeli nationals.
- (b) Second, the pre-emptive, preclusive, and prejudicial nature of the Prosecutor’s application for the arrant warrant process would make pursuing prosecution of Israeli nationals contrary to the principal of cooperation.

¹ ICC-01/18-249, Pre-Trial Chamber I, *Decision on requests for leave to file observations pursuant to rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence*, 22 July 2024, para 11.

² Statement of ICC Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan KC: *Applications for arrest warrants in the situation in the State of Palestine (Prosecutor’s Statement’)*, 20 May 2024, available at <https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-icc-prosecutor-karim-aa-khan-kc-applications-arrest-warrants-situation-state>

³ Statement of ICC Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan KC: *Applications for arrest warrants in the situation in the State of Palestine (Prosecutor’s Statement’)*, 20 May 2024, available at <https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-icc-prosecutor-karim-aa-khan-kc-applications-arrest-warrants-situation-state>

I. ACCORDING TO THE OSLO ACCORDS, PALESTINE CANNOT EXERCISE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER ISRAELI NATIONALS AND, THEREFORE, CANNOT DELAGATE JURISDICTION TO THE ICC.

4. On February 5, 2021, in its decision on territorial jurisdiction concerning the situation in Palestine, the majority of Pre-Trial Chamber I did not address the jurisdictional issues related to the Oslo Accords. Instead, they stated that these issues would be examined when the Prosecutor submits an application for an arrest warrant or summons under article 58 of the Statute, or if a State or suspect files a challenge under Article 19(2) of the Statute⁴.

5. The Prosecutor has now submitted applications for arrest warrants under Article 58 of the Statute, including against Israeli nationals, bringing the unresolved Oslo Accords issue into focus. In line with the Jurisdiction Decision and under Articles 19(1) and 58 of the Statute, these additional jurisdictional questions must be considered when evaluating the applications for arrest warrants. Addressing this issue now would prevent the risk of an arrest warrant being issued without the necessary legal grounds for jurisdiction.

6. We therefore wish to offer observations as to whether the Court can assert jurisdiction over Israeli nationals in situations where, according to the Oslo Accords, Palestine cannot exercise criminal jurisdiction over Israeli nationals.

7. First, we remind the Court that representatives from the international community have reiterated their strong backing for UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338⁵, along with the Oslo Accords⁶ ("OA") as the legal basis for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and determining the status of the disputed territories⁷. The OA are thus the framework that must be used at this time.

⁴ ICC-01/18-143, Pre-Trial Chamber I, *Decision on the 'Prosecution request pursuant to Article 19(3) for a ruling on the Court's territorial jurisdiction in Palestine'* ("Jurisdiction Decision"), 5 February 2021, para. 131.

⁵ UN Security Council Resolution 242 (22 November 1967) and 338 (22 October 1973).

⁶ Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 28 September 1995.

⁷ See, for example, G.A. Res. 73/19, U.N. Doc. A/RES/73/19, preambular para. 25 and operative paras. 16 and 19 (23 Jan. 2019); G.A. Res. 73/256, U.N. Doc. A/RES/73/256, preambular para. 2 (5 Dec. 2018); S.C. Res. 2334, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2334, para 8 (23 Dec. 2016); G.A. Res. 67/19, *supra* note 35, at para. 5.

8. The OA state that the Palestinian Authority (PA) has only the powers explicitly transferred to it by Israel according to the agreements. Article I of the 1995 Interim Agreement specifies that Israel retains all remaining powers. The PA's powers under the OA are limited and apply only to specific areas of the territory⁸. They are also restricted, applying only to Palestinians and non-Israelis within those areas⁹. Furthermore, Article XVII(2)(c) of the 1995 Interim Agreement states: "the territorial and functional jurisdiction of the Council shall apply to all persons, except for Israelis, unless otherwise provided in this Agreement"¹⁰. Article XVII(4)(a) states that Israel has all powers not specifically given to the Palestinians by the Accords. These agreements confirm that Palestinian jurisdiction is limited for Palestinians and non-Israelis in the West Bank (excluding Area C) and Gaza Strip. This limitation is not due a reduction in existing jurisdiction but because the Palestinians lacked such jurisdiction before the agreements and were not granted full criminal jurisdiction through them.

