



Summary of the Judgment and Sentence in the case of *The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi*

Introduction – appearances

1. Trial Chamber VIII of the International Criminal Court hereby delivers a summary of the Chamber's Judgment in the case of *The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi* as to whether Ahmad Al Mahdi is guilty of the crime of intentionally directing attacks against protected objects, alleged to have been committed between 30 June 2012 and 11 July 2012 in Timbuktu, Mali, against 10 sites of a religious and historic character. The judgment is being issued simultaneously in English, French and Arabic. The Chamber underscores that only the written Judgment in English is authoritative.
2. May I ask the parties to introduce themselves.

Summary of Procedural Steps

3. The Chamber will start by briefly recalling the procedural steps that led up to today's hearing.
4. On 18 September 2015, the Single Judge of Pre-Trial Chamber I issued a warrant for Mr Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi's arrest. Mr Al Mahdi was transferred to The Hague on 26 September 2015 and his first appearance took place on 30 September 2015.

5. On 18 February 2016, the parties reached a plea agreement in relation to the charge ('Agreement'): Mr Al Mahdi indicated to the Prosecution that he accepted his responsibility for the crime charged and provided a detailed account of his actions.
6. On 24 March 2016, the Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed the charge.
7. The Chamber was constituted on 2 May 2016 and has since issued 18 decisions and orders and 12 oral decisions. One status conference was held on 24 May 2016 in preparation of the trial. During this status conference, it was decided that, in the event of a conviction, the judgment and sentence in this case would be rendered simultaneously.
8. The trial was held between 22 and 24 August 2016. Mr Al Mahdi made an admission of guilt. All oral submissions relating to the judgment and sentencing were received, and the Prosecution presented the testimony of three witnesses.
9. On the first day of trial, Mr Al Mahdi confirmed that he:
 - (i) Understood the nature of the charge against him, and the consequences of an admission of guilt;
 - (ii) Had made an admission of guilt voluntarily, after sufficient consultation with Defence counsel;
 - (iii) Waived his rights to: (a) plead not guilty and require the Prosecution to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt at a full trial; (b) not confess guilt and to remain silent; (c) raise defences and grounds for excluding criminal responsibility, and to present admissible evidence at a full trial; (d) examine the witnesses against him and to obtain the examination of witnesses on his behalf at a full trial; and (e) appeal a conviction or sentence, provided the sentence is not in excess of the recommended sentencing range; and
 - (iv) Accepted his individual criminal responsibility for the charge, including all modes of liability alleged.

The Accused and the charge

10. The Chamber will now present the Accused and the crime he is charged with.
11. Mr Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, also known as Abu Turab, was born in Agoune in the region of Timbuktu, Mali. He is between 30 and 40 years old and belongs to a family recognised in his community for having a particularly good knowledge of Islam. Having received Koranic education since his childhood, Mr Al Mahdi has a thorough knowledge of the Koran and gave lectures as an expert on religious matters. He joined the armed group known as Ansar Dine in April 2012.
12. Mr Al Mahdi is charged with intentionally directing attacks against 10 buildings of a religious and historical character in Timbuktu, Mali, between around 30 June 2012 and 11 July 2012.

Judgment

13. The Chamber will now recall the context in which the alleged crime was committed.
14. In January 2012, a conflict of non-international character took place in the territory of Mali. In the context of and in relation to that conflict, armed violence took place and led to different armed groups taking control of the north of the country. In early April 2012, following the retreat of Malian armed forces, the groups Ansar Dine and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) took control of Timbuktu. From then until January 2013, Ansar Dine and AQIM imposed their religious and political edicts on the territory of Timbuktu and its people. They did so through a local government, which included an Islamic tribunal, an Islamic police force, a media commission and a morality brigade. This morality brigade was called the *Hesbah*.

15. After living briefly in Algeria, Mr Al Mahdi returned to Mali around the beginning of April to provide support to these armed movements. Mr Al Mahdi was in direct contact with the leaders of Ansar Dine and AQIM, including Iyad Ag Ghaly (the leader of Ansar Dine), Abou Zeid (the 'Governor' of Timbuktu under the armed groups), Yahia Abou Al Hammam (an AQIM chief) and Abdallah Al Chinguetti (a religious scholar within AQIM). Mr Al Mahdi was viewed as an expert on matters of religion, and was consulted in this capacity, including by the Islamic tribunal. Mr Al Mahdi was very active in aspects of the Ansar Dine and AQIM administration.
16. Abou Zeid asked Mr Al Mahdi to lead the *Hesbah*, and he did so from its creation in April 2012 until September 2012. He wrote a document on the role of the *Hesbah* and its objectives, which was then distributed to the other government structures put in place. The *Hesbah* was entrusted with regulating the morality of the people of Timbuktu, and of preventing, suppressing and repressing anything perceived by the occupiers to constitute a visible vice.
17. When the governor of Timbuktu at the time, Abou Zeid, and his collaborators were informed of the practices of the Timbuktu population related to these mausoleums, Mr Al Mahdi was asked to monitor the cemeteries visited by the residents. The objective was to raise awareness amongst the population to stop such practices and, as the case may be, to prohibit them from pursuing them. Mr Al Mahdi did this monitoring for around one month, taking notes on the inhabitants' behaviour at the mausoleums, meeting with local religious leaders and explaining on the radio what could and could not be done at the mausoleums.
18. The mausoleums of saints and mosques of Timbuktu are an integral part of the religious life of its inhabitants. Timbuktu's mausoleums and mosques constitute a common heritage for the community. These mausoleums are frequently visited by the residents – they are places of prayer and, for some, places of pilgrimage.

Destruction of the sites

19. In late June 2012, the leader of Ansar Dine – Ag Ghaly – made the decision to destroy the mausoleums, in consultation with two prominent AQIM members – Al Chinguetti and Al Hammam. Mr Al Mahdi was also consulted by Abou Zeid before this decision was made. Mr Al Mahdi expressed his opinion that all Islamic jurists agree on the prohibition of any construction over a tomb, but recommended not destroying the mausoleums so as to maintain relations between the population and the occupying groups. Nevertheless, Ag Ghaly gave the instruction to proceed to Abou Zeid, who in turn transmitted it to Mr Al Mahdi in his capacity as the chief of the *Hesbah*.
20. Despite his initial reservations, Mr Al Mahdi accepted to conduct the attack without hesitation on receipt of the instruction. He was conscious of the object of the common plan to attack these sites. Mr Al Mahdi wrote a sermon dedicated to the destruction of the mausoleums, which was read at the Friday prayer at the launch of the attack. He personally determined the sequence in which the buildings were to be attacked.
21. The attack itself was carried out between around 30 June 2012 and 11 July 2012. Ten of the most important and well-known sites in Timbuktu were attacked and destroyed by Mr Al Mahdi and other individuals adhering to the same common plan:
- (i) The Sidi Mahamoud Ben Omar Mohamed Aquit Mausoleum, on 30 June 2012: around 60 individuals, in the presence of Mr Al Mahdi and Al Chinguetti, razed the mausoleum to the ground. Armed men ensured the security of those who were actively engaged in destroying the mausoleum.
 - (ii) The Sheikh Mohamed Mahmoud Al Arawani Mausoleum on 30 June 2012; it was also destroyed.