9. Based on customary rules of treaty interpretation, the relevant provisions in the OA show that the PA never had full criminal jurisdiction over Israeli nationals. Instead of having a right they chose not to exercise, the OA indicate that, prior to the agreements, they never possessed prescriptive, adjudicative, or enforcement jurisdiction in this matter.

10. As long as the parties to the OA do not renounce them, these agreements continue to define the powers granted to the PA and regulate the relationship between Israel and Palestine. Also notable: if such an instance should occur, the powers given to the Palestinian Authority via the OA would expire and the PA would still not possess criminal jurisdiction in relation to Israeli nationals. Therefore, it is legally impossible for Palestine to assign criminal jurisdiction to the ICC under Article 12(2)(a) of the ICC Statute for war crimes allegedly committed by Israelis.

11. When looking at *travaux préparatoires* to the ICC Statute regarding Article 12(2), the article is clearly based on the notion of delegation-based jurisdiction by sovereign States and

⁸ See Article XVII (2)(a).

⁹ See Article XVII(4)(b) "To this end, the Israeli military government shall retain the necessary legislative, judicial and executive powers and responsibilities, in accordance with international law. *This provision shall not derogate from Israel's applicable legislation over Israelis in personam.*"

¹⁰ The exception involves specific civil matters detailed in the 1995 Interim Agreement, See Annex IV, Article 3(2)(a).

emerged from a careful compromise among the delegations at the Rome Conference. It is also clear from the *travaux préparatoires* that the jurisdiction was based on delegation, but, ultimately, that such jurisdiction was restricted to territorial and active personality jurisdiction¹¹. For cases falling under Article 12(2) there is no notion of universal jurisdiction, unlike for specific cases of UN Security Council referrals under Article 13(b) of the Statute. A State can only transfer to the ICC jurisdiction over crimes that would otherwise be under the authority of its own national courts. In other words, Article 12(2)(a) allows states to delegate their sovereign power to prosecute these crimes to the Court¹².

12. For Palestine to properly delegate criminal jurisdiction over the "situation in Palestine" to the ICC under Article 12(2)(a) of the ICC Statute, it must first have the authority to prosecute Israeli nationals, an authority it does not possess. Allowing jurisdiction following the Prosecutor arrest warrants against Israeli officials would be equal to an inversion of the exercise of delegated jurisdiction and would violate the *nemo plus iuris transferre potest quam ipse habet* principle that prescribes that a State cannot delegate more rights than it has.

13. We respectfully argue that failure to prohibit such an inversion of the exercise of delegated jurisdiction would be inappropriate and damaging to the Court's reputation for independence and judicial integrity, and its future legitimacy; the ICC should refrain from inadvertently granting rights to the PA it does not actually possess.

II. THE PRE-EMPTIVE, PRECLUSIVE, AND PREJUDICIAL NATURE OF THE ARRANT WARRANT PROCESS MAKES PURSUING THE PROCESS AGAINST ISRAELI NATIONALS CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPAL OF COOPERATION.

14. We now offer the Pre-Trial Chamber observations on Articles 17, 18 and 54 (3) of the Rome Statute. Given the core importance of the complementarity and the cooperation principles, we must examine the admissibility of the arrest warrant based on the pre-emptive, preclusive, and prejudicial nature of the process. The appearance of – or actual – non-respect of these important principles could gravely impact the Court's standing. As long-time

¹¹ See *Proposal by the Republic of Korea for Article 6[9], 7[6] and 8[7]*, 18 June 1998, A/CONF.183/C.1/L.6.

¹² Office of the Prosecutor, *Prosecution's Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the Statute*, ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18-1, para. 49 (9 Apr. 2018).

advocates of the Court and international justice, we urge that this outstanding jurisdictional issue be resolved early by the Pre-Trial Chamber.

15. In April 2024, the Prosecutor's office presented its vision in the Policy on Complementarity and Cooperation, which states that complementarity and cooperation work together to show the collective determination of State Parties to ensure lasting respect for and enforcement of international justice¹³. Thus, the guiding principle of complementarity should be proactive efforts to use national proceedings for enforcing international criminal law¹⁴.