- (iii) The Sheikh Sidi El Mokhtar Ben Sidi Mouhammad Al Kabir Al Kounti Mausoleum, located in the Sidi El Mokhtar Cemetery and visited by pilgrims from Mali and elsewhere, on 30 June 2012. Mr Al Mahdi supervised the destruction and gave instructions, along with tools, to the attackers.
- (iv) The Alpha Moya Mausoleum, located in the Alpha Moya Cemetery and visited in order to pray and make offerings, on 30 June 2012. Mr Al Mahdi directly participated and Abu Zeid also visited the site around the time of the attack. As previously, there was a security cordon of 30 combatants protecting those who engaged in the destruction.
- (v) The Sheikh Mouhamad El Mikki Mausoleum, a place of spiritual retreat and reflection, located in the Three Saints Cemetery, on the following day, 1 July 2012. The mausoleum was completely destroyed.
- (vi) The Sheikh Abdoul Kassim Attouaty Mausoleum, located in the Three Saints Cemetery and built in the sixteenth century, on 1 July 2012.
- (vii) The Sheikh Sidi Ahmed Ben Amar Arragadi Mausoleum, located in the Three Saints Cemetery on 1 July 2012. Mr Al Mahdi physically participated in the attack, which completely destroyed the mausoleum.
- (viii) The door of the Sidi Yahia Mosque on 2 July 2012. Legend had it that this door had not been opened for 500 years and that opening it would lead to the Last Judgment. Al Chinguetti told Al Mahdi that the door had to be opened, and both went to the site with pickaxes that Mr Al Mahdi bought with *Hesbah* funds. Mr Al Mahdi explained the destruction to journalists while it was taking place.
- (ix) and (x) The two mausoleums adjoining the Djingareyber Mosque (especially visited on Mondays and Fridays and for important religious celebrations), on or around 10-11 July 2012. Al Chinguetti asked Mr Al Mahdi to destroy the mausoleums, who agreed and oversaw the attack. Mr Al Mahdi physically took part in the destruction, and

decided at one point that a bulldozer should be used. When the attackers were clearing the rubble towards the end of the acts of destruction, Abu Zeid and Al Chinguetti, among others, came to provide and demonstrate their support at the site. The mausoleums destroyed were the Ahmed Fulane Mausoleum and the Bahaber Babadié Mausoleum.

22. All these sites were dedicated to religion and historic monuments, and were not military objectives. With the exception of the Sheikh Mohamed Mahmoud Al Arawani Mausoleum, all these buildings had the status of protected UNESCO World Heritage sites.

Role of Mr Al Mahdi

23. In respect of the role of Mr Al Mahdi, the Chamber finds that he knew that he exercised joint control over the attack and was fully implicated in its execution. He contributed to the attack in the following ways:

- (i) he supervised the execution of the operations, using his men from the *Hesbah* and overseeing the other attackers who came to participate in the operations;
- (ii) he collected, bought and distributed the necessary tools/means in order to successfully carry out the attack;
- (iii) he was present at all of the attack sites, giving instructions and moral support;
- (iv) he personally participated in the attack that led to the destruction of at least five sites: (a) the Alpha Moya Mausoleum; (b) the Sheikh Sidi Ahmed Ben Amar Arragadi Mausoleum; (c) the door of the Sidi Yahia Mosque; (d) the Ahmed Fulane Mausoleum and (e) the Bahaber Babadié Mausoleum; and

- (v) he was responsible – having been designated by Al Chinguetti – for communicating with journalists to explain and justify the attack.

Conclusion of the Chamber

- 24. On the basis of the Accused's statements in open court and the Agreement he signed with the Prosecution, the Chamber is satisfied that the Accused understands the nature and consequences of the admission of guilt and that the admission was voluntarily made after sufficient consultation with Defence counsel. The Chamber is also satisfied that the admission of guilt is supported by the facts of the case.
- 25. The Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that the admission of guilt, together with the additional evidence presented, satisfies the essential facts to prove the crime of attacking protected objects under Article 8(2)(e)(iv).
- 26. The Chamber considers that Mr Al Mahdi's contributions collectively qualify as an essential contribution with the resulting power to frustrate the commission of the crime: Mr Al Mahdi was the head of the *Hesbah*, one of four primary institutions established by Ansar Dine and AQIM upon occupying Timbuktu. He had overall responsibility for the execution phase of the attack, determining the sequence in which the buildings would be destroyed, making the necessary logistical arrangements and justifying the attack to the broader world through media interviews. Mr Al Mahdi personally oversaw the attack itself – he was present at all of the attack sites and directly participated in the destruction of five of the protected mausoleums and mosques.
- 27. The Chamber is also satisfied that Mr Al Mahdi's contributions were made pursuant to an agreement with others which led to the commission of the crimes. This is evidenced by: (i) Mr Al Mahdi's role in the Ansar Dine leadership; (ii) the effective decision taken by Mr Ag Ghaly and other members of the leadership to attack the mausoleums/mosques; (iii) Mr Al

Mahdi's sermon on destroying the buildings immediately before the attack; (iv) Mr Al Mahdi's choice of the sequence in which the buildings would be destroyed and (v) the coordinated and deliberate manner in which the attack was carried out.

28. Noting Mr Al Mahdi's direct participation in many incidents and his role as media spokesperson in justifying the attack, the Chamber is also satisfied that Mr Al Mahdi personally meets the subjective elements of the crimes.

29. For these reasons, the Chamber considers all the elements of Article 25(3)(a) co-perpetration to be established.

30. Accordingly, the Chamber unanimously finds that Mr Al Mahdi is guilty, within the meaning of Article 25(3)(a), of the crime of attacking the protected sites mentioned earlier as a war crime under Article 8(2)(e)(iv).

31. With regard to the other modes of liability confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber, namely: (i) Article 25(3)(b) (soliciting and inducing); (ii) Article 25(3)(c) (aiding and abetting) and (iii) Article 25(3)(d) (contributing in any other way), and all accepted by Mr Al Mahdi, the Chamber makes the following conclusions:

32. The Appeals Chamber has noted that the Statute differentiates between principal (Article 25(3)(a)) and accessory (Article 25(3)(b)-(d)) liability, with principals bearing more blameworthiness 'generally speaking and all other things being equal'. In accordance with this general rule, given that the Chamber has decided that all the elements of co-perpetration are met there is no need to make any further findings on the accessory liability alternatives.

33. The Chamber further notes that the Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed Article 25(3)(a) direct perpetration for the five buildings where Mr Al Mahdi personally participated in the destruction. On the basis of the analysis above, and noting that Article 8(2)(e)(iv) of the Statute criminalises the act of

directing a specific kind of attack irrespective of whether the buildings in question are destroyed, the Chamber considers that Mr Al Mahdi satisfies all the elements for both direct perpetration and co-perpetration.

34. As also submitted by the Prosecution, the Chamber notes that Mr Al Mahdi oversaw the entire attack against all 10 buildings, and that co-perpetration encapsulates not only his physical participation but also his position of authority in relation to the crimes committed. The Chamber finds that attacking all 10 mausoleums/mosques as a co-perpetrator best reflects Mr Al Mahdi's criminal responsibility. On this finding, Mr Al Mahdi's direct participation in relation to five of the attacks supports the Chamber's conclusions that he made an essential contribution to the crimes charged pursuant to a joint criminal plan.

Sentence

35. Having concluded that Mr Al Mahdi is responsible for intentionally attacking the above-mentioned protected objects as a co-perpetrator, the Chamber will now read the summary of the reasoning followed for the determination of the appropriate sentence. In doing so, the Chamber has considered the gravity of the crime as well as whether or not mitigating or aggravating circumstances exist.

Gravity

36. With regard to the gravity requirement, the Chamber first notes that, unlike other accused convicted by this Court, Mr Al Mahdi is not charged with crimes against persons but with a crime against property. In the view of the Chamber, even if inherently grave, crimes against property are generally of lesser gravity than crimes against persons.

37. With regard to the extent of the damage caused, the Chamber recalls that most of the 10 sites were completely destroyed. Moreover, the attack was carefully planned and lasted approximately 10 days. Additionally, the impact of the attack on the population was heightened by the fact that it was relayed in the media. The Chamber also notes the testimony of P-431 (a Malian expert in cultural matters) and P-151 (a UNESCO witness), who explained that Timbuktu was an emblematic city with a mythical dimension and that it played a crucial role in the expansion of Islam in the region. Timbuktu is at the heart of Mali's cultural heritage, in particular thanks to its manuscripts and to the mausoleums of the saints. The mausoleums reflected part of Timbuktu's history and its role in the expansion of Islam. They were of great importance of the people to Timbuktu, who admired them and were attached to them. They reflected their commitment to Islam and played a psychological role to the extent that they were perceived as protecting the people of Timbuktu. P-151 also described how the people of Timbuktu were collectively ensuring that the mausoleums remained in good condition in the course of symbolic maintenance events involving all the entire community – women and elderly and young people. The mausoleums were among the most cherished buildings of the city and they were visited by the inhabitants of the city, who used them as a place for prayer while some used them as pilgrimage locations.