16. The Policy then adds:

"In the final analysis, by deepening its cooperation and complementarity activities, by bringing its work closer to States, and by deepening its understanding of national actors, the Office will position itself to more effectively implement its core investigative and prosecutorial mandate, while fostering efforts to catalyse genuine domestic proceedings wherever possible"¹⁵.

17. We submit that the Prosecutor's application for the issuance of arrest warrants with respect to Israeli nationals is in line with neither the Policy nor with Articles 17, 18 and 54 (3) of the Statute.

18. Article 17 of the Statute specifies that a case can be brought before the court if the state in question is "unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution." Additionally, the article clarifies that unwillingness includes situations where "there has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings," among other criteria.

19. However, in the case against Israeli officials, the arrest warrants were issued only six months from the opening of the Prosecutor's investigation into the current Israel-Hamas war. This truncated period left little time for Israel to examine the allegations and the Prosecutor to conduct his investigation, which would include meeting with Israeli officials to investigate the

¹³ Office of the Prosecutor, Policy on Complementarity and Cooperation (2024), available at : <https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/policy-complementarity-and-cooperation-2024>

¹⁴ Prof. Yuval Shany, Prof. Amichai Cohen, « In Search of Complementarity: Israel's Possible Responses to ICC Arrest Warrants », The Israel Democracy Institute, July 4 2024, available at : <https://en.idi.org.il/articles/54878>

¹⁵ Office of the Prosecutor, Policy on Complementarity and Cooperation (2024), para. 4, available at : <https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/policy-complementarity-and-cooperation-2024>

allegations of complex war crimes and crimes against humanity, such as starvation. These allegations cannot be investigated hastily.

20. Furthermore, the Prosecutor initiated his investigation into the specific allegations relating to the charges against Israeli officials regarding the situation in the Gaza strip since “at least 8 October 2023,”¹⁶ less than six months ago, and has already pursued arrest warrants. While arrest warrants have been issued quickly in some cases, it has been in relation to situations where civil society had been completely dismantled due to civil war and / or faced multiple decades of decline under an authoritarian leader, for example in the Muammar Gaddafi over the situation in Libya¹⁷. In a situation where a democratic government, is in power and where the prosecution and judiciary are functioning appropriate time needs to be given to see if the obligations to investigate and prosecute if reasonable grounds are met.

21. The May 20 2024 statement regarding filing applications for arrest warrants stated that complementarity necessitates deferring to national authorities only if they conduct independent and impartial judicial processes that do not protect suspects and are not merely a façade. It requires comprehensive investigations to examine the policies and actions underlying these cases¹⁸. The Prosecutor seems to imply that the Israeli authorities are not conducting an impartial process and that actions taken by them are “a sham.”

22. We respectfully argue that these implications are unfounded and ignore multiple elements, one of which is the credible, well-documented independence of the Israel judiciary¹⁹ and that, over the years, Israel’s Office of the Attorney General has, despite the presence of immunity laws, successfully prosecuted several former and current prime ministers and

¹⁶ Statement of ICC Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan KC: Applications for arrest warrants in the situation in the State of Palestine (Prosecutor’s Statement’), 20 May 2024, available at <https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-icc-prosecutor-karim-aa-khan-kc-applications-arrest-warrants-situation-state>

¹⁷ See ICC-01/11-01/11, “Gaddafi Case – Timeline”, available at: <https://www.icc-cpi.int/libya/gaddafi>

¹⁸ Statement of ICC Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan KC: Applications for arrest warrants in the situation in the State of Palestine (Prosecutor’s Statement’), 20 May 2024, available at <https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-icc-prosecutor-karim-aa-khan-kc-applications-arrest-warrants-situation-state>