38. Thus, the Chamber considers that the fact that the targeted buildings were not only religious buildings but had also a symbolic and emotional value for the inhabitants of Timbuktu is relevant in assessing the gravity of the crime committed.

39. Furthermore, all the sites but one (the Sheikh Mohamed Mahmoud Al Arawani Mausoleum) were UNESCO World Heritage sites and, as such, their attack appears to be of particular gravity as their destruction does not only affect the direct victims of the crimes, namely the faithful and inhabitants of

Timbuktu, but also people throughout Mali and the international community. The Chamber notes the testimony of P-431, who indicated that the people of Timbuktu protested against the destruction and refused to see the mausoleums razed to the ground. The witness testified that destroying the mausoleums, to which the people of Timbuktu had an emotional attachment, was a war activity aimed at breaking the soul of the people of Timbuktu. In general, the population of Mali, who considered Timbuktu as a source of pride, were indignant to see these acts take place. Moreover, P-151 described how the entire international community, in the belief that heritage is part of cultural life, is suffering as a result of the destruction of the protected sites.

40. Lastly, the Chamber notes that the crime was committed for religious motives. Indeed, during the period they ruled over the territory of Timbuktu, Ansar Dine and AQIM took measures to impose their religious edicts on the population. The creation of the *Hesbah*, which was headed by Mr Al Mahdi, was meant precisely to eradicate any visible vice it identified in Timbuktu. Furthermore, when the leaders of Ansar Dine discovered the practices of the inhabitants of Timbuktu, they led a campaign explaining what should and should not be done with the mausoleums. In the end they decided to destroy the sites in order to stop these prohibited practices. The Chamber considers that the discriminatory religious motive invoked for the destruction of the sites is undoubtedly relevant in its assessment of the gravity of the crime.
41. The Chamber concludes that the crime for which Mr Al Mahdi is convicted is of significant gravity.

Mr Al Mahdi's culpable conduct

42. The Chamber then considered Mr Al Mahdi's culpable conduct. In doing so, the Chamber considered Mr Al Mahdi's degree of participation, his degree of intent and, to a certain extent, the means employed to execute the crime.
43. The Chamber notes that Mr Al Mahdi played an essential role in the execution of the attack. As the head of the *Hesbah*, he was charged with executing the common plan. He organised all the logistics of the attack, oversaw the entire operation, supervised its execution, decided in which order the sites should be destroyed, collected and distributed the necessary tools, provided logistical and moral support to the direct perpetrators and supervised them, and was present at every site.
44. In relation to Mr Al Mahdi's intent, the Chamber notes that, in addition to attending the destruction of each site, Mr Al Mahdi personally participated in the destruction of at least five of the sites. Moreover, he justified the necessity of the attack by writing a sermon that was read before the attack and by giving public speeches as the destructions were occurring.
45. The Chamber did not find any aggravating circumstances.
46. In this regard, the Chamber is not convinced by the Prosecution's submission that Mr Al Mahdi abused his power and official capacity as head of the *Hesbah* and that this is an aggravating circumstance. Indeed, in line with the Appeals Chamber's jurisprudence, the Chamber considers that the mere fact that Mr Al Mahdi committed the crime in this position does not as such constitute an aggravating circumstance. Furthermore, in his capacity as head of the *Hesbah*, Mr Al Mahdi initially advised against the destruction of the sites.
47. In relation to the Prosecution's argument that the fact that the crime affected multiple victims is an aggravating circumstance, the Chamber has already taken into account the far-reaching impact of the crime committed by Mr Al

Mahdi in its assessment of the gravity of the crime and cannot therefore consider it as an aggravating circumstance.

48. Similarly, the Chamber has already considered the religious nature of the attack as part of its assessment of the gravity. Accordingly it cannot be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
49. In relation to Mr Al Mahdi's culpable conduct, the Chamber has found two mitigating circumstances, namely his reluctance to commit the crime and the means of execution employed to commit it.
50. The Chamber notes that, despite accepting the decision to destroy the sites and his full implication in its commission, Mr Al Mahdi was initially reluctant to destroy them. The Chamber finds that this reluctance is of some relevance for the determination of the sentence and attaches weight to it.
51. The Chamber clarifies that, contrary to the Defence's submissions, the fact that Mr Al Mahdi committed the crime as part as an organised group, does not constitute a mitigating circumstance. The Chamber recalls that, once the decision to destroy the sites had been taken by other members of the group, Mr Al Mahdi fully endorsed it and he was fully implicated in the execution of the attack.
52. Furthermore, the Chamber notes that, except for the destruction at the Djingareyber Mosque, for which he recommended that a bulldozer be used, Mr Al Mahdi advised against using a bulldozer at all of the other sites so as not to damage the graves next to the mausoleums and made sure that the attackers showed respect for the constructions next to the mausoleum while carrying out the attack.
53. With regard to Mr Al Mahdi's lack of preparation for assuming responsibilities as head of the *Hesbah*, alleged by the Defence, the Chamber notes that the Defence did not make any effort to support this argument and therefore rejects it.

54. In sum, the Chamber considers that Mr Al Mahdi's initial reluctance to destroy the sites, as well as his recommendation not to use a bulldozer, do constitute mitigating circumstances.

Mr Al Mahdi's individual circumstances

55. Turning now to Mr Al Mahdi's individual circumstances, the Chamber does not consider that Mr Al Mahdi's age and economic background are of relevance. Furthermore, an absence of prior convictions is a fairly common feature among individuals convicted by international tribunals and shall not, contrary to Defence's submission, be counted as a relevant mitigating circumstance. Additionally, the Chamber does not intend to give any weight, be it aggravating or mitigating, to the fact that Mr Al Mahdi was a scholar and expert in religious matters, irrespective of the evidence of his positive role in his community before the take-over of the city by Ansar Dine.

56. Despite serious security concerns for his family, whom he has not seen since his transfer to the Court, Mr Al Mahdi has been behaving in an irreproachable manner in detention and made a statement stating his appreciation of the manner in which he had been treated by the Court as a whole. The Chamber considers that this factor is relevant, despite it being a legitimate expectation of any detainee, and attributes limited weight to it. Similarly, the Chamber accepts the Defence's arguments that Mr Al Mahdi's admission of guilt and cooperation with the Prosecution, as discussed further below, show that he is likely to successfully reintegrate into society and accords a limited weight to them.

57. More importantly, the Chamber notes that Mr Al Mahdi admitted his guilt. The Chamber further observes that Mr Al Mahdi took responsibility for his actions as early as the first day of his interviews with the Prosecution. Subsequently, the parties reached an agreement sufficiently early in the

proceedings, namely before the confirmation of charges, to help substantially speed up the proceedings.

58. Additionally, not only did Mr Al Mahdi accept his responsibility but he also provided a detailed account of his actions, facilitating the Chamber's establishment of the facts of the case.

59. The Chamber considers that an admission of guilt is undoubtedly a mitigating circumstance and gives it substantial weight. In this regard, the Chamber notes that the admission was made early, fully and appears to be genuine, led by the real desire to take responsibility for the acts he committed and showing honest repentance. This admission of guilt undoubtedly contributed to the rapid resolution of this case, thus saving the Court's time and resources and relieving witnesses and victims of what can be a stressful burden of giving evidence in Court. Moreover, this admission may also further peace and reconciliation in Northern Mali by alleviating the victims' moral suffering through acknowledgement of the significance of the destruction. Lastly, such an admission may have a deterrent effect on others tempted to commit similar acts in Mali and elsewhere. This said, the Chamber notes that this admission is made against a backdrop of overwhelming evidence pointing to Mr Al Mahdi's guilt.