¹⁹ The ICC Prosecutor also stated : “Israel has a professional and well-trained military. They have, I know, military advocate generals and a system that is intended to ensure their compliance with international humanitarian law. They have lawyers advising on targeting decisions, and they will be under no misapprehension as to their obligations, or that they must be able to account for their actions.”. See « ICC Prosecutor speaks in Cairo on the situation in Israel and Palestine », at 14 :33, available at : @intlcrimincourt <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DHyxpHiM1KA>

ministers²⁰. Additionally, Israel's Supreme Court has the authority to review and overturn decisions made by the Military Advocate General and the Attorney General, including those related to initiating a criminal investigation, filing criminal charges, determining specific charges, or appealing decisions made by the Military Courts²¹. Regarding the current matter, there is also the stated willingness and practice of evaluating and, if applicable, prosecuting violations of laws of armed conflicts and criminal law²². Israel's record demonstrates the seriousness with which the State of Israel investigates alleged crimes. We cite relevant portions of the recent statement made by Israel Ministry of Justice:

"The Offices of the Attorney General and the State Attorney thoroughly examine all credible allegations of violations of the law by state officials, and enforce the law. Israel's legal system is prepared to examine any credible allegation both with regard to policy and specific incidents."²³

23. Furthermore, Article 54 (3) of the Statute specifically authorizes the ICC prosecutor to establish "arrangements or agreements [...] to facilitate cooperation with a State." Israeli officials were preparing to host ICC officials²⁴. However, the unexpectedly requested arrest warrants made by the Prosecutor, lead to the sudden cancellation of his long-planned evidence-gathering mission in the region. This decision disrupted plans for the Prosecutor and his team to collect on-site evidence for their investigation and allow Israeli officials to present

²⁰ Prof. Yuval Shany, Prof. Amichai Cohen, « In Search of Complementarity: Israel's Possible Responses to ICC Arrest Warrants », The Israel Democracy Institute, July 4 2024, available at : <https://en.idi.org.il/articles/54878>

²¹ See Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *The 2014 Gaza Conflict: Factual and Legal Aspects - The Full Report*, 14 June 2015, para 440, available at : <https://www.gov.il/en/pages/2014-gaza-conflict-factual-and-legal-aspects>

²² Times of Israel, AG, state attorney: 'No foundation' to ICC prosecutor's bid to arrest Israeli leaders, 22 May 2024, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/ag-state-attorney-no-foundation-to-icc-prosecutors-bid-to-arrest-israeli-leaders/>

²³ Statement by Israel Ministry of Justice, May 22 2024, available at : <https://x.com/JusticeGov/status/1793254507758985672>

²⁴ See for example: "In his own statement, "US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the Biden administration "fundamentally rejects" Khan's decision and questioned the legitimacy and credibility of his investigation, noting that the prosecutor had been set to visit Israel shortly to hear its arguments but instead went on TV to announce the charges", Times of Israel, *Biden calls ICC prosecutor's decision to seek arrest warrant for Netanyahu 'outrageous'*, May 20 2024, available at : <https://www.timesofisrael.com/biden-calls-icc-prosecutors-decision-to-seek-arrest-warrant-for-netanyahu-outrageous/>

their response to the allegations²⁵. The Prosecutor would have been able to gain an understanding of the judicial and legal oversight of the war against Hamas and would have discussed Israel's policy on humanitarian aid to Gaza, central to the allegations that Israel is deliberately "starving" Gazans. Canceling the visit and instead filing applications for arrest warrants and conducting media interviews on the same day violated the principle of cooperation which, as noted, is an important principle of the ICC.

24. Cooperation is a guiding principle. Meeting with Israeli officials to better understand the judicial and legal oversight of the conduct of the war against Hamas, including Israeli policy on humanitarian aid to Gaza, would be critical in evaluating the notion of "intentionality" under Article 8 of the Statute at the stage of the Prosecutor's determination as to whether there is reasonable basis to proceed or not. Additionally, conducting a proper and thorough investigation is essential for the determination by the Pre-Trial Chamber as to whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court, thereby issuing an arrest warrant as per Article 58 of the Statute.

25. Another issue pertaining to the pre-emptive and preclusive nature of the application for arrest warrants against Israeli officials by the Prosecutor touches upon admissibility and lies within Article 18 of the Statute, which states that, upon initiation of an investigation, the Prosecutor must notify State parties and States that would typically have jurisdiction over the crimes in question. This notification should "enable the [State] to provide information in relation to its domestic investigations and prosecutions under Article 18(1) of the Statute and demonstrate the degree of mirroring" at the national level²⁶.

²⁵ See "Exclusive: ICC prosecutor opted for warrants over visit to Gaza", Reuters, July 5 2024, available at: <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/icc-prosecutor-opted-warrants-over-visit-gaza-2024-07-05/>

²⁶ ICC-01/21-77 18-07-2023 1/77 PT OA, *Judgment on the appeal of the Republic of the Philippines against Pre-Trial Chamber I's "Authorisation pursuant to Article 18(2) of the Statute to resume the investigation"*, July 18 2023, para. 107.

26. In March 2021, the former Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, sent an Article 18 letter of notification to Israel²⁷. This followed the opening of an investigation in 2021²⁸ covering: the 2014 Gaza conflict (Operation "Protective Edge"); Israel's settlement policy in the West Bank; and the use of lethal force by the IDF during the Gazan 2018-2019 Great March of Return protests. The current war following the Hamas October 7 2023 attack against Israel and its central criminal allegation of a governmental policy of starvation was, therefore, not part of the investigation for which Israel had received notification in 2021. Indeed, this is of a materially different character to the times of crimes which were included in the 2021 Article 18 notification to Israel. Israel was not put "on notice", as is required by the Statute, that this was a potential area that the ICC might investigate²⁹.

27. Given that the Prosecutor is investigating an entirely new set of allegations, he should have sent – but, to our knowledge, did not issue – new Article 18 notification letters to Israel and other States, which would have informed them of the shift in the investigation's focus, nor did he provide an opportunity to Israel and other States to assert Article 18 complementarity.

28. For all the reasons above, we argue that the Prosecutor's filing of applications for warrants of arrest against Israeli officials was pre-emptive and that, by closing off the possibility of pursuing a cooperative approach, it was also preclusive.

29. Lastly, filing arrest warrant applications is prejudicial, creating a misguided, shocking moral equivalence between Israel and Hamas leaders. The act itself of issuing arrest warrants criminalizes Israel, isolating its leaders for condemnation and indictment on the international stage. Drawing a moral equivalence between terrorists – whose stated mission is to exterminate the Jewish People and eliminate Israel – and the leaders of a democratic nation defending itself against an attack is concerning as a matter of credibility of the court.

²⁷ See Reuters, « ICC letter triggering deferral deadline sent to Israel, Palestinians », March 19 2021, available at : <https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN2BB2A8/>

²⁸ *Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, respecting an investigation of the Situation in Palestine*, available, March 3 2021, at : <https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-icc-prosecutor-fatou-bensouda-respecting-investigation-situation-palestine>

²⁹ Prof. Yuval Shany, Prof. Amichai Cohen, « The Prosecutor's Circumvention of Article 18 Complementarity? A Flaw in the ICC's Palestine Investigation », June 1, 2024, available at : <https://www.justsecurity.org/96296/icc-article-18-complementarity/>

30. Second, seeking arrest warrants is prejudicial because it has disrupted negotiations between Israel and the Court. This can only lead to a breakdown in communication and impede potential pathways to cooperation.

31. Third, the inconsistency compared to the Venezuela case is also prejudicial and risks affecting the standing of the Court. In December 2020, the ICC Prosecutor determined there was sufficient evidence to suggest that Venezuela's authoritarian regime of Nicholas Maduro had committed crimes against humanity, including arbitrary detention, torture, rape, and persecution of its citizens. However, in April 2024, after his fourth visit to Venezuela, the Prosecutor announced an agreement for an ICC "technical team" to return to Caracas. Despite Venezuela's authoritarian nature, the Prosecutor pursued cooperation. In contrast, in Israel, a democratic country with an independent press, judiciary, active NGOs, and free elections, the Prosecutor decided to forgo cooperation and instead rush to seek arrest warrants.

32. The Court's mandate, to address the most serious crimes of international concern – if the state under suspicion is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution – is clear. Acting outside this mandate would risk politicizing the Court, thereby eroding its credibility.

CONCLUSION

33. The *amici curiae* trust that these observations will be of assistance to the Pre-Trial Chamber in determining the Prosecutor's Request.

Respectfully submitted:



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Dated this 5 day of August 2024.

At Ottawa, Canada