60. In addition to admitting his guilt in full, Mr Al Mahdi has been cooperating with the Prosecution substantially, as detailed at length by witness P-182. The Chamber notes that this cooperation has been spontaneous and started as early as the first day of his interviews. Mr Al Mahdi responded in an honest manner and his cooperation enabled the Prosecution to corroborate, clarify and specify information it already had in its possession. During his interviews with the Prosecution, Mr Al Mahdi did not show any reluctance in touching upon his own acts.

61. The Chamber is also mindful of the fact that Mr Al Mahdi has cooperated despite being fully aware that his cooperation with the Prosecution increased

the security profile of his family. Accordingly, the Chamber considers that Mr Al Mahdi's substantial cooperation with the Prosecution is an important factor going to the mitigation of the sentence to be imposed.

62. The Chamber notes that, as early as the first day of trial, Mr Al Mahdi expressed genuine remorse for his acts. The Chamber notes that Mr Al Mahdi has expressed his 'deep regret and great pain'. He insisted that the remorse he was feeling was for the damage caused to his family, his community in Timbuktu, his country and the international community. Not only did Mr Al Mahdi categorically express his remorse, he made the solemn promise that 'this was the first and the last wrongful act [he] will ever commit'. Mr Al Mahdi also indicated that he was willing to 'accept the judgment of the Chamber'. Lastly, Mr Al Mahdi called on people not to become involved in the same acts that he was involved in 'because they are not going to lead to any good for humanity'.

63. In addition to expressing remorse, and contrary to the submission of the LRV, the Chamber does note that Mr Al Mahdi has expressed sentiments of empathy towards the victims of the crime he committed. The Chamber refers to the example of actions showing this empathy cited by the Defence, such as Mr Al Mahdi's offer to the imam of the Sidi Yahia Mosque to reimburse the cost of the door.

64. The Chamber considers that such expression of remorse and empathy to the victims is a substantial factor going to the mitigation of the sentence.

Determination of the sentence

65. The Chamber has balanced all these factors to determine the appropriate sentence. It has taken into account the mitigating circumstances found, and considered the circumstances both of the convicted person and the crime. In order to sufficiently and adequately reflect the moral and economic harm

suffered by the victims of the present case and fulfil the objectives of sentencing, the Chamber has imposed a sentence that is proportionate to the gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances and culpability of Mr Al Mahdi.

66. In its written submissions, Prosecution submitted that Mr Al Mahdi's sentence should be between nine and eleven years. The Defence made extensive submissions on the adequate assessment of the gravity of the crime charged, the absence of aggravating circumstances and the importance of the mitigating circumstances in this case. The LRV requested that the sentence handed down on Mr Al Mahdi be severe and exemplary.

67. Mr Aouini, the Court will now ask the defendant to rise. Would the Accused please rise.

68. Mr Al Mahdi, the crime which you have been convicted of is of significant gravity. This said, the Chamber has found no aggravating circumstances and five mitigating circumstances, namely: (i) your admission of guilt; (ii) your cooperation with the Prosecution; (iii) the remorse and the empathy you expressed for the victims; (iv) your initial reluctance to commit the crime and the steps you took to limit the damage caused; and, (v) even if of limited importance, your good behaviour in detention despite your family situation. Taking into account all these factors, the Chamber, unanimously, sentences you to 9 years of imprisonment.

69. In accordance with the Appeals Chamber's jurisprudence, the time you have spent in detention in accordance with an order of this Court, namely since your arrest pursuant to the warrant issued on 18 September 2015, shall be deducted from the sentence.

70. Mr Al Mahdi, you may sit down.

71. The Chamber thanks all the parties and participants, as well as all the staff from the Registry for their tireless efforts to make these hearings possible. The Chamber wishes to convey a special thanks to the translators, who greatly

assisted the Chamber to make it possible to issue the Judgment and Sentence in English, French and Arabic simultaneously.

72. This concludes today's hearing